On the face of it Brexit appears likely to pull Scotland in a direction that it does not want to go. But could Brexit actually create the conditions for a solution that leaves most people happy enough, and does not leave the other side resentful? Jim Gallagher suggests that this is a possibility. The return of powers from Brussels not only to Whitehall, but also the devolved governments, presents an opportunity to move towards a confederal constitution that could satisfy the demands of people in all parts of the Union.
The absence of a coherent strategy for getting the UK out of Europe is becoming increasingly clear. Brexit is construed ever more narrowly as simply a bid for independence, a search for sovereignty (not parliamentary sovereignty, it seems, as parliament will have no say in triggering the negotiations leading to the UK’s departure). This tells us something about referendums as a decision-making device, and points to what a bad idea Brexit as a pretext for another Scottish independence referendum is. But, paradoxically, the government’s post-Brexit destination might just offer the chance of a more constructive resolution for Scottish-UK relations.
It is increasingly clear that Brexit was a nationalist referendum. Both sides would be insulted by the comparison, but Messrs Johnson and Gove spent the campaign singing the same tune as Alex Salmond. Both claimed to be positive, but were essentially negative. They were telling people to vote against a union – European or British. But voting against something is writing a blank cheque for something else. And if you write a blank cheque, somebody else fills it in.
In Whitehall today, the three Brexit ministers can’t agree how to fill that cheque in. That’s hardly surprising, since their pre-referendum promises were inconsistent: we are not going to get the single market without free movement of labour. This shows the first big problem with the referendum as a device. If people vote against something, there is no saying what they will get instead, and when the campaigners aren’t in a position to deliver their promises, the outcome will probably be something the population don’t actually want. Chances are, had it been offered them in terms, a majority of voters would have rejected the Brexit deal we are about to get.
In the wake of the EU referendum result there has been much discussion about the possibility of Scotland and Northern Ireland preserving closer relationships with the EU than the UK as a whole. Brian Walker writes that the idea that Scotland and Northern Ireland could be exempted from Brexit lacks credibility, but that demands for some sort of continuing relationship with the EU should be examined closely. Failure to take these suggestions seriously could have significant implications for the future of the British Union.
No one can have been surprised that fundamental political fault lines opened up again in the shock of the Brexit referendum result. As the Westminster government struggle to find a platform to stand on to trigger Article 50, in Scotland the issues are being treated with considerable caution and in Ireland with something close to despair. Viewed from Westminster, each is still a sideshow because a brutal binary choice between the continuing UK and continuing membership of the EU is one they are not ready to face. Indeed, since the referendum polling in favour of fundamental constitutional change has barely shifted. In Scotland support for independence still scores a few notches under 50 per cent, well short of the SNP’s target of 60 per cent for calling a second independence referendum. In Northern Ireland, while Sinn Féin promptly called for a border poll, an Ipsos MORI opinion survey for the BBC released published in early September found 63 per cent in favour of the continuing UK, only two points below a similar survey three years ago, with a resounding 83 per cent claiming the Brexit result did not affect their opinion.
But it would be a mistake to believe that in the end the Scots and all kinds of Irish will tag along behind England’s lead. New thinking is emerging that might allow the ‘nations’ to preserve relationships with the EU which are compatible with an increasingly devolving UK that has severed its main institutional links with the EU at the centre.
Constitutionally, the argument that their Remain majorities might win Scotland and Northern Ireland straight exemptions from the overall referendum result tout court lacks credibility. The ‘reverse Greenland model’ has its attractions but the difference in scale and complexity with the British Isles makes it difficult to follow beyond the basic notion.
In a paper published this week by Nuffield College, Oxford Jim Gallagher argues that in responding to June’s Brexit vote the UK and Scottish governments must proceed rationally, on the basis of the evidence, and pursue the national interest. They should not feel bound by the Leave campaign’s promises and should seek to stay in, or as close as possible to, the single market. The paper is summarised here.
In an attempt to unite the Tory party David Cameron has split the country. He has left the governments of the UK with a shambles to clear up. It is not at all easy to see a path through the rubble, but if governments focus on the things that really matter – the economy, the territorial integrity of the UK – then perhaps they will be able to discern a way forward.
The first thing they need to do is understand the nature of the vote. Just like the vote in the Scottish referendum, it was as much a cry of distress as a political statement. Like the Leave campaign, the Leave vote is more protest than proposal. Of course, there are those in the UK who are ideologically opposed to Europe, but what got leave over the line in the referendum were the votes of the politically alienated and economically distressed. The present setup, economic or constitutional, is not working for them, and they were led to believe (by a notably mendacious campaign) that leaving the EU would solve their problems. Those who thought things couldn’t get any worse for them were not put off by George Osborne’s warnings about risk.
In that sense voters are like students – they give the answer to the question they would have liked the examiner to ask. But in this referendum, it was the question setters who failed.
The shockwaves from Thursday’s earthquake continue to reverberate through the political landscape. The Prime Minister has been toppled, and the existing differences between the UK’s four nations threaten to widen into serious rifts. In particular, the place of Scotland in the UK – supposedly settled for a generation two years ago – is again in question. Akash Paun explains.
Every single local authority area in Scotland voted Remain. Meanwhile, with the exception of London, every region in England voted Leave, as did Wales. Northern Ireland voted narrowly to remain, but with a large minority, mainly from the unionist community, opting for Leave, in line with the preference of Northern Ireland’s unionist First Minister.
The outcome flipped the pattern of the 1975 European Economic Community (EEC) referendum, when England was the most pro-Europe of the four nations, while Scotland and Northern Ireland were more sceptical about the European project. On that occasion, though, EEC membership was supported by a majority in each of the four nations, and a total of two-thirds of all UK voters, so there was no sense in which the outcome was being imposed against the will of any part of the UK.
The situation today is very different and territorial tensions are running high. Nicola Sturgeon, Scottish First Minister, has already announced that a second referendum on Scotland’s independence is now ‘on the table’ – although Westminster’s agreement would be needed for any such poll. The SNP would only be likely to want to hold such a poll if it was confident of victory – not a given, even in the context of Brexit. But placing the issue back on the table will concentrate minds in Westminster.
The differing referendum results in the UK’s component parts have led to immediate speculation about a second independence referendum in Scotland and a border poll in Northern Ireland. Robert Hazell assesses the situation.
Scotland (by 62–38) and Northern Ireland (by 56–44) voted to remain in the EU, but were outvoted by England and Wales. This has led to immediate speculation that there might be a second independence referendum in Scotland, and a border poll in Northern Ireland to seek re-unification with the south. Scotland’s First Minister Nicola Sturgeon has said that a second independence referendum is ‘highly likely’, and Northern Ireland’s Deputy First Minister Martin McGuinness has (not for the first time) called for a border poll. How likely is it that a referendum to leave the UK might be held in Scotland, or Northern Ireland; and how likely is it that such a referendum would be carried?
In both countries the two questions are closely connected. Having lost the 2014 independence referendum, Nicola Sturgeon is not going to call for another one unless she is confident that next time it can be won. She is likely to wait until the polls consistently show support of 60 per cent or more for several months. Since September 2014 the polls have suggested that Scotland is divided more or less 50–50, when Scots are asked if they would support independence now. It might be expected that Brexit would give a boost to support for independence, but our Brexit devolution seminar on 19 May suggested several reasons why that might not be the case.
The UK has voted to leave the European Union. So what happens next? How, in practical terms, will Brexit actually happen? Alan Renwick explored some key elements of the withdrawal process before the referendum campaign began. Here, he gives a point-by-point overview of what the road to Brexit will look like. This is an updated version of a post published on 20 June, which is available here.
The effect of the referendum
1. The UK remains a member of the EU for the time being. In purely legal terms, the referendum result has no effect at all: the vote was advisory, so, in principle, the government could have chosen to ignore it. In political terms, however, ministers could never have countenanced that. The Prime Minister has said that voters’ will ‘must be respected’ and indicated the start of a process of withdrawal. We should presume that the vote to leave means that we will indeed leave (see point 16) – though there is scope for various complications along the way.
2. The immediate effects of the result are political rather than legal: the Prime Minister has announced his resignation, and a motion of no confidence has been submitted in Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn. There was speculation before the referendum that David Cameron would be out of Downing Street within days after a vote for Brexit, but his decision to stay until his successor has been elected reflects much more than just personal preference. The Cabinet Manual is clear (at paragraph 2.10) that he cannot go until he can advise the Queen on who should form the new government. Conservative party rules set out a two-stage leadership election process: first, the parliamentary party, through successive ballots, whittles the field down to two candidates; then the party membership, by postal ballot, chooses between these. Recent experience suggests this would take two to three months.
As the referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU draws closer, the result is impossible to predict. Many are asking what, in practical terms, would happen if we vote for Brexit. Alan Renwick explored some key elements of the withdrawal process before the referendum campaign began. Here, he gives a point-by-point overview of what the road to Brexit might look like.
**An updated version of this post was published on 24 June in light of the referendum result**
The effect of the referendum
1. We will not immediately leave the EU if the result on 24 June shows a majority for Brexit. Indeed, in purely legal terms, the referendum result has no effect at all: the vote is advisory, so, in principle, the government could choose to ignore it. In political terms, however, ministers could not do that. We should presume that a vote to leave means that we will leave (see point 16) – though there is scope for various complications along the way.
2. The Prime Minister would very likely announce his resignation quickly, but would stay in post until his successor was chosen. There is much speculation that David Cameron would be out of Downing Street within days, and it is true that his position would probably become untenable. But the Cabinet Manual is clear (at paragraph 2.10) that he cannot go until he can advise the Queen on who should form the new government. Conservative party rules set out a two-stage leadership election process: first, the parliamentary party, through successive ballots, whittles the field down to two candidates; then the party membership, by postal ballot, chooses between these. Recent experience suggests this would take two to three months.