Tag Archives: Scotland

Devolution in the 2024 party manifestos 

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The parties contesting the general election have now published their manifestos, allowing exploration and comparison of their constitutional proposals. In this fourth post in a series on the manifestos, Patrick Thomas examines the commitments on devolution, and considers what these might mean for the future of the UK. 

It has now been a quarter of a century since the devolved institutions in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales were established. Twenty-five years on, devolution remains a live issue in all but one of the 2024 manifestos. But this inclusion of the constitutional questions around devolution is where the commonalities largely stop.  

The 2024 manifestos present four different visions and approaches in the area of devolution. The Conservative Party displays a hesitancy and even hostility towards devolution, and an instinctive desire to assert Westminster power. The Labour Party, on the other hand, clearly likes the system it created in 1998 and so sets out a vision for reasserting the status quo. The Liberal Democrats seek to take devolution much further, by making the UK a federal state. And the Scottish National Party and Plaid Cymru share a vision of ever greater devolution, at least partly in hope that it will further their end goal of independence from the UK. Two other manifestos do not present a vision for devolution, but in very different ways. The Green Party manifesto acknowledges the importance of devolution but seeks to stay out of the debate, while supporting freedom of choice. Reform UK, on the other hand, simply ignores devolution entirely. 

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The 2019 Conservative Party manifesto: were its pledges on the constitution delivered? 

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The 2019 Conservative Party manifesto contained a number of constitutional policy commitments – on Brexit, UK institutions, elections, civil liberties, and devolution. As the manifestos for this year’s general election emerge, Lisa James assesses the delivery record of the 2019–24 Conservative governments against the pledges made in 2019. 

The 2019 Conservative Party manifesto contained a wide-ranging set of constitutional commitments. Since its publication much has changed – the UK has left the EU, experienced a global pandemic, and had three Prime Ministers and five Chancellors of the Exchequer. But delivery against manifesto commitments still matters, so with the 2019–24 parliament dissolved, now is the time to reassess the pledges that were made. 

Getting Brexit done 

The single highest profile – and titular – pledge of the manifesto was of course the promise to ‘get Brexit done’. The election followed a period of parliamentary deadlock, and the negotiation of Boris Johnson’s Brexit deal. The manifesto pledged to pass this deal, limit the length of the ‘transition period’ for negotiating new trade arrangements, end the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) over the UK, and end the supremacy of EU law. 

The Brexit deal was rapidly passed following the Conservative general election victory, and the UK left the EU on 31 January 2020. The pledge not to extend the transition period beyond the end of 2020 was also kept. The deal largely removed ECJ jurisdiction from the UK, but the court retained a continuing role in relation to Northern Ireland as a result of its treatment under Johnson’s Brexit deal (discussed further below). The supremacy of retained EU law (a special category of legislation derived from the UK’s EU membership) was ended by the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act 2023. 

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In praise of fixed-term parliaments

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The surprise general election may leave many suddenly nostalgic for the principle of fixed-term parliaments. The original central arguments for fixed terms have been reawakened. In this post, Meg Russell and Robert Hazell revisit these long-standing arguments, summarise the birth and death of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011, and argue that – on the basis of UK and international experience – we should consider returning Westminster to fixed terms. 

The lengthy and debilitating speculation about when Rishi Sunak might call the general election may have reminded many of the arguments in favour of fixed-term parliaments. His shock announcement on 22 May that such an election would take place in July only reinforces those views. This blog post revisits the arguments for fixed terms, reminds readers of how the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 (FTPA) was created and abolished, and argues for reintroduction of the principle of fixed terms – albeit with flexibility to allow early elections on occasion, as applies in many other democracies (and existed under the FTPA). 

The arguments for fixed-term parliaments 

The following is a summary of points in favour of the principle of fixed-term parliaments: 

  • Allowing the government to decide the timing of elections provides an unjustified incumbency advantage. 
  • It also confers disproportionate power on the executive over parliament. 
  • A fixed election cycle is better for both civil service and electoral administration planning, and encourages more long-term thinking in government. 
  • Fixed terms are also better for political parties, prospective parliamentary candidates, and the regulation of election spending. 
  • Speculation about an early election may unnecessarily unsettle commercial and economic decisions. 
  • Parliamentary business, including the work of select committees, can be planned and carried through with less risk of interruption.  

These are not our words; they are drawn (mostly verbatim) from the report of the cross-party parliamentary Joint Committee on the Fixed-term Parliaments Act (paragraph 17), published in March 2021. Based on recent experience, some of them may now feel very familiar. 

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The new voting system for mayors and PCCs: how it affects democracy

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This month’s elections for mayors and police and crime commissioners were contested under a revised voting system. In a post published yesterday, Alan Renwick found that this change had a substantial impact on the results, to the benefit of the Conservatives. Here, he concludes that it also harmed democracy. 

Elections of mayors and police and crime commissioners (PCCs) were previously held under the Supplementary Vote (SV) system, where each voter could express first and second preferences. Now they take place using First Past the Post (FPTP), where there is a vote for a single candidate. The previous post in this series showed that this change produced a marked shift in the outcome of the elections held earlier this month, and that it did so entirely to the benefit of the Conservatives.  

That a change in the rules should favour those in power who instigated it is already cause for concern: democracy requires a level playing field. But ministers might defend the reform on the basis that the new system is superior on democratic grounds to its predecessor and that it was introduced fairly. Both of these claims therefore require interrogation. How do the two systems compare in terms of democratic quality? And was the process through which the change in voting system came about appropriate?  

Which voting system is more democratic? 

As I outlined in a blogpost published when the bill changing the voting system was before parliament in 2021, ministers argued that FPTP is the more democratic system: SV, they said, allows losing candidates – those coming second in terms of first preferences – to win. But this argument is circular: it works only if we have already accepted the FPTP definitions of ‘winner’ and ‘loser’.  

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Public appointments: what are they, and why do they matter?

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This is the first edition of this briefing. It has since been updated. Read the most up-to-date version and other briefings on the Constitution Unit’s website.

Public appointments – senior appointments made by ministers to various public service roles – are vital to the working of government, but some have attracted controversy in recent years. Lisa James explains how public appointments work, and how they might be reformed.

Background

Public appointments – various senior appointments made by ministers to public bodies – can have a major impact on how well the public sector operates. Though the system often works smoothly, recent years have seen some high-profile controversies linked to public appointments, notably those surrounding Paul Dacre’s application to be chair of Ofcom, and the appointment of Richard Sharp as chair of the BBC. These and other cases have raised questions about whether the system now needs additional safeguards.

Why do public appointments matter?

These appointments include senior roles across a wide range of public bodies – including delivery or policy advisory bodies, regulators and funders, as well as departmental non-executive directors. They also include individual roles (for example, commissioners for victims, further education, or children).

The holders of public appointments can therefore have a major impact on the successful delivery of policy and services. A well-functioning public appointments process, which can engage and deliver the best candidates, matters for the quality of governance. This is demonstrated in countries where control over appointments has allowed backsliding leaders (i.e. those who seek to erode democracy) to install allies in key positions.

Given that the holders of public appointments are so important to the working of government, ministers understandably want to be confident that these posts are held by people who are in sympathy with their aims and approach. But it is important for public trust – and successful delivery – that appointments are also made on merit, and cronyism or patronage is guarded against.

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