Should we codify the royal prerogative?

com.google.Chrome.vxw6lk.jpgThe recent controversy about the unlawful attempt to prorogue parliament and the judicial review that followed has given rise to renewed calls for the codification of the royal prerogative or the enactment of a written constitution. Anne Twomey argues that there are benefits to a looser prerogative power, and that experience in other countries has shown that codification should be undertaken with caution.

The recent controversy about the prorogation of parliament and the judicial review of its exercise in Miller No 2 (also known as Cherry/Miller) has again given rise to calls for the codification of the prerogative or the enactment of a written constitution.

A written constitution is not necessarily an antidote for ambiguity or interpretative discretion. The same issues that arose in Miller No 2 could also arise under a written constitution. For example, section 5 of the Australian Constitution confers upon the Governor-General of Australia the power to prorogue the federal parliament. In doing so, however, it does not delineate the scope of the power to prorogue and whether there are any internal limits on it. The term ‘prorogue’ would have to be interpreted in its historical context, as a prerogative power, and in a manner that is consistent with the principles that are derived from the constitution, including the principles of responsible and representative government

So what would happen if an Australian government requested the Governor-General to prorogue parliament for a significant period, in circumstances where it appeared to have lost confidence and to be seeking to frustrate the ability of parliament to fulfil is legislative and accountability functions? It is likely that Australian courts would face exactly the same issues as the UK Supreme Court did in Miller No 2, regarding justiciability, the scope of the power to prorogue and the application of fundamental constitutional principles. Simply setting out the existing power in legislation or a written constitution does not, of itself, resolve all questions as to its application.

While most prerogative powers have now been abrogated by legislation, there is usually a good reason while those that have survived as prerogative do so. It may be because of the need to exercise them in a quick and decisive fashion. Sometimes, codifying prerogatives in legislation, particularly where prescriptive conditions are included, can exacerbate problems about their use. Disputes are likely to arise about the interpretation of the application of the conditions, courts are likely to become involved in enforcing them, and the delay involved in litigation is likely to exacerbate any political crisis. Continue reading

Miller 2/Cherry and the media – finding a consensus? 

thumbnail_20190802_092917.jpgprofessor_hazell_2000x2500_1.jpg Despite the UK Supreme Court managing to find unanimity regarding the legality of the attempted prorogation of parliament in  September, the rest of the country, including its national newspapers, appeared to divide along Leave/Remain lines regarding the correctness of the judgment. Sam Anderson and Robert Hazell analyse how the national press discussed the political and constitutional questions raised by the judgment.

The government’s resounding defeat in the Supreme Court is one example of the rolling constitutional drama that breaks in the news almost daily. However, when it comes to media coverage of these stories, the key consideration is almost always ‘What impact will this have on Brexit?’ Issues are reported through the Leave/Remain divide, with popular news outlets framing events for their audiences. This post seeks first to examine the extent to which this has occurred with the prorogation case by looking at eight national newspaper editorials, and the way they have framed the political implications of the judgment. Then, using the same editorials, we will examine whether there is consensus around important constitutional issues that have arisen in this case, such as the proper role of the Court and the importance of the independence of the judiciary. We coded the editorials on both these questions, and found that the case was framed by almost all the papers to some degree through a Brexit lens, and that there is a lack of consensus on the constitutional issues.  

The political questions

The first issue was coded on a scale of -5 to five. Zero reflects the position of the Court: that the judgment concerned the specific prorogation issue, but was neutral with regards to the political implications of the decision. Editorials which argued the judgment would have negative political implications for the government and the Brexit process were assigned a negative number up to -5, depending on the extent they engaged in direct criticism of the judgment, and promoted the government’s policy of getting Brexit done. Editorials that argued that the judgment would have positive political implications for the government and Brexit process were assigned a positive number up to five, depending on the extent to which they were directly critical of the government and its Brexit policies. All eight articles were independently coded by two researchers. Where discrepancies occurred, a mid-point was taken. 

Paper Implications for Brexit 
Sun -5
Mail -4
Express -2
Telegraph  -1.5
Times  0.5
FT  2
Independent 3
Guardian  4.5

 

Looking qualitatively, there were three overarching positions taken. Of the eight publications, four were critical of the judgment and its  potential political implications. The Sun described the Prime Minister as the victim of a ‘staggering legal coup and accused the Court of having done the bidding of Remainers. The Daily Mail was less virulent, but still argued the case was a victory for Remainers, and emphasised how the judgment allowed MPs (including ‘masochistically intransigent Eurosceptic zealots) to continue to try and block the will of the electorate. The Daily Express was less direct but warned politicians that the case should not be used as a way to try to avoid Brexit. The Daily Telegraph made the only substantive comments on the case, noting pointedly that the Supreme Court overruled the High Court’s finding of non-justiciability, and gave some explanation for the prorogation: the government had only been ‘trying to carry out the democratic will’ of the people as expressed in the referendum.  Continue reading

Holding a Queen’s Speech in October risks heaping more embarrassment on the Queen

professor_hazell_2000x2500_1.jpgAfter its first attempt at proroguing parliament was found to be unlawful by a unanimous Supreme Court, the government now seems set on a shorter prorogation, to be followed by a Queen’s Speech. Robert Hazell argues that a Queen’s Speech is not just unnecessary, it is also undesirable if the government wants an early election.

In the past couple of weeks the Queen has been wrong-footed by two of her Prime Ministers. On 19 September there was the disclosure by David Cameron in his memoirs that he had sought the Queen’s help when he feared the Scottish independence referendum might be lost. And on 24 September the Supreme Court delivered its judgment declaring that Boris Johnson’s advice to the Queen to prorogue parliament for five weeks had been unlawful. It followed that the Order made by the Queen in Council to prorogue parliament was itself unlawful, null and void. 

Buckingham Palace indicated its ‘displeasure’ at the first episode. On the second, the Palace has maintained a dignified silence; but it is said that when Boris Johnson phoned the Queen upon his early return from New York, he apologised for giving her unlawful advice. Although that in itself provoked a constitutional thunderclap, there may be even bigger thunder clouds to come if Johnson persists with his plans for a Queen’s Speech in mid-October, while also calling for early elections.

Few commentators have remarked on this, but there is an inherent contradiction between these two objectives. A Queen’s Speech usually follows an election, rather than preceding one. If it is delivered in mid-October, and is swiftly followed by an election in November, then the Queen’s Speech will be not so much the government announcing the legislative programme for the next session, but more of an election manifesto. The Queen will have been used to make a Conservative party political broadcast.  Continue reading

The Supreme Court ruling in Cherry/Miller (No.2), and the power of parliament

meg_russell_2000x2500.jpgThis week’s Supreme Court judgment against Boris Johnson on parliament’s prorogation has shaken British politics and will be looked back on as a landmark case. Yet at the same time, Meg Russell argues, it simply reinforces the core principle of parliament’s centrality in our constitution. There has long been a myth of executive-dominance in the British system. Perhaps after this case, the fact that the government gains its power and authority from parliament will be better recognised – by those both inside and outside the system.

The Supreme Court’s judgment in the prorogation case was damning. Short of deciding that Boris Johnson had misled the Queen (which would be difficult to know, given private conversations) the court issued the strongest possible condemnation on all counts. The government had argued that prorogation was non-justiciable: i.e. not a matter in which the courts could get involved. The justices instead ruled it justiciable. Having established that, they then ruled it to be unlawful. Then, rather than leaving any loose ends regarding remedies, they explicitly quashed the prorogation, declaring that ‘Parliament has not been prorogued’. To cap it all, the decision was a unanimous one by all 11 justices who sat in the case. The prorogation was hence not just ‘improper’, as argued previously on this blog, and in a letter to the Times signed by 22 constitutional experts, but also found to be unlawful in the most powerful possible terms.

In some respects this feels like a constitutional earthquake. Few at the outset expected such a resounding result. On the basis of the High Court’s judgment, the first hurdle of justiciability was in doubt. Many who watched the proceedings, and the careful forensic analysis by Lord Pannick, representing Gina Miller, will soon have started thinking otherwise. This can only have been reinforced by watching the presentations by the government’s lawyers, who claimed that the issue of prorogation should be resolved politically rather than through the courts. Their suggestion that parliament could somehow defend itself, when the very point of the case was that parliament had been shut down, rang hollow.

The court’s judgment confirmed that advising the monarch to prorogue ‘will be unlawful if the prorogation has the effect of frustrating or preventing, without reasonable justification, the ability of Parliament to carry out its constitutional functions as a legislature and as the body responsible for the supervision of the executive’ (para 50). That flows, the judgment suggested, from two principles at the very core of the UK constitution: the sovereignty of parliament, and the accountability of the government to parliament – exercised, for example, through questions and committees. Continue reading

Can Boris Johnson ignore parliament and force a no deal Brexit?

meg_russell_2000x2500.jpgprofessor_hazell_2000x2500_1.jpgControversy is swirling over the extent to which Boris Johnson’s government must be bound by parliament, particularly regarding a ‘no deal’ Brexit. Some have even suggested that Johnson could flout a Commons vote of no confidence and pursue this outcome contrary to parliamentary support. Meg Russell and Robert Hazell explore such questions, concluding that both convention and parliamentary logic mean Johnson cannot ultimately force a ‘no deal’. But to prevent this MPs must be organised and determined.

There has been much recent controversy about whether Boris Johnson’s new government can press ahead with a ‘no deal’ Brexit against the express wishes of the House of Commons. This was kicked off in part by a front-page story in Tuesday’s Times headed ‘Johnson to defy any vote of no confidence’ – suggesting that even if MPs went so far as to withdraw their support from the government, the Prime Minister could stay on and force a ‘no deal’ Brexit, perhaps in the middle of a general election campaign. Various commentators have subsequently expressed their views. Many questions raised are close to those that we addressed in an earlier post on this blog reflecting on constitutional questions surrounding the (then still awaited) appointment of the new Prime Minister. Here we return to some of these questions, and our conclusions are twofold. First, despite disparate commentators’ voices, there is a high degree of agreement on the key issues. Second, the essential answer to the question posed in our title is ‘no’. But this depends on strong political will and organisation by the forces in parliament opposed to ‘no deal’.

The options available to MPs

Much energy has been spent in recent months, including prior to the Johnson premiership, reflecting on what MPs’ options are if they want to block a ‘no deal’ Brexit. The general view – for example from the Institute for Government, and from Jack Simson Caird on this blog – is that such options are limited, but do exist. MPs’ continued determination to prevent a ‘no deal’ outcome was demonstrated by the heavy defeat inflicted on Theresa May’s government over the Northern Ireland (Executive Formation) Bill – which in effect blocked the threat of an autumn prorogation. On a previous occasion, ‘no deal’ was defeated by 400 votes to 160. Now, following the departure of many ministers from the government, the forces against ‘no deal’ on the Conservative backbenches are even stronger.

Continue reading

Six constitutional questions raised by the election of the new Conservative leader

professor_hazell_2000x2500_1.jpgmeg_russell_2000x2500.jpgIn less than one month, Conservative Party members will elect a new leader from a two-man shortlist. Under normal circumstances, what happens next would be obvious – Theresa May would resign and the winner would be called on by the Queen to form a government and take office as Prime Minister. However, with the Conservatives lacking a parliamentary majority and normal party loyalties skewed by Brexit, the current scenario is far from normal. Robert Hazell and Meg Russell identify six key constitutional questions that the Conservative leadership election raises for the winner, his party, the Palace and parliament.

With the Conservative Party leadership contest in full swing, the expectation is that Britain will soon have a new Prime Minister. But the process has opened up some significant constitutional controversies. This is the first time that party members will potentially directly elect a new Prime Minister, and this innovation is happening at a time not only of minority government, but with the governing party severely divided. Some senior Conservatives have signalled that they might go so far as to vote no confidence in a new leader who sought to deliver a ‘no deal’ Brexit, while some candidates in the race suggested a possibility of proroguing parliament to avoid MPs blocking a ‘no deal’. In this post we address six of the most burning constitutional questions raised by these controversies.

1. Will the new leader of the Conservative Party be appointed Prime Minister?

Not necessarily. The key test is whether the Conservatives’ new leader is able to command the confidence of the House of Commons. This is how it is expressed in the key paragraphs of the Cabinet Manual:

2.8    If the Prime Minister resigns on behalf of the Government, the Sovereign will invite the person who appears most likely to be able to command the confidence of the House to serve as Prime Minister and to form a government.

2.9    … In modern times the convention has been that the Sovereign should not be drawn into party politics, and if there is doubt it is the responsibility of those involved in the political process, and in particular the parties represented in Parliament, to seek to determine and communicate clearly to the Sovereign who is best placed to be able to command the confidence of the House of Commons. As the Crown’s principal adviser this responsibility falls especially on the incumbent Prime Minister …

2.18    Where a Prime Minister chooses to resign from his or her individual position at a time when his or her administration has an overall majority in the House of Commons, it is for the party or parties in government to identify who can be chosen as the successor.

Clearly none of these paragraphs quite covers the present unusual circumstances: Prime Minister Theresa May is on course to resign as an individual (2.18), rather than on behalf of the government (2.8), but the governing party does not have an overall Commons majority. Two things however are clear in either case. First, that the new Prime Minister must be the person most likely to be able to command the confidence of the House of Commons, and second, that it is the responsibility of the politicians to determine who that person is, in order to protect the Queen from the political fray.

Whether the new Conservative Party leader can command parliamentary confidence is clearly in some doubt given comments from Conservative MPs that they may not be able to support the new government. The government only has a majority of three (including the DUP), so only a very few rebels is enough for it to lose its majority. The parliamentary arithmetic is not necessarily that simple, because some pro-Brexit Labour rebels could conceivably decide to support the government. But the number of Conservative rebels is potentially large enough. Continue reading