To devolve or not to devolve? The European Union (Withdrawal) Bill and devolution

The European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, published last week, is likely to have sizable implications for the future of devolution in the UK. In this post Michael Keating considers these, suggesting that the provisions of the bill may move the UK closer to a more hierarchical model of devolution, in which the broad principles are set in London and the details filled in across the nations.

One of the many contentious details of Brexit is what will happen to those competences that are currently both devolved to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and also Europeanised. As the United Kingdom has a ‘reserved powers’ model of devolution, all powers not expressly reserved to Westminster are devolved. This means that in a range of fields including agriculture, fisheries, the environment and parts of justice, powers are shared between Europe and the devolved level, with no UK departments and common UK policies only in so far as there are common EU policies.

After Brexit, if nothing were done, these competences would revert to the devolved level. There is a broad recognition that there will need to be some UK-wide frameworks in the absence of European ones, and a linkage between the UK and devolved levels. Agricultural support and fisheries management are devolved but international agreements in these fields are reserved. If future international trade agreements include agriculture, there will be a need for provisions on permissible levels of support and subsidy. Agreements in fisheries will include the management of stocks. There will need to be arrangements for a level playing field across the UK in industrial aid and agriculture support. Environmental policy spills over the borders of the UK nations, calling for cooperation.

The question is about what form these frameworks will take and who will be responsible for making them. At one end is the position of the Welsh government, which has argued that devolved competences should remain devolved and that common frameworks, where necessary, should be negotiated among the four UK nations. This would be done through a UK Council of Ministers modeled on the EU Council of Ministers. Another suggestion has been that the UK would lay down broad frameworks for policy, while leaving the powers otherwise devolved. The UK government has recently been suggesting that this would merely reproduce the existing arrangements, in which the devolved bodies are bound by EU frameworks. They implement, rather than make, policy and would not, therefore, lose powers.

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The European Union (Withdrawal) Bill: constitutional change and legal continuity

The long-awaited ‘Great Repeal Bill’, to be known officially as the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, was published last Thursday. The bill is a complex mix of constitutional change and legal continuity. Jack Simson Caird highlights some of its main elements.

Nine months after Theresa May first announced that there would be a ‘Great Repeal Bill’, and three and a half months after triggering Article 50, the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill (EUW Bill) was published on 13 July 2017.

Constitutional change

The EUW Bill repeals the European Communities Act 1972 (ECA) (clause 1). The ECA provides the ‘conduit pipe’ through which EU law flows into the UK, and represents a central component of the UK’s current constitutional architecture. The key provisions of the EUW Bill replace the ECA with a new constitutional framework. The main constitutional changes in the EUW Bill include:

  • the creation of a new distinct body of law known as ‘retained EU law’;
  • broadly-framed delegated powers for government to alter this body of law;
  • new instructions to the courts on how to interpret retained EU law; and
  • amendments to the legislation that underpin devolution.

Legal continuity

The government’s position is that the primary purpose of the bill is to provide a ‘functioning statute book’, ensuring legal continuity after exit day. The bill’s most-far reaching provisions, in terms of their direct legal effect, are those which retain existing EU-derived law (clause 2) and convert most directly-applicable EU law (clause 3). However, the continuity provided by these provisions must be seen in context of the reality that leaving the EU will also require major constitutional and policy changes in a relatively short, and currently uncertain, time frame.

Balancing continuity and change

Since the announcement of the intention to convert the acquis (the entire body of EU rights and obligations) ‘wholesale’ through this bill, the government has claimed that the general rule is that the ‘same rules and laws’ will apply on the day after Brexit. While a significant proportion of EU law will be able to be preserved, this general position masks the complexity of legislating for Brexit:

  • the delegated powers in the bill will be used to amend retained EU law in significant ways, notably to reflect the withdrawal agreement;
  • a proportion of EU law will no longer apply once the UK is outside the EU;
  • the government is bringing forward a number of bills to make substantive policy changes in areas currently covered by EU law; and
  • preserved EU law will function differently as retained EU law than it did as EU when the UK was an EU member state and subject to the full force of EU law.

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British politics and what we’ve learned after the 2017 general election

Last month’s general election delivered the latest in a series of political surprises, with the Conservatives falling short of a majority when many had anticipated they would win a landslide. On 21 June the Constitution Unit hosted a panel of election experts consisting of YouGov’s Joe Twyman and academics Justin Fisher, Jennifer Hudson, Philip Cowley and Alan Renwick to reflect on what happened. Fionnuala Ní Mhuilleoir reports.

Although we have become used to political upsets in recent years the outcome of the 8 June election nonetheless came as a surprise to many, including the Prime Minister, who saw her majority disappear when she had hoped to increase it substantially. How did this happen? How did the Conservatives manage to lose the massive lead they held at the start of the campaign, and Labour out-perform all expectations? How did the pollsters do after they had failed to call the 2015 election correctly? And what does the result mean for the government’s position in the new parliament, and for Brexit and beyond? These questions were all discussed at a Constitution Unit seminar held on 21 June, chaired by the Unit’s Director Professor Meg Russell. The panel included YouGov’s Joe Twyman, Professor Justin Fisher from Brunel University and Professor Philip Cowley from Queen Mary University of London. Dr Jennifer Hudson and Dr Alan Renwick from the Constitution Unit completed the line-up.

Joe Twyman

Joe Twyman opened the seminar with a brief post mortem on YouGov’s 2015 general election polling, which had predicted that the Conservatives would be the largest party in a hung parliament. The Conservatives went on to win 330 seats, securing a small but workable majority. YouGov subsequently identified three problems in the 2015 polling process: the samples used by YouGov and other polling companies to measure voting intention were not representative; figuring out whether people will turn out to vote is challenging; seat estimation across 650 constituencies is inherently very difficult.

Twyman then described how YouGov has responded to these issues. First, it has invested heavily in targeted recruitment, spending more than £100,000 in the last year to identify and recruit the types of people who were underrepresented in YouGov samples between 2010 and 2015, particularly those who were not interested in politics. Second, YouGov has updated how it analyses turnout. Thirdly, it has also developed a new seat estimation model.

This seat model, as is now well known, correctly predicted a hung parliament. In the run up to June 8 YouGov faced trenchant criticism, both from established commentators and on social media. Twyman reflected on Paul Krugman’s statement after the US election results that economists and commentators ‘truly didn’t understand the country we live in’. Through the efforts of YouGov, according to Twyman, we do now understand the country we live in a little better.

Justin Fisher

Justin Fisher began his contribution by drawing the audience’s attention to how important lead time ahead of an election is for party campaigns. The national and constituency campaigns have merged, with national campaigns now supporting the constituency effort. Lead time gives parties more time to plan targeting, information distribution, spending and fundraising. In a normal election campaign the critical period is the six-to-nine months before the poll.

The snap election left no opportunity for such advance campaigning. One implication is that this is likely to have been a much less expensive campaign than usual. Another is a shift in emphasis in campaigning techniques from direct mail (which requires lead time) to face-to-face campaigning and e-campaigning, which require much less preparation time. Fisher stressed that the evidence needed to confirm these expectations is still being collected.

Though the 2017 election may have accelerated the shift to e-campaigning, Fisher argued that campaigning techniques were partly heading that direction regardless. He also warned of what he called e-campaigning myths. He debunked the myth that micro-targeting of voters had only just been invented: parties have gathered data from phone calls and indirect mail for years. E-campaigning, therefore, represents evolution rather than a revolution. A further myth is the claim that because parties are using e-campaigning it must be effective. In 2015, research found it to be electorally effective, but less so than face-to-face campaigning. This has yet to be examined for the 2017 election.

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Monitor 66: The most unexpected election

The latest issue of Monitor, the Constitution Unit’s regular newsletter, has been published today. The issue covers all of the major UK constitutional developments over the past five months, a period that has included the unexpected general election result, the confidence and supply agreement between the Conservatives and DUP that followed, Nicola Sturgeon’s announcement of plans for a second referendum (later ‘reset’) and the beginning of Brexit negotiations, plus much else besides. The front page article is reproduced here. You can read the full issue at this link

Current British politics is rarely dull. Added to the unexpected result in the 2016 Brexit referendum and the subsequent Miller case regarding parliament’s role in the process (not to mention the Conservatives’ unexpected outright majority in 2015), we now have our second hung parliament in seven years, a resurgent Corbyn-led Labour Party, and a previously popular Prime Minister who appears to be on the ropes. All this following a general election that few expected, and that some even thought pretty much impossible under the 2011 Fixed-term Parliaments Act.

Following the successful passage of the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act, authorising the trigger of Article 50 (see page 4), Theresa May surprised almost everybody on 18 April by proposing a general election for 8 June. Having started with what looked like an unassailable lead in the polls, in an election where she sought to strengthen her hand in parliament during the Brexit negotiations, she managed instead to lose her slender Commons majority and was forced into a confidence and supply arrangement with Northern Ireland’s Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) (see page 6). Her authority within her own government is much diminished, and ministers have openly squabbled with each other over Brexit priorities. Meanwhile, Labour’s unexpected gains leave its previously fractious parliamentary party appearing suddenly united behind Jeremy Corbyn.

The results were also a blow to Nicola Sturgeon, whose Scottish National Party (SNP) lost twelve seats to the Conservatives, six to Labour and three to the Liberal Democrats. Conservative leader Ruth Davidson (who spoke at a packed Constitution Unit event during the campaign) in contrast made a strong case for the Union and gained further stature and negotiating power. Sturgeon acknowledged on 27 June that she would have to put the campaign for a second Scottish independence referendum on hold for the time being (see page 11).

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The EU referendum, one year on: public debate

Today is the first anniversary of the EU referendum. To mark this the UK in a Changing Europe Initiative and Political Studies Association have published a collection of essays titled EU Referendum: One Year OnAlan Renwick‘s contribution, focusing on the continuing weakness of public debate around Brexit and how it might be strengthened, is re-produced here. 

This month’s general election was supposed to be about Brexit. In her Downing Street statement on 18 April announcing her intention to seek the dissolution of parliament, Theresa May spoke of little else. She suggested that, without an early election, her opponents would have both the will and the ability to disrupt her efforts to negotiate the best possible Brexit deal. The vote, she hoped, would deliver a secure majority for her favoured Brexit plan.

Brexit’s low profile

In the end, however, Brexit did not dominate. It was mentioned on average 580 times a day in the main UK-wide newspapers in the week following May’s statement. But that fell below 500 for the following two weeks, then below 400 for the four and a half weeks between then and polling day – dipping to just 155 a day in the sixth week of the campaign, immediately following the Manchester bombing. When the BBC’s Andrew Neil interviewed the Prime Minister on 22 May, his questions turned to Brexit only in the last few minutes. Interviewing Jeremy Corbyn four days later, he asked nothing directly about Brexit itself, though he did enquire towards the end about immigration. The other main television debates and interviews gave Brexit more attention, but still it did not dominate.

There were at least three reasons for this. One, as just suggested, was the unforeseen and tragic eruption of terror into the campaign caused by the attacks in Manchester and London. This inevitably shifted the agenda towards the terrorist threat. It raised deep questions about both Theresa May’s record on police funding and Jeremy Corbyn’s record of opposition to counter-terrorism legislation and seeming friendship with certain terrorist organisations.

A second reason was the spectacular misfiring of the Tory campaign. Conservative strategists intended to focus on one core message: that Theresa May, not Jeremy Corbyn, was the person to provide the ‘strong and stable leadership’ needed for successful Brexit. But the Conservative manifesto introduced controversial policies – most notably on social care – that distracted attention away from that core message. The Prime Minister’s forced u-turn on social care undermined the credibility of the message. Veteran election watcher Sir David Butler tweeted (sic) that ‘In the 20 general election campaigns I’ve followed, I can’t remember a U-turn on this scale’.

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Ask the Experts: Legal and Constitutional Implications of Brexit

On 13 June UCL Public Policy and the House of Commons Library jointly hosted an ‘Ask the Experts’ event on the legal and constitutional implications of Brexit. The panel consisted of specialists from both institutions. Marc Phoon reports.

The possible economic and social consequences of Brexit were central features of the referendum debate and continue to be discussed widely. However, of equal importance are the legal and constitutional implications of Brexit, which may very well underpin the long term outcomes of the Brexit negotiations. ‘Ask the Experts: Legal and Constitutional Implications of Brexit’, an event jointly hosted by UCL Public Policy and the House of Commons Library on 13 June, aimed to provide some clarity on this matter.

The panel consisted of staff from both the House of Commons Library and UCL. Vaughne Miller is the Head of International Affairs and Defence at the House of Commons Library and an EU law specialist. She was joined by two of her colleagues, Arabella Lang, a treaty specialist and Jack Simson Caird, a constitutional law specialist and UCL alumnus. Ronan McCrea, a Senior Lecturer from the Faculty of Laws and Christine Reh, Reader in European Politics from the Department of Political Science, both based at UCL, completed the panel. Meg Russell from the Constitution Unit chaired the event. In introducing the panel, she emphasised the high-quality, reliable and digestible briefings publicly available from the House of Commons Library, as well (of course) as the materials available from the Constitution Unit, the UCL Brexit Hub and other UCL experts.

Vaughne Miller

Vaughne Miller kick-started the discussion by offering an overview of the differing approaches taken by the EU and the UK government ahead of the Brexit negotiations. The EU, through the European Commission and European Council, has already set out its priorities for the negotiations. It is particularly concerned with issues related to EU citizens’ rights post-Brexit, the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland and the so called ‘divorce bill’ – i.e. the financial settlement between the UK and the EU. She noted that the EU has a clearer position than the UK government because of the EU’s laws on transparency, which mean that the majority of the negotiation guidelines coming from the EU will be publicly available.

Miller went on to explain that it is not yet clear how the UK parliament is going to be kept informed about the progress of Brexit negotiations. The government has indicated that the UK parliament will be kept at least as informed as the European Parliament. Nevertheless, MPs have signalled their expectations on this matter through a report published by the European Scrutiny Committee. Furthermore, because of the general election and summer recess, there are concerns about whether there will be adequate parliamentary scrutiny of the early stages of the negotiations. Notably, select committees in the Commons which scrutinise government departments are not likely to be properly established until September this year.

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A cross-party committee of the Privy Council should be established to seek consensus on the terms of Brexit

Following last week’s general election result Theresa May is likely to face severe difficulty in negotiating Brexit successfully unless she seeks cross-party consensus. In this post Jim Gallagher suggests that consensus could be achieved through a special committee of the Privy Council, the membership of which would reflect the House of Commons and also contain representatives of the devolved legislatures.

It will be impossible for a minority government with a weak Prime Minister to negotiate Brexit successfully, against a ticking clock, if it deals with the issue in the normal way of British politics. Government cannot formulate policy privately, then seek to sell it to the House of Commons while talking fitfully to the devolved administrations. Theresa May’s administration can be held to ransom, if not by the DUP, by factions in her own party. The opposition will sense blood and might be keener to bring down the government than do a European deal. The devolved will stand on their rights to consent. So even if she can negotiate some agreement with Brussels, she will fail to secure a domestic legislative consensus and the deal will fail.

The government has already used up two of the 24 months allowed for this negotiation and succeeded only in weakening its position. As a result, the UK is faces a high risk of crashing out the EU in an unmanaged way.

Leaving the EU presents the British state with an unprecedented problem. It must be handled in an unprecedented way. Other countries might consider a government of national unity to give the negotiators authority to commit to a deal. We seem too partisan for that, but some senior figures in both government and opposition parties are already saying openly that a cross-party consensus will need to be built on this question. To build such a consensus, however, is anything but straightforward and will require a degree of trust and information sharing that is wholly alien to our normal way of doing government business – to which Westminster and Whitehall will default unless something radically different is devised.

If government tries to develop policy behind closed doors, keeping the devolved at arms-length and negotiating tactically secure a day-to-day majority in parliament, it will almost inevitably fail. There is certainly very little chance of completing the process in time for the agreement to be settled and ratified in Europe as well as here.

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