Should military action require parliamentary approval? 

The role of parliament in authorising the use of military force has been much debated in recent years, and most recently due to airstrikes against targets in Yemen. The Unit hosted an event with three distinguished experts to discuss what role – if any – parliament should have in approving military action. Rowan Hall offers a summary of the key contributions.

Recent airstrikes in Yemen have revived the debate around parliament’s role in military action. In March, the Constitution Unit held an event on this very topic, with a panel consisting of academic experts Dr Veronika Fikfak and Dr James Strong, and former Cabinet minister and current chair of the Royal United Services Institute, David Lidington. This blog post summarises some of the points made at the event, a recording of which is available on YouTube and in podcast form

Dr Veronika Fikfak 

Veronika Fikfak began by outlining the current constitutional convention governing parliament’s role in military action and made three key points. 

First, citing the Cabinet Manual, Fikfak said that the role of MPs currently only extends to debating military action, not necessarily to voting on it. Although MPs have voted on military action in the past, this is not always guaranteed under the convention as it currently stands.  

Second, Fikfak said that the convention as it currently stands is explicitly linked to the period before military action takes place, not during or after it happens. She welcomed this, arguing that if parliament is to have a real say, it needs to do so in advance of military action. However, she did also note that this aspect of the convention has not always been observed.  

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An inquiry into inquiries: why the House of Lords has established a Statutory Inquiries Committee

As the Post Office Horizon IT Inquiry and the Covid-19 inquiry continue their work, Philip Norton explains how public inquiries can operate very differently, depending on how they are established. He discusses the numerous ways inquiries can operate, analyses post-legislative scrutiny of the relevant legislation, and outlines the aims of a new parliamentary inquiry on the subject, which he chairs.

Recent years have seen some notable disasters and scandals, including the Manchester Arena bombings, the Grenfell Tower fire, the miscarriage of justice in the Post Office Horizon IT scandal, the use of infected blood, and child sexual abuse. Whenever they occur, there is a natural desire to identify what went wrong and what can be done to prevent a reoccurrence. These tasks are typically vested in a public inquiry. Such inquiries have become a significant feature of public life. 

Setting up public inquiries is not a new activity. However, as a study by the Institute for Government has shown, public inquiries have become more numerous. Prior to the enactment of the Inquiries Act 2005, there were different statutory bases for inquiries. The principal one was the Tribunals and Inquiries (Evidence) Act 1921. It was regarded as cumbersome, requiring both Houses of Parliament to approve a Secretary of State establishing an inquiry with the same powers as the High Court. When inquiries were established, they tended to be lengthy and expensive.   

As the government’s figures show, not all public inquiries are established by statute. Ministers have the option of setting up an inquiry on a non-statutory basis. These tend to be favoured for reasons of time and cost. A non-statutory inquiry can be conducted relatively quickly. However, public pressure often leads to the creation of a statutory inquiry or a non-statutory inquiry being converted into a statutory one. Statutory inquiries have the advantage of being empowered to summon witnesses and take evidence under oath. Despite the Act imposing a duty on chairs to consider financial cost, they can still be expensive as well as lengthy, sometimes costing millions of pounds and sitting for years. Although ministers may be critical of this, the public tend to favour the statutory over the non-statutory. A survey carried out by Crest Advisory found that 75% of those questioned felt that an inquiry should investigate the event or events as thoroughly as possible even if this means the inquiry taking longer or costing more than was originally anticipated. 

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International agreements: what is parliament’s role, and why does this matter?

Treaties and other international agreements have a major effect on citizens’ day-to-day lives. But the mechanisms for parliamentary involvement in scrutinising and agreeing them are widely considered inadequate. Lisa James and Arabella Lang explain how these mechanisms work, and how they might be reformed.

Background

International treaties and other agreements are vital policy tools in a world where many problems and solutions cross borders. But the UK parliament has limited involvement in them, which is increasingly considered inadequate. Parliamentary committees such as the Commons Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, the Lords International Agreements Committee, and the former Commons International Trade Committee – as well as external experts – have consistently called for a greater role for parliament in both making and approving international agreements.

What are international agreements?

International agreements vary hugely in their scale and scope. They include large trade agreements between several states, such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which the UK is in the process of joining; security, data or visa agreements between two governments; international human rights and refugee conventions; and agreements governing international organisations such as the EU or UN. At one extreme, it can take years to set a negotiating mandate, conduct negotiations, agree and sign a text, implement and ratify the agreement, and bring it into force. Or, at its simplest, an agreement might consist of an exchange of letters between two states.

International agreements also vary in their effects. Some are legally binding treaties, with consequences under international law for any breaches. Others are not legally binding but still have political force, and may entail spending commitments or have other significant impacts. The UK–Rwanda agreement on offshoring asylum seekers, for example, was initially a non-binding Memorandum of Understanding, before the two governments negotiated a binding treaty.

During the UK’s EU membership, many of the international agreements affecting the country were negotiated and scrutinised at EU level. Following Brexit, the UK is now conducting more of its own international negotiations. This has brought increasing attention to how those negotiations and the resulting agreements are – or should be – scrutinised and approved domestically.

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The UK Governance Project: proposals for reform

A commission chaired by former Attorney General Dominic Grieve recently published a report on the current state of UK governance, which has identified substantial problems and made recommendations to improve matters. Here, Dominic outlines the report’s key conclusions and recommendations, ahead of an online Constitution Unit event at which he and fellow commissioner Helen MacNamara will discuss the report in greater detail and answer audience questions.

Introduction

The origin of this project was a shared concern amongst the Commissioners who came together to produce it, that the institutions which underpin our parliamentary democracy are losing credibility. This is certainly the view of the public. A 2023 Constitution Unit survey has shown that only 38% of respondents were ‘very satisfied’ or ‘fairly satisfied’ with the way UK democracy operates. In contrast 52% were dissatisfied. The same percentage agreed with the statement that ‘politicians tend to follow lower ethical standards than ordinary citizens’. Yet the same politicians are the lawmakers and governors who expect others to respect the rules they create. 

It should therefore come as little surprise that 78% of respondents also considered that ‘healthy democracy requires that politicians always act within the rules’. Yet in recent years there is plenty of evidence that this has not been happening. Government ministers have been found to be ignoring the ministerial code of conduct under which they are supposed to operate. When they have, nothing has been done about it. We have had a Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, who was found by the Commons Privileges Committee to have deliberately misled parliament. The principle that appointees for life to the House of Lords as legislators in a revising chamber should be of conspicuous integrity, has been shown to be capable of being flouted at Prime Ministerial will. The Electoral Commission, which was created to ensure that elections should be free from improper interference by the government or other interests, has had its powers and independence reduced.  It has become more obvious than ever, particularly during the Covid-19 pandemic, that the powerful degree of control that a government exercises over parliament is not conducive to the enactment of properly scrutinised primary laws and secondary legislation.

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Why the UK should have a Parliamentary Committee on the Constitution

Last year, the Institute for Government and the Bennett Institute for Public Policy published a Review of the UK Constitution. One recommendation in that review was that parliament create a joint committee on the constitution. Steph Coulter sets out the case for such a body.

As part of our recently completed Review of the UK Constitution, the Institute for Government and Bennett Institute for Public Policy outlined the key issues with the UK’s current constitutional arrangements and made recommendations for reform. We highlighted the lack of clarity within a system underpinned by an uncodified constitution and the failure of existing political checks to deter constitutional impropriety.

Given the UK system’s reliance on parliamentary sovereignty as its central constitutional principle, we believe that parliament should be central to addressing these issues. Therefore, one of our key recommendations was the establishment of a new Parliamentary Committee on the Constitution, comprised of members from both the House of Commons and House of Lords. By acting as a central and authoritative constitutional guardian, such a body would go some way to improving constitutional clarity and would provide a more effective check on unconstitutional behaviour than existing arrangements.

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