Category Archives: constitutional standards and the health of democracy

The report on Richard Sharp raises big constitutional questions

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The Heppinstall report into Richard Sharp’s appointment as BBC chair raised questions about possible reforms and has sparked calls for more far-reaching changes. Peter Riddell surveys such proposals, arguing that the merits of different options need to be carefully weighed.

The long-awaited report by Adam Heppinstall KC into the appointment of Richard Sharp as BBC chair has not only led to Sharp’s resignation, but also triggered a debate about changing how public appointments are made to reduce or eliminate the role of the Prime Minister. This links with many of the themes I discussed in my inaugural lecture at UCL on 26 April.

Having been Commissioner for Public Appointments at the time of Sharp’s appointment, I welcomed the setting up of the Heppinstall inquiry following the disclosure in January that Sharp had been involved – on his own account in a very limited way – in previously secret discussions about arranging financial support for Boris Johnson, the then Prime Minister, in autumn 2020 at the same time as he was applying to become BBC chair.

Heppinstall concluded that the original appointment process had been ‘good and thorough’ but that Sharp had breached the government’s Governance Code for Public Appointments by not disclosing to the advisory interview panel that he had met Johnson to inform him of his application and that he was going to meet Simon Case, the Cabinet Secretary, to attempt to introduce him to someone (Sam Blyth, a distant cousin of Johnson) who might assist the Prime Minister with his personal finances.  This created a potential conflict of interest and the risk of a perception that Sharp would not be independent from Johnson. The Sharp/Case meeting – and differences about what was said and recorded – has attracted considerable attention but is largely irrelevant, since Case never met nor contacted Blyth.

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What can the OECD initiative on ‘building trust and reinforcing democracy’ tell us about multilateral efforts to strengthen democracy?

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The OECD’s new commitment to ‘building trust and reinforcing democracy’ arrives amid a broader international movement to address ‘backsliding’. In this post, Sophie Andrews-McCarroll explains the new initiative.

Alarm bells have increasingly been sounded about the risks of democratic backsliding across the world – including in established democracies in Europe, the UK and US. Backsliding is the process by which a state becomes gradually less democratic – often manifest in the reduction of checks and balances, breakdown in political norms, and reductions in civil liberties and electoral integrity. It is facilitated by political polarisation, and declining public trust in democratic institutions. The OECD’s new initiative on ‘building trust and reinforcing democracy’ – discussed at a high-level ministerial meeting, chaired by Luxembourg, in November – is one response to these concerns.

The OECD approach to policy problems

The OECD is an intergovernmental organisation that provides countries with independent policy analysis to promote economic and social well-being. It promotes best practice and provides international benchmarks, seeking to promote evidence-based policy solutions and entrench norms through a peer review and surveillance approach. Its authority rests on its technical expertise, and it lacks the coercive instruments available to other international organisations like the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, European Union or World Trade Organisation. This appeal to evidence and best practice is supported by a consensus-based model of decision making: all 38 member countries must unanimously agree to all commitments or declarations made, and any action plans adopted. Such an approach means that initiatives can only be agreed if they have broad buy-in, including from smaller, traditionally less powerful countries. But it also means that ambitious goals may have to be watered down to achieve consensus.

Building trust and reinforcing democracy

This subject has been a long-standing OECD priority, being on the organisation’s horizon since at least 2013. But the holding of the ministerial meeting – which itself required a consensus decision by the member states – reflects its topicality and urgency.

It also comes amid a number of other international initiatives designed to strengthen democracy. Notably, these include the United States’ 2021 ‘Summit for Democracy’, an international summit which set out a programme of democratic reform to be pursued during the following ‘Year of Action’, and followed up at a second summit in March 2023. The US was a vice-chair – along with Colombia, France and Lithuania – of the OECD ministerial meeting, reflecting the Biden-Harris administration’s commitment to reversing both the notorious democratic erosion the US suffered under Donald Trump, and its retreat from multilateral institutions and agreements. The November meeting also followed, and drew on, an extensive cross-national survey investigating public trust levels across 22 OECD countries.

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The parliamentary battle over Brexit and the constitution

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Today sees the publication of a new book by the Unit’s Meg Russell and Lisa James, The Parliamentary Battle over Brexit. Here the authors summarise some of its key findings about why parliament was drawn into such controversy over the implementation of Brexit. They reflect on what these events teach us about our constitution, as well as what may need to change in order to avoid repeating such problems, and to mend the damage done.

The UK’s arguments over what became known as Brexit began long before the June 2016 referendum, and continued with increasing bitterness afterwards. Parliament was often central, both as a venue for such arguments, and in terms of disputes about its proper role. It and its members frequently faced criticism and blame. Our new book, published today, charts The Parliamentary Battle over Brexit, from the early pressures for a referendum, through disputes about the triggering of Article 50 and control of the House of Commons agenda, the repeated defeats of Theresa May’s deal, and Boris Johnson’s unlawful parliamentary prorogation, to the UK’s eventual departure from the EU following his deal. The book charts what happened, but also asks what went wrong and whether things could have been handled differently. It reflects on what these events teach us about the functioning of our constitution, and what if anything might need to change.

The book includes a wealth of detail about key political moments, and the roles of different individuals and groups. Here we focus on some of the bigger questions about the lasting legacy of the battles over Brexit for the culture and institutions of UK politics, and particularly for the place of parliament itself. A fuller version of this analysis appears in the final chapter of the book.

Referendums and public participation

The referendum of 23 June 2016 was only the third ever such UK-wide vote (the first being on European Community membership in 1975, and the second in 2011 on changing the House of Commons voting system). The handling of the referendum was the single biggest error of the Brexit process, from which many other difficulties flowed.

Unlike the 2011 referendum, which was underpinned by legislation setting out the detail of the proposed new voting system, no clear prospectus was offered to the voters for Brexit. Prime Minister David Cameron hoped to use the vote – described disapprovingly by the House of Commons Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee as a ‘bluff call’ referendum – to make the question of Brexit go away. Parliament never debated the substance of the question, the government did not detail the options, and civil servants were forbidden from preparing for a Leave vote. Leave campaigners argued at the level of principle, rather than on a specific plan. As one Brexit-supporting interviewee told us, ‘it was only [after the referendum] that different types of Brexit started coming to the fore. Soft Brexit and hard Brexit had never been canvassed before the referendum; the expressions were coined afterwards’. Issues that would soon come to dominate the agenda, such as membership of the Customs Union or Single Market, and crucially the Northern Ireland border, were barely mentioned during the campaign. This left the government – and parliament – in a very difficult position. The different options for Brexit had to be established only after the vote had taken place, and on this the voters had conveyed no clear instruction.

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Sunak’s constitutional dilemmas

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Today the Unit publishes Monitor 83, providing analysis of constitutional events over the last four months. In this post, which also serves as the issue’s lead article, Meg Russell and Alan Renwick argue that while Rishi Sunak’s premiership has seen a decline in constitutional turbulence compared to the recent past, various points of constitutional tension remain, creating dilemmas both for him and his party political opponents.

Successive issues of Monitor in recent years have told a story of constitutional unease. The premierships of Boris Johnson and Liz Truss saw checks and balances eroded and the rule of law questioned. The last issue – published in November 2022 – reported Rishi Sunak’s promise on entering Downing Street to restore ‘integrity, professionalism and accountability’; but too little time had passed by then to assess his delivery. Four months on, the picture remains complex and mixed. Sunak clearly faces challenges on the constitutional front, particularly in keeping his restive party together.

On the positive side, the Prime Minister appointed a new Independent Adviser on Ministers’ Interests in December – his predecessor having denied that she needed one – and in January acted swiftly on the new Adviser’s conclusion that the actions of the Chairman of the Conservative Party, Nadhim Zahawi, ‘constitute[d] a serious failure to meet the standards set out in the Ministerial Code’ (see story: Standards in Government). In February, the Deputy Prime Minister, Dominic Raab, whose conduct remains under investigation, said that he would resign if found guilty of bullying officials.

The government’s approach to relations with the European Union also moved from confrontation to trust-building. This shift helped Sunak to unlock a significantly improved deal on the Northern Ireland Protocol in February (see story: The Northern Ireland Protocol). In the wake of that agreement, the Johnson-era Northern Ireland Protocol Bill – through which the UK would have unilaterally arrogated to itself the right to deviate from the Protocol’s terms, almost certainly in violation of international law – was withdrawn.

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