Can Boris Johnson stop Indyref2?

With the Scottish Parliament elections approaching, the Unit gathered together three experts to discuss the prospect of Boris Johnson seeking to block a second Scottish independence referendum, and how the Scottish government might respond to such efforts. Charlotte Kincaid summarises the contributions.

With the May 2021 Scottish Parliament elections approaching, and the recent attention on the continuing political conflict between First Minister Nicola Sturgeon and her predecessor Alex Salmond, eyes are very much on Scotland and the prospect of a second independence referendum (‘Indyref2’). Boris Johnson has said he would refuse a referendum, but is this possible, and what would be the ramifications? To explore the possibility of Indyref2 and how such a referendum would be brought about, the Constitution Unit hosted a webinar with three experts: Professor Aileen McHarg of Durham Law School; James Forsyth, political editor of The Spectator magazine; and Dr Alan Renwick, Deputy Director of the Constitution Unit. The summaries below are presented in order of the speakers’ contributions.

Professor Aileen McHarg

Professor McHarg explored a number of pathways to a referendum from a legal perspective. She first addressed if the UK government can prevent a second Scottish independence referendum: it can, and it isn’t required to agree to a Section 30 order, or amendments to the Scotland Act to enable Holyrood to legislate for a second referendum – as was the case for the 2014 referendum.

But can the Scottish Parliament legislate for a referendum without a Section 30 order? This is less clear. The SNP has marked its intention to unilaterally introduce a referendum bill with or without a Section 30 order if it wins a majority in Holyrood following the May elections. If the bill passed, it would be subject to legal challenge. If the bill were judged as beyond the Scottish Parliament’s competence, any referendum which followed would not have a legal grounding, and in Aileen’s view, the idea of a referendum was ‘a non-starter’. She described talk of a wildcat referendum – such as that experienced in Catalonia in 2017 as ‘entirely misplaced’. There would be questions concerning the legitimacy of a unilaterally-called referendum, even if it were ruled lawful by the Supreme Court; unionists may be unwilling to engage in such a referendum.

Another possible pathway, although unlikely, is Westminster legislating to dissolve the Union. This is possible because a referendum on Scottish independence is not a legal requirement of independence.

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Northern Ireland on the brink, again: the responsibility of London

As political tensions rise and riots erupt, or are provoked, on the streets of Belfast, the suggestion is now widely heard that the Northern Ireland institutions may again collapse before long. But London appears at present to have a limited grip of the Northern Ireland situation, suggests Alan Whysall, and if it does not change its approach markedly, it – and others – may face great grief soon.

Lessons of history

London governments were hands off in Northern Ireland until the late 1960s. Meanwhile conditions developed there that provoked protest, which was then hijacked by terrorism. Over several decades they painfully learned again about Ireland, the need to give its affairs at times a degree of priority, and the importance of working with Dublin. That approach led to the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement, and an intensive cooperative effort between the governments to implement it and keep it on the road.

Since 2016, matters have changed. In settling the UK’s approach to Brexit, it has generally been regarded as a side issue, to be resolved once the grand lines of the withdrawal plan were settled. The May government, under much pressure from Brussels, Belfast and Dublin, eventually recognised that the architecture of Brexit must accommodate Northern Ireland concerns. In 2019, however, policy shifted from the May backstop to the Johnson Protocol, and there is a strong perception that Northern Ireland has chiefly been valued as a battleground for the government’s trench warfare with the EU.

The build-up to the recent violence

Brexit is of course not the sole cause of what is now going wrong. In various ways, the underpinnings of the Agreement have been weakening for eight or nine years; and a number of factors led to the Executive collapsing in early 2017. But the tensions that Brexit has provoked, and the necessity to create a border somewhere – across the island, around the two islands, or between Great Britain and Ireland (the inevitable choice, because the other two are unfeasible) have seriously envenomed matters.

Nevertheless, Julian Smith, the last Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, developed a strong rapport with all the main Northern Ireland parties, and the Irish government, and was able to reach the New Decade, New Approach agreement to bring the institutions back early last year. But he was promptly sacked, apparently for having offended Number 10, a step widely seen in Northern Ireland as indicating the government’s general lack of concern for its affairs. He was replaced by Brandon Lewis.

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Boris Johnson and parliament: misunderstandings and structural weaknesses

On 21 January Unit Director Meg Russell appeared on a panel with two former Conservative Chief Whips, reflecting on Boris Johnson’s troubled relationship with parliament as Prime Minister. In this post she presents her central arguments – that the Johnson government in its early months has seemed to demonstrate some basic misunderstandings about parliament and its role; but also the government’s behaviour has highlighted some of parliament’s key weaknesses.

In early September 2020 I wrote a blogpost on Boris Johnson and parliament, which documented 13 unhappy episodes in 13 months. I had originally aimed at producing a list of 10 such episodes, but found that there was just too much material. Some of the incidents were obvious – such as the attempted prorogation the previous September, ultimately ruled unlawful by the Supreme Court. Others have continued to bubble along unhappily in the subsequent months – including the persistent refusal by Leader of the House of Commons Jacob Rees-Mogg to provide time for MPs to debate and agree proposals from the Procedure Committee to allow them to work virtually during the pandemic (frequently covered on this blog – see here and here), and the sporadic suggestions from government sources that the House of Lords should move to York. Some incidents were more obscure, but worth recalling for the record – such as Downing Street’s attempt to impose Chris Grayling as chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee (which rather dramatically backfired).

Of course that post was written five months ago, and the list continues to gets longer. It predated, for example, the dramatic showdown with former Conservative leaders over the government’s Internal Market Bill. It predated the announcement of the new Christmas lockdown rules during Commons recess, and the government’s refusal to allow a recall to debate them – despite protests by numerous Conservative backbenchers. It noted Johnson’s excessive first round of Lords appointments, but not his second within six months – both in clear breach of the Lord Speaker’s hardfought attempts to control the size of the chamber. It predated Johnson’s overruling of the House of Lords Appointments Commission’s recommendations on propriety, for the first time by any Prime Minister in the Commission’s 20-year existence.

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