Five key questions about a further Brexit referendum

alan.jfif (1)meg_russell_2000x2500.jpglisa.james.resized.staff.webpage.jpg (1)Proposals for another Brexit referendum will be at the heart of the election campaign and it is therefore important that the viability of politicians’ plans are thoroughly tested. Drawing on recent research, Alan Renwick, Meg Russell and Lisa James here set out five key questions. They suggest that Labour’s plans for a referendum within six months are challenging, though not necessarily impossible. A poll which pitted Boris Johnson’s deal against Remain would be simpler and quicker, avoiding additional negotiation time. This would also have the advantage of enhancing the referendum’s legitimacy among Brexit supporters. 

The parties are finalising their election manifestos, and several will propose a further referendum on Brexit. These policies will come under close scrutiny during the campaign. This post draws on and updates a detailed report published by the Constitution Unit last year. It sets out the possible routes to a further Brexit referendum, the key choices that would need to be made, and the possible consequences of those choices. It finds that a referendum between Boris Johnson’s deal and remaining in the EU would be both the simplest, and the quickest, option.

How would a referendum come about?

The major unknown – and unknowable – factor at this stage is the outcome of the general election. It is impossible to predict post-election parliamentary arithmetic with any confidence, but it will have a material effect on the probability and form of a referendum.

There are three main possibilities. The first is a Conservative majority, under which a referendum is very unlikely to take place. The second is a Conservative minority government, which might accept a confirmatory referendum as the price of passing its Withdrawal Agreement. The third is a Labour-led government: either a majority government, or a minority government supported by smaller pro-referendum parties. Under this scenario, the Labour leadership proposes to negotiate a new deal with the European Union, and to offer a referendum between their deal and Remain. Continue reading

Might Boris Johnson try to call an election sooner than people think?

professor_hazell_2000x2500_1.jpgmeg_russell_2000x2500.jpgWhile there has been much talk about a possible vote of no confidence when parliament returns in the autumn, speculation about the possibility of the Prime Minister himself seeking to trigger an immediate election in September has been much more limited. In this post, Robert Hazell and Meg Russell suggest that an October election could hold some attractions for Johnson, but it would also hold significant risks. Crucially, under the Fixed-term Parliaments Act Labour could readily block him from pursuing it.

Since Boris Johnson became Prime Minister on 24 July there has been a daily blizzard of announcements from No 10 trumpeting more spending on the police, the NHS, schools, and other public services. This has led some commentators to conclude that he is gearing up for an autumn election. The context has largely been speculation, on the one hand, about a possible parliamentary vote of no confidence triggering such an election either shortly before or after Brexit day on 31 October, or on the other hand, over whether Johnson could successfully proceed with a ‘no deal’ Brexit, pulling the rug from under the Brexit Party, and hold an election in November.

Much energy has gone into debating how parliament might prevent ‘no deal’, considering possible legislation, votes of no confidence, governments of national unity, the caretaker convention, and the the Prime Minister’s ability to advise the Queen when polling day will be. On this blog, we have contributed our share (see here). But amidst the speculation about a vote of no confidence under the Fixed-term Parliaments Act, there has been far less focus on the possible use of the other route to an early election provided in the Act, which is to invite the Commons to agree to an early dissolution. One exception was a piece in last week’s Spectator, suggesting that when parliament returns on 3 September Boris Johnson could immediately trigger such a vote, potentially leading to a general election on 10 October. Theresa May, after all, surprised everyone by triggering an early election in 2017. Could Boris Johnson do the same?

This post considers the reasons why the Prime Minister might be tempted to pursue such a route, and the very significant obstacles that he would face.

Why Boris Johnson might favour a snap election

The potential scenario is this: Boris Johnson returns on 3 September announcing that he wants to call an early election, to seek a mandate to bolster his tough negotiating position that the EU must drop the Irish backstop – or that failing that, the UK would pursue a ‘no deal’ Brexit. He might claim that this was necessary to appeal over the heads of intransigent MPs to the public at large. Continue reading

Who should pick party leaders: MPs, members or a wider public?

The Conservatives and Liberal Democrats are currently in the midst of party leadership campaigns that could change the country’s political course. The winner of the former will likely succeed Theresa May as Prime Minister, whilst the next Lib Dem leader could lend a crucial number of votes to the largest minority party in the event of a hung parliament. On 17 June the Constitution Unit hosted four experts in political party processes to discuss the question, ‘Who should pick party leaders: MPs, members or a wider public?’. Lorenzo Leoni summarises the speakers’ contributions.

The question of how parties elect their leaders has perhaps never been so pertinent to the wider political process. For the first time, the decision of who becomes the country’s next Prime Minister looks likely to be decided as a consequence of a party membership choosing their party leader, without the intervening event of a general election. The implications of this (and the growing influence of memberships in party leadership elections more generally) for our system of representative democracy have perhaps not been sufficiently articulated before now. This well timed seminar sought to address some of these issues by bringing together four party experts to help make sense of leadership elections:  Tim Bale, Professor of Politics, Queen Mary University of London; Mark Pack, editor of Liberal Democrat Newswire and former Head of Innovations at the Liberal Democrats; Jess Garland, Director of Policy and Research at the Electoral Reform Society and Paul Webb, Professor of Politics at the Sussex European Institute.

Tim Bale, Professor of Politics, Queen Mary University of London

Tim Bale opened the evening with what was perhaps the most timely analysis: that of how the Conservative Party chooses its leader. Unlike members of other parties, they have no direct influence on policy, so leadership elections are one of the only ways in which they can influence the party’s direction. Beginning with a brief pen-portrait of the party, he illustrated how the 160,000 or so members of the party are unrepresentative of the population as a whole: demographically they are middle class, over 50, white, and geographically concentrated in the South; ideologically they generally identify as either ‘fairly or very right-wing’.

Bale was sanguine about the fact that a small group of people are responsible for electing not only their party leader but the country’s Prime Minister. Whilst divergent from the wider population, Bale noted that Conservative members are not too dissimilar from the larger group of people who vote for the party at a general election: they are not a ‘breed apart’ from those who support the party come polling day. He also sought to remind the audience that the UK is a democracy that relies on party strength within the House of Commons to determine who should be Prime Minister. In that context, he argued, allowing the party to select their own leader (and therefore the Prime Minister) was not automatically a cause for concern.  

Bale argued that it is imperative that parties remain organisations of civil society rather than drifting into a position where they are over-regulated and closely entwined with the apparatus of the state. It is crucial they have agency to do as they wish and, as the ‘movers and shakers’ in our system, if the party commands a majority in parliament it is quite natural that their leader should also become Prime Minister.  Continue reading

Taking stock: what have we learned from the European elections?

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Last week, voters across the UK (and indeed, across the European Union) took part in the European Parliament elections. Now that we know the outcome, Alan Renwick examines the impact on the results of both the rules that governed the election and the strategies of the parties.

The European elections raised important questions about how the voting system – and parties’ and voters’ reactions to it – might influence the results. Would the imperfect proportionality of the system harm the smaller parties? Should those parties – particularly the three Britain-wide anti-Brexit parties – have formed an alliance? Could voters maximise the impact of their ballots through tactical voting? Now that the results are in, it is time to take stock.

The impact of the rules

As I set out in an earlier post, European Parliament elections in Great Britain use a list-based system of proportional representation (while those in Northern Ireland use Single Transferable vote, or STV). This system is proportional, but not very. The D’Hondt formula for allocating seats favours larger parties. So does the fact that the number of seats available in each region (ranging from three in the North East of England to ten in the South East) is fairly low.

The results would certainly have been different had the elections been held using First Past the Post, as was the case for European elections in Great Britain before 1999. This system, still used for Westminster elections, awards a seat to the largest party in each constituency. Had voters cast the same votes as they did on Thursday, the Brexit Party would under First Past the Post have won almost every seat in England and Wales outside London and the Home Counties; the Liberal Democrats and Labour would have dominated in London and parts of its environs; the SNP would have captured every seat in Scotland; and the Conservatives would have been wiped out. In fact, many voters would not have cast the same votes as they did. For example, the anti-Brexit parties could probably have agreed joint candidates much more easily than under the actual system, helping them to secure some extra seats. But the Brexit Party would very likely still have scooped up most seats on less than a third of the vote. Continue reading

Mandatory reselection: lessons from Labour’s past

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At the Labour Party conference in September, a union-backed compromise led to changes in the way parliamentary candidates are selected by their constituencies. Eric Shaw explains how the debate is reminiscent of the internal party struggles of the 1980s, and how the current struggles over this issue differ from the discord of the past.

At the recent Labour Party conference two issues appeared to provoke the most heated debate: Brexit and the issue of the ‘mandatory reselection’ of MPs. The former was predictable and understandable. But mandatory reselection? It is an issue about which the vast majority of the population knows little and cares even less, a matter so arcane and abstruse that even the small number who follow party conferences could be forgiven for feeling baffled.

Yet selection rules do matter. In recent years the capacity of the rank and file in political parties to directly influence policy, always rather restricted, has tended to shrink further with influence over candidate selection surviving as one of the few effective ways in which members can assert some measure of control over their party. Because many seats do not change hands, those who select candidates within a party are often in effect choosing their constituency’s MPs, hence influencing the composition and ideological direction of the governing elite. Many years ago, Eric Schattschneider, a notable American scholar, contended that ‘The nature of the nominating procedure determines the nature of the party; he who can make the nominations is the owner of the party. This is therefore one of the best points at which to observe the distribution of power within the party’. Candidate selection is about power.

It is for this reason that clashes over selection rules have been, at least since the 1970s, a flashpoint of controversy within the Labour Party. In 1973 the Campaign for Labour Party Democracy (CLPD) was established to press for the introduction of what was called mandatory reselection, the principle that before each election an MP must seek and gain the nomination of his or her constituency party. Why was this deemed so important?

Events during both the 1964–70 and the 1974–79 Labour government had shown that, whatever the formal position, in practice party members who lacked a seat in parliament or a role in the government lacked any effective mechanism by which it could compel a Labour cabinet to implement a manifesto on which it had campaigned and been elected. No means existed by which the PLP could be held collectively responsible to the wider party but, if a procedure for ‘mandatory reselection’ was instituted MPs could be made individually answerable to their local parties. If an MP had to compete before each election for the right to stand as the party’s candidate, they would have to be more receptive to constituency opinion or risk losing their seat. Continue reading