Tag Archives: Fixed-Term Parliaments

In praise of post-election transition periods 

Posted on by

The UK is about to embark on its first July general election since 1945. After an initial burst of activity, this timing will give both government and parliament some breathing space before ‘politics as usual’ resumes in the autumn. Various experts have previously indicated the benefits of a more formal post-election transition period. Meg Russell summarises these, suggesting that the unusual circumstances in 2024 might encourage reflection on longer-term changes to the system. 

Rishi Sunak’s election timing surprised many. Tomorrow’s vote represents the first UK general election held in July since 1945. Prior to the last election, held in December 2019, all of the previous 10 contests had taken place in April, May or June.  

An earlier post on this blog in praise of fixed-term parliaments discussed the downsides of the uncertainty over this year’s timing. This follow-up post instead considers some of the potential upsides of the timetable, in terms of likely events in the weeks and months ahead. After polling day, parliament is due to reconvene on 9 July, with a King’s speech setting out the government’s intended legislative programme following on 17 July. The start date for parliament’s summer recess seems likely to be delayed slightly from the previously planned 23 July. But there will be little appetite – among MPs, their staff, civil servants or journalists – for parliamentary activity in August. This makes an enforced break of several weeks very likely, allowing election participants to recover, but also to plan ahead. 

Continue reading →

In praise of fixed-term parliaments

Posted on by

The surprise general election may leave many suddenly nostalgic for the principle of fixed-term parliaments. The original central arguments for fixed terms have been reawakened. In this post, Meg Russell and Robert Hazell revisit these long-standing arguments, summarise the birth and death of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011, and argue that – on the basis of UK and international experience – we should consider returning Westminster to fixed terms. 

The lengthy and debilitating speculation about when Rishi Sunak might call the general election may have reminded many of the arguments in favour of fixed-term parliaments. His shock announcement on 22 May that such an election would take place in July only reinforces those views. This blog post revisits the arguments for fixed terms, reminds readers of how the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 (FTPA) was created and abolished, and argues for reintroduction of the principle of fixed terms – albeit with flexibility to allow early elections on occasion, as applies in many other democracies (and existed under the FTPA). 

The arguments for fixed-term parliaments 

The following is a summary of points in favour of the principle of fixed-term parliaments: 

  • Allowing the government to decide the timing of elections provides an unjustified incumbency advantage. 
  • It also confers disproportionate power on the executive over parliament. 
  • A fixed election cycle is better for both civil service and electoral administration planning, and encourages more long-term thinking in government. 
  • Fixed terms are also better for political parties, prospective parliamentary candidates, and the regulation of election spending. 
  • Speculation about an early election may unnecessarily unsettle commercial and economic decisions. 
  • Parliamentary business, including the work of select committees, can be planned and carried through with less risk of interruption.  

These are not our words; they are drawn (mostly verbatim) from the report of the cross-party parliamentary Joint Committee on the Fixed-term Parliaments Act (paragraph 17), published in March 2021. Based on recent experience, some of them may now feel very familiar. 

Continue reading →

Can Boris Johnson simply repeal the Fixed-term Parliaments Act?

Posted on by

professor_hazell_2000x2500_1.jpg

The Conservative manifesto pledged to repeal the Fixed-term Parliaments Act, but was silent about what, if anything, would replace it. Robert Hazell argues that it is not enough to simply repeal the Act; new legislation will have to be drafted, parliamentary scrutiny will have to take place, and the options for reform should be properly considered.

Can the Fixed-term Parliaments Act simply be repealed? The short answer is: no. As always, it is more complicated than that. But the commitment in the Conservative manifesto was unambiguous: ‘We will get rid of the Fixed Term Parliaments Act [sic] – it has led to paralysis at a time the country needed decisive action’ (page 48). And decisive action is what the government hopes to display through early repeal of the FTPA. It does not seem to be one of the issues to be referred to the new Constitution, Democracy and Rights Commission, since they were mentioned separately in the Queen’s Speech. So — unless the government has second thoughts — we can expect early legislation to be introduced to repeal the FTPA.

The government may feel that it can press ahead with little opposition, since the Labour manifesto contained an equally unambiguous commitment to repeal: ‘A Labour government will repeal the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011, which has stifled democracy and propped up weak governments’ (page 81). But there is no need for urgent legislation: this is not a pressing issue, and with a government majority of 87, we are not going to see motions for early dissolution or ‘no confidence’ any time soon. And there are good reasons for taking it more slowly: not least, that there is provision for a statutory review of the FTPA in section 7 of the Act, due to be initiated in 2020. In anticipation of that review, the Lords Constitution Committee is already conducting an inquiry into the operation of the Act, due to conclude in around March.

The evidence submitted last year to the Constitution Committee (in 14 written submissions, and four sessions of oral evidence) has brought out many of the difficulties involved. These are both political and technical. The main political difficulty is that repeal of the Act would return us to the situation where the incumbent Prime Minister can choose the date of the next election. No one disputes the potential advantage that confers: in Roy Jenkins’s famous phrase, uttered during a Lords debate on 11 March 1992, it is equivalent to deciding ‘to give the pistol in a race to one of the competitors and encourage him to fire it whenever he thinks that the others are least ready’. It also enables the government to time the election when they are doing well in the opinion polls, and to stoke up their support through good news announcements and giveaway budgets. Petra Schleiter’s research shows that this confers a significant electoral advantage: in the UK since 1945, the average vote share bonus realised on calling an early election was around 6%, and it doubled the likelihood that the incumbent PM survived in office.

Electoral fairness is the main argument for fixed terms, but not the only one. Other reasons include better planning in Whitehall because of greater certainty, less risk of losing legislation to a snap election, more clarity for the Electoral Commission and electoral administrators, and for the political parties. It is true that electoral certainty has not been much in evidence in recent years, with two early elections in 2017 and 2019. But it would be wrong to judge the FTPA solely on the basis of the extraordinary Brexit parliaments of 2015 and 2017. It is too early to rush to judgement, and it is too insular: most of the Westminster world, and almost all European parliaments have fixed terms, so there is plenty of wider experience to draw upon. A more balanced approach would ask – as the Lords Constitution Committee has done – whether the FTPA needs fine tuning, and if so what amendments are required, rather than rushing straight to repeal. Continue reading →

In defence of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act

Posted on by

The Fixed-term Parliaments Act has come in for a lot of criticism of late, but is it as badly designed and drafted as some commentators would have us believe? The House of Lords Constitution Committee recently commenced an inquiry into the effectiveness of the Act to seek answers to this question. Robert Hazell was one of the first witnesses to give oral evidence to the Committee, and in this blog , written with Nabila Roukhamieh-McKinna, he explains the background to the inquiry, and some of the key issues being addressed.

Background

With perfect timing, the House of Lords Constitution Committee announced on 25 July, the day after Boris Johnson became Prime Minister, that they planned to conduct an inquiry into the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 (FTPA). With even more exquisite timing, the Committee held their first evidence session on 4 September, the day that Johnson tried but failed to persuade the House of Commons to vote for an early general election under section 2(1) of the Act. Robert Hazell gave evidence in that first session on 4 September, supported by Nabila Roukhamieh-McKinna.

The FTPA attracted some controversy when it was passed, and contains a provision for a statutory review after ten years. Section 7 requires the Prime Minister to arrange next year for a committee to carry out a review, with a majority of its members being from the House of Commons. The current inquiry can be seen as the Lords gearing up for the statutory review.

The FTPA has been strongly criticised, and blamed for the deadlock in parliament, where the government remains in office but cannot deliver on its flagship policy. This is largely due to the Act’s stipulation that the support of two-thirds of MPs is required for an early dissolution. Formerly, the Prime Minister could make an issue a matter of confidence, such that its defeat would automatically trigger a general election. Professor Vernon Bogdanor laments this undermining of prime ministerial power, arguing that Theresa May was unable to threaten the Commons with dissolution, unlike Edward Heath in 1972 with the European Communities Bill.

Conversely, Sir Bernard Jenkin MP has accused the drafters of the FTPA of strengthening the Prime Minister. He refers specifically to the ambiguity about the 14-day period after the government loses a vote of no confidence, during which there is no requirement for the Prime Minister to resign. Similarly, Catherine Haddon writes that the Act has ‘done little but to frustrate and confuse,’ given its silence on what should happen during the 14 day period. Such criticisms are not new. In a debate in 2014 Sir Edward Leigh MP argued for its repeal, and Lord Grocott and Lord Desai have both introduced bills providing for such an outcome.

This rush to judgement seems premature, with only limited experience so far of the FTPA. It is also insular. Fixed terms tend to be the norm, in Europe and the Westminster world, and there are lessons to be learned from their experience. Robert Hazell’s written submission to the Lords Constitution Committee summarised the main lessons to be learned from overseas, drawing on the Constitution Unit’s detailed report on Fixed Term Parliaments published in 2010. This blog starts with a summary of the arguments for and against fixed terms, before addressing the main concerns raised about the FTPA. Continue reading →