How would Emmanuel Macron govern without a parliamentary majority?

An Emmanuel Macron presidency would not represent quite the political earthquake of a Marine Le Pen presidency, but in some respects it would nonetheless take France’s political system into uncharted territory. Macron’s En Marche! movement currently has no MPs and, even if it performs well at the parliamentary election in June, it is highly unlikely to win a majority. Andrew Knapp explains what this could mean for a Macron presidency, suggesting that the most likely possibility is the formation of a minority government relying on different majorities on different issues.

Emmanuel Macron could still lose to Marine Le Pen at the second round of France’s presidential election on 7 May. If he continues to behave as if he has already won – which he mostly has since his first-round victory on 23 April – voters could return the favour and stay at home for the run-off. Or he could perform disastrously at the debate with Le Pen set for 4 May. Or a particularly fruity scandal could break over his head (his declaration of his own net worth, for example, looks suspiciously modest when set alongside his earnings when a banker with Rothschild’s). Barring these eventualities, however, Macron will become the eighth President of the Fifth Republic: the margin of victory suggested by current polls (62 per cent to Le Pen’s 38), very much greater than that expected for the Remain vote in the UK, or for Hilary Clinton in the United States, could well be reduced, but is unlikely to be reversed. Macron would also be the Fifth Republic’s youngest president by a margin of nine years (the current record-holder is Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, elected in 1974 at age 48).

What then? Would President Macron govern, or merely reign? To categorise the Fifth Republic as a semi-presidential system, which it broadly is, does not take us very far towards an answer, because semi-presidential systems vary so widely among themselves. France’s President is clearly the EU’s most powerful head of state, which is why he (not, so far, she), and not the Prime Minister, represents France at the European Council. But is he also the most powerful head of the political executive of any EU state? That is more debatable. The formal powers vested in the President by the Constitution of the Fifth Republic are considerable, but quite insufficient to govern as he chooses. To do that, he needs the backing of a parliamentary majority. The chances of Macron getting that, in the legislative elections to be held on 11 and 18 June, are very uncertain.

Untangling those presidential powers that stem from the constitutional text from those that depend on circumstance is a favourite pastime of students of French politics. And the Macron case offers a new terrain for speculation in this area because his victory on 7 May would, in certain respects, take France’s political system into uncharted territory.

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Is the Fixed-term Parliaments Act a dead letter?

The ease with which Theresa May was able to secure an early dissolution last week has led to suggestions that the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 serves no useful purpose and should be scrapped. Drawing on wider evidence of how fixed-term parliaments legislation works in other countries, Robert Hazell argues that there is a danger that it is being judged prematurely, on the basis of a single episode. Future circumstances in which a Prime Minister seeks a dissolution may be different, and in these cases the Fixed-term Parliaments Act may serve as more of a constraint.

On 19 April the House of Commons voted by 533 votes to 13 to support the Prime Minister’s motion for an early general election, easily surpassing the two-thirds threshold required for dissolution under the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011. In the preceding debate Conservative MPs such as Sir Edward Leigh and Jacob Rees-Mogg argued that the Fixed Term Parliaments Act served no useful purpose, and should be scrapped; while others such as Peter Bone said that it demonstrated the Act was working. Which of them is right? Was this a vindication of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act, in allowing a degree of flexibility, with the formal decision to hold an early election now being made by parliament, and not the executive? Or did it show that the Act is an emperor without clothes, as Sir Edward Leigh put it, because no opposition party can ever be seen to vote against the prospect of an early election?

There is a risk of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act being judged prematurely, on the basis of a single episode. This blog draws on a wider evidence base of how fixed term parliaments legislation works in other countries, set out in our 2010 report on fixed-term parliaments.  Almost all European countries have fixed terms, and in the Westminster world fixed-terms have recently been introduced in Canada, as well as most of the Canadian provinces, and most of the Australian states; only the Australian federal parliament, New Zealand and Ireland have no fixed-term laws, but in Australia and New Zealand the maximum term is three years. These countries show varying degrees of flexibility, with differing safety valves for extraordinary dissolution.

Mid-term dissolution is the most crucial aspect of any fixed term parliament law, balancing the need for government stability against democratic accountability. Key considerations are how and by whom dissolution may be initiated, what threshold must be reached, and any limitations on the process. The coalition government in 2010 initially proposed a 55 per cent threshold for dissolution, but that proposal was widely misunderstood to apply to no confidence motions as well. In introducing the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill, Nick Clegg set the record straight, explaining that no confidence motions would still require a simple majority; but raised the bar for government initiated dissolutions to two thirds of all MPs, based on the two thirds requirement in the devolution legislation. The justification for a higher threshold for government-initiated dissolution is that it should make it impossible for governments to call an early election without significant cross-party support.

But such a dual threshold is rare in other parliaments. Figure 1 sets out the threshold requirements for dissolution and confidence motions elsewhere in Europe.  In all cases the threshold for a no confidence motion is a simple or absolute majority (an absolute majority being of the total number of MPs, rather than of those voting). In those cases where dissolution can be triggered by a parliamentary vote, the threshold is the same

Figure 1. Source: K. Strøm et al, Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), Table 4.12.

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Devolution in England: a review

On Monday 10 April Professor Tony Travers of the London School of Economics (LSE) spoke at a Constitution Unit seminar on devolution in England. The talk covered the history of English devolution, international comparisons, and some thoughts for the future amidst the current Brexit-dominated political landscape. Kasim Khorasanee reports.

English devolution – the delegation of powers, responsibility, and accountability from central Whitehall/Westminster government to sub-national levels – has had a fitful and uneven history. Its inevitable comparators are the devolution processes to Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales which took place from the late 1990s onwards. All three received national devolved governments and legislatures. More recently, Scotland and Wales have been the subjects of significant fiscal devolution. England, on the other hand, appears to have been left out in the cold – having no devolved government outside London, and both fewer MPs and lower public expenditure per head of population than other parts of the UK. Professor Travers explained that historically this trade-off was seen as necessary to maintain the Union – it was felt that an assertive England would dominate any federal union, for example its budget would be significantly larger than a federal UK government’s. However, devolution to the other UK nations had stirred something of a burgeoning sense of English identity.

English devolution – a brief history

Taking us on a canter through the history of English devolution, Travers began with Labour’s aborted attempts in the 1970s. The Kilbrandon Report (1973) recommended regional devolution within England, as well as legislatures for Wales and Scotland. The Layfield Report (1976) emphasised the importance of local accountability and responsibility for financial matters. Both failed to be implemented, and attempts at Scottish and Welsh devolution played a key part in the fall of the Labour government. The ensuing Conservative government in the 1980s brought to an end a number of significant devolved entities – metropolitan counties, the Greater London Council, and the Greater Manchester County Council. It was under Tony Blair’s Labour government that devolution received its new life. However, while Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland received devolved assemblies, regional devolution within England was stopped short by the North East referendum (2004). But the North East was offered ‘nothing like’ the powers devolved to Scotland and Wales. An opposition campaign, illustrating their point with a life-sized white elephant, convincingly defeated the devolution proposal by 78 per cent to 22 per cent. This left the idea of regions ‘doomed – possibly forever’. In terms of new elected bodies, the only significant change was hence the resurrection of London-wide government, with the establishment of the Greater London Assembly and London Mayor in 2000.

City regions and fiscal devolution

Travers flagged that ‘city regions’ have since taken over as the focus of English devolution efforts. He drew a parallel between Tony Blair’s presidential governing style, and his push for city regions to be led by further directly-elected mayors. This enthusiasm was carried on by David Cameron, who continued to build on his predecessor’s policy. City regional mayors were made a condition of greater devolution to combined authorities. Travers emphasised that the current legislative framework for English devolution envisaged highly ‘bespoke’ devolution across the country. In doing so he highlighted that this could result in wide – seemingly random – disparities in the functions devolved to different city regions. One area which appeared quite resistant to change, however, was fiscal devolution. Although the aforementioned Layfield Report, and more recently the London Finance Commission’s reports (2013 & 2017), called for localised responsibility for taxation, central government has traditionally been highly reluctant to implement this. Travers acknowledged that responsibility for local business rates was being devolved to local government by 2020, but pointed out that it was being offset by the phasing out of the central grant to councils.

To put the UK’s lack of fiscal devolution in context Travers drew on international comparisons. He cited OECD statistics setting out the UK’s sub-national tax-raising as 1.6 per cent of GDP. By comparison Sweden, Canada, and Germany all had figures of over 10 per cent, the OECD average sitting at 8.8 per cent. The UK was very much an outlier in this respect (see below).

Similarly there are far fewer taxes devolved to London when compared with other capitals such as New York, Berlin, Tokyo, and Paris. In sum there would have to be far more radical change than currently envisaged to bring the UK into alignment with OECD trends.

Current government policy

From speaking to civil servants, Travers identified that Theresa May’s Conservative government intended to shift its emphasis away from devolution. The current ongoing processes for the May 2017 elected mayors, the 2018 mayoral election in Sheffield, and the potential for a ‘North of Tyne’ combined authority and mayor, were the extent of the devolution policy horizon. In a piece of analysis which drew chuckles from the audience he cited the number of UK budget mentions of the phrases ‘devolution’, ‘Northern Powerhouse’, and ‘mayor’ between March 2013 and March 2017. There was a spike in mentions after the coalition – between 2015 and 2016 the average number of mentions of the three phrases per budget document was 31, 14, and 13 respectively. However this dropped sharply in Philip Hammond’s March 2017 budget to eight, one, and zero mentions respectively.

Mayors and communal identities

Travers suggested that the experience of London indicated that the introduction of directly elected mayors for city regions across the UK could have significant implications. As well as having a generally higher turnout compared to local elections, London’s mayoral elections have helped cement the idea of London as a political unit in people’s minds. Devolution can reinforce a sense of difference from the whole, and Travers drew attention to the fact that the three significant ‘Remain’ regions in the EU referendum – Greater London, Northern Ireland, and Scotland – were also the subjects of significant devolution (though the balance of votes in Wales was for ‘Leave’). In the case of London this sense of civic identity had not yet gained enough momentum to push for Scottish or Welsh-style devolution. However, Travers did note an increase in the number of news articles discussing London independence. He suspected that the incoming 2017 elected mayors would – as London’s mayor had historically done – lobby for increased powers once in office. As a body the mayors could hence potentially become a lobby for English devolution. Given the consistent electoral popularity of London’s mayors, and some of the high profile candidates for the incoming May 2017 mayoral elections, these positions might also increasingly prove a staging ground for national political careers.

Reflections

In considering why England was so centralised Professor Travers reflected on a variety of explanations – the historic power of the Crown, the end of Empire, and the conflicts with local government across the 1970s and 80s. Ultimately, he expressed uncertainty about the reason, but suggested that national politicians in the UK appear to instinctively have little faith in sub-national government. Ultimately the future of English devolution is tied up with wider forces – the fate of the Union, austerity and the financing of the state, and the Brexit process.

About the speaker

Professor Tony Travers is a Professor at the LSE, and Director of the LSE London research centre

About the author

Kasim Khorasanee is a Research Volunteer at The Constitution Unit

The Fixed-term Parliaments Act and the snap election

The Fixed-term Parliaments Act was supposed to have stopped Prime Ministers from calling snap general elections. But that is exactly what Theresa May seems to have done. Alan Renwick here explains what the rules say and why they have proved so weak.

We have become accustomed to a familiar choreography when general elections are called. Cabinet ministers gather to hear the Prime Minister’s decision. The Prime Minister drives to Buckingham Palace to request the dissolution of parliament from the Queen. Finally, the Prime Minister returns to Downing Street and announces the news to the world.

This time, the process is a little different. Cabinet ministers gathered. But Theresa May did not go to the Palace (we are told she spoke to the Queen by telephone yesterday, but there was no strict requirement for her to do so). Rather, following her announcement of what – interestingly – she described as the government’s intention to hold an election, Theresa May now has to seek parliamentary approval for the decision.

This is the consequence of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act, which was passed under the Conservative–Lib Dem coalition government in 2011. Previously, the Prime Minister could request an election whenever she wanted and the general expectation was that it would take exceptional circumstances for the Queen to refuse. Now, there are only two circumstances in which an early election can take place:

  • either two thirds of all MPs must vote for the election;
  • or the government must lose a vote of confidence and fourteen days must pass without the successful creation of a new government.

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The Easter Act 1928: a date with history

The Easter Act 1928 sets the date of Easter as the first Sunday after the second Saturday in April. However, the commencement order to bring it into force has never been passed. Kasim Khorasanee considers the age-old dispute over the date of Easter – and its place in the debate over the role of Christianity in British life.

Easter, the celebration of the resurrection of Jesus Christ, is perhaps the most important date in the Christian calendar. However, disagreement over when to mark it dates back to the earliest years of Christianity. Originally celebrated to coincide with Passover on the 14th day of Nisan in the Jewish calendar, dispute arose when certain churches moved to celebrate it on the following Sunday.

The separation from the Jewish calendar was endorsed by the First Council of Nicea in 325 A.D. In 1582 A.D. a further split occurred when the Roman Catholic and Protestant churches adopted the Gregorian calendar to improve the accuracy of the Easter date. The Orthodox churches maintained the older calculations relying on the Julian calendar. This distinction between the churches remains to this day and is reflected in other important dates, such as the celebration of Christmas.

The League of Nations and passage of the Easter Act 1928

The lunar calculations underlying the timing of Easter cause it to ‘float’ relative to the calendar date. For this reason the Protestant and Roman Catholic celebration of Easter can fall any time between 22 March and 25 April. This variation was identified as ripe for reform by the ‘Advisory and Technical Committee for Communications and Transit’ of the League of Nations. (Other issues on the Committee’s agenda included deciding whether a year should have twelve or thirteen months!) Representatives of the Roman Catholic, Orthodox, and Anglican churches joined the committee, and a report issued in 1926 endorsed stabilising the date of Easter on the Sunday after the second Saturday in April. This proposal, supported by the Archbishop of Canterbury, was carried into UK law in the form of the Easter Act 1928.

However, commencement of the Easter Act was left subject to the passage of a statutory instrument through the affirmative procedure. This procedure requires both chambers of parliament to vote on a commencement order to bring the Easter Act into force. The Easter Act also specified that before bringing any such vote, ‘…regard shall be had to any opinion officially expressed by any Church or other Christian body.’ At present the Easter Act remains on the statute books, awaiting a commencement order to bring it into force.

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PACAC’s report on the EU referendum opens important questions that deserve further attention

Yesterday, the House of Commons Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee (PACAC) published a report (summarised here) on Lessons Learned from the EU Referendum. Media headlines have focused on the committee’s concerns about possible interference during the referendum campaign by cyber hackers but, as Alan Renwick writes, the report also raised other important issues that deserve further attention.

The House of Commons Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee (PACAC) yesterday published a report on the conduct of last year’s EU referendum. The headlines in media reporting of this for the most part highlighted the committee’s concerns about possible interference during the referendum campaign by cyber hackers. But the MPs also draw out various other important lessons that might be learnt for any future referendums held in the UK. These deserve our careful attention.

Many of the proposals ought to be uncontroversial. The committee adds its weight to calls for extension of the so-called ‘purdah’ period – when state resources cannot be used in support of either side in the campaign – beyond the current 28 days. That would prevent any repeat of the pro-Remain leaflet that the government sent to all households last year at a cost of over £9 million to taxpayers. It would be a desirable step – though, as I suggest below, not the only necessary step – towards the creation of a level playing field in referendum campaigns.

The MPs also urge an updating of the purdah rules – written in 2000 – to reflect the realities of campaigning in the digital age. There was confusion last year as to whether those rules allowed a website promoting the government’s position that was created before the ‘purdah’ period to remain live during that period. The committee sensibly argues that his should be reviewed with a view to providing clarity.

Turning to the system for registering to vote, the committee – again very sensibly – argues for changes designed to minimise the danger of any repeat of last year’s website crash, which forced a last-minute extension of the registration deadline just days before the vote took place.

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How can referendums in the UK be improved? Lessons learned from the EU referendum

Today, the House of Commons Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee (PACAC) published a report on Lessons Learned from the EU Referendum. The report touches on a variety of areas in relation to the conduct of referendums, including the role of referendums, the role of the civil service during referendum campaigns and cyber security. PACAC’s chair, Bernard Jenkin, outlines his committee’s findings, which they hope that the government will take heed of so that the country is ready for any future referendums.

Today, the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee (PACAC) has published its latest report on Lessons Learned from the EU Referendum. With Holyrood demanding a new Scottish independence referendum, it is clear that referendums have become a permanent part of the UK’s democratic system, with major implications for our system, which is based on representative democracy. PACAC’s report highlights the importance of clarity in relation to the role and purpose of referendums, and ensuring that referendums are conducted fairly and effectively.

PACAC argues that referendums are appropriate for resolving questions of key constitutional importance that cannot be resolved through the usual medium of party politics. PACAC also argues, however, that referendums are less satisfactory in the case of what might be called a ‘bluff call’ referendum when, as last June, the referendum is used by the government to try to close down an unwelcome debate. As well as a clear question, the outcome in either case must also be clear. That means there should be more clarity and planning by the government holding the referendum, so there is less of a crisis of uncertainty if they don’t get the answer they want, as in the EU referendum.

PACAC considered four other areas in relation to the conduct of referendums: the fairness of the so-called ‘purdah’ period; the administration of the referendum; the role of the civil service during a referendum campaign; and cyber security.

On purdah, the government claimed at the time that the purdah provisions would impair the functioning of government. However, these provisions were of critical importance to the fair conduct of the referendum. The purdah provisions should be strengthened and clarified for future referendums and PACAC supports the Law Commission’s proposals to consolidate the law regulating the conduct of referendums. Additionally, PACAC asserts that the purdah restrictions should be updated to reflect the digital age, and extended to cover the full ten weeks of the referendum period, as recommended by the Electoral Commission.

With regard to the administration of the referendum, the evidence gathered during PACAC’s inquiry suggests that, while not without some faults, the EU referendum was on the whole run well.  PACAC commends the Electoral Commission for the successful delivery of the referendum, which was of enormous scale and complexity.

Nevertheless, there are lessons to be learned to improve planning and delivery in the future. During the EU referendum, one of the most significant problems was the collapse of the voter registration website, just hours before the registration deadline on 7 June. The government said that the collapse of the website was caused by ‘unprecedented demand’, with 515,256 online applications to register to vote recorded on 7 June alone.

According to the Electoral Commission, the problems that led to the website’s crash were aggravated by a large number of duplicate applications to register to vote. 38 per cent of applications made during the campaign were duplicate applications.  PACAC supports the Electoral Commission’s recommendation that the government should develop an online service to enable people to check whether they are already correctly registered to vote. This would be of invaluable assistance in preventing the Register to Vote website from collapsing again in the future, though PACAC says that the possibility of this collapse being the result of a cyber-attack cannot be ruled out. This is because the crash had indications of being a DDOS (distributed denial of service) ‘attack’, which PACAC understands is common and easy to do with botnets.

Another area PACAC identifies as requiring improvement is the designation process. During its inquiry, witnesses from both Britain Stronger In Europe and Vote Leave argued that there was a lack of clarity on the criteria used to designate campaigns. Additionally, Vote Leave argued that earlier designation would have been fairer, as the late date of designation brought several budgeting and cash-flow issues. PACAC recommend that the Electoral Commission review the designation process to examine where greater transparency could be achieved. This review should address whether earlier designation would have been fairer, and whether there should be a more explicit fit and proper person test for those applying for designation.

On the role of the civil service during referendum campaigns, PACAC regrets that the government did not accept the recommendation made by its predecessor committee, the Public Administration Select Committee (PASC), that there should be a new paragraph in the Civil Service Code to clarify the role and conduct of civil servants during referendums. The manner of the presentation of some government reports, particularly those from the Treasury (which have proved to be so inaccurate), and the decision to spend £9.3 million on sending a leaflet to all UK households advocating a Remain vote, were inappropriate and undermined public confidence in civil service impartiality. By clarifying the role of civil servants during a referendum campaign, PASC’s recommendation would have helped to avoid such controversies.

On cyber security, PACAC argues that it is important to be aware of the potential for foreign interference in referendums or elections. Lessons with regards to the protection and resilience of IT systems against possible foreign interference must also extend beyond the technical as while the US and UK understanding of cyber is predominantly technical and computer-network based, Russia and China use a cognitive approach based on understanding mass psychology and how to exploit individuals.  PACAC commends the government for promoting cyber security as a major issue for the UK, but argue that more must be done and that permanent machinery for monitoring cyber security in respect of elections and referendums should be established.

As alluded to already, PACAC is critical of the government’s lack of contingency planning for a Leave vote. In the run up to the 1975 referendum, Whitehall prepared for a possible UK exit from the Common Market with a ‘fairly intensive’ programme of Cabinet Office led contingency planning. In contrast, in the run up to the EU referendum last June, PACAC was alarmed to learn that the government’s official position was that there would be no contingency planning. The only exception to this policy was planning within the Treasury to anticipate the impact of a Leave vote on the UK’s financial stability. Although PACAC was relieved to learn that work was undertaken within the civil service on the potential implications of a Leave vote, civil servants should never have been asked to operate in a climate where contingency planning was banned. PACAC recommend that in the event of future referendums, civil servants should be tasked with preparing for both possible outcomes.

It is essential that referendums are well run, that they are conducted fairly, and that they command public trust and confidence.  PACAC hopes, therefore, that the government takes heed of its recommendations, so that the country is ready for any further referendums in the future.

PACAC’s full report on Lessons Learned from the EU Referendum can be read here.

About the author

Bernard Jenkin MP is the Chair of the House of Commons Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs select committee and the Conservative MP for Harwich and North Essex.