Devolution returns to Northern Ireland

Two years after the Democratic Unionist Party put the institutions of the 1998 Belfast/Good Friday Agreement into suspension by withdrawing from them, those institutions returned, and devolved government exists in Northern Ireland again, headed by a Sinn Féin First Minister. Negotiations between the UK government and DUP led to a deal, embodied in a white paper. Alan Whysall looks at the paper, and the prospects for the Agreement settlement.

How we got here

The history of the dispute has been set out on this blog and a recent Constitution Unit podcast. Briefly, a Protocol to the EU Withdrawal Agreement left Northern Ireland effectively within the EU single market for goods and customs arrangements. This avoided the necessity for a border within the island of Ireland, which would be acutely difficult in both political and practical terms; it gave Northern Ireland rights to trade freely in the EU as well as Great Britain. But potentially it inhibited trade with GB, the symbolism of which antagonised some unionists. Hardline pressure grew. The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) responded by withdrawing from the institutions in February 2022, thereby shutting them down.

The Windsor Framework, agreed between the UK and EU in 2023, was intended to respond to the DUP’s demands – but it stayed out. Negotiations went on, in private, between the DUP and London, reportedly involving Julian Smith, who more or less uniquely among recent secretaries of state is widely respected in Northern Ireland. There was also a brief interparty discussion in December in which the government made an offer of relief for Northern Ireland’s desperate public finances. But deadlines came and went.

Finally, a week or so ago, DUP leader Jeffrey Donaldson presented the proposals emanating from the negotiations to various party groupings; and securing majorities, albeit not it appears large ones, announced acceptance.

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Northern Ireland’s political institutions: time for change?

The Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee has published a report on the effectiveness of the institutions established by the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement. Alan Whysall argues that it is a much-needed contribution to informed debate. Its proposals for institutional change are unlikely to be implemented as cast. But similar reforms may be essential to the survival of the Agreement settlement.

Politics in Northern Ireland has been deadlocked for almost two years, leaving the institutions established by the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement unable to function. The Assembly does not meet; ministers have not been appointed to form an Executive; government is carried on by civil servants with very limited powers, with occasional interventions from London; there is financial disarray.

The leader of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), Jeffrey Donaldson, whose veto has led to the deadlock, has appeared for some months to be edging towards lifting it, despite profound differences of view between DUP leadership figures. Matters seemed to be coming to a head last week following publication of a British government offer to the main political parties of a financial package if devolution resumes. But it is now clear there will be no DUP decision before Christmas – although the Secretary of State, while announcing an improved financial package, declared that talks on resuming devolution were over: the government’s final offer was on the table. 

Into this context, the Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee published a timely report on the functioning of – and possible reforms to – the Agreement institutions. Though the report passed largely unnoticed outside Northern Ireland, this is much more than geekery. Institutional reforms may be essential to ensuring stable and effective government in the future, whatever the result of the current negotiations. Change will not be easy, however: the DUP opposed the report’s recommendations, and Sinn Féin appears cool towards them (see below). So the consensus that has generally been sought for changes to the Agreement is by no means present.

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Positioning for the next election

Today, the Unit published Monitor 85providing analysis of constitutional events over the last four months. It covers a continuing crisis of parliamentary scrutiny and political standards, a string of avoidable by-elections, the continuing stalemate in Northern Ireland, SNP travails in Scotland, electoral reform in Wales, and a failed referendum campaign in Australia. This post, which also serves as this issue’s lead article, outlines how the government and its opponents are starting to draw the battle lines for the next general election against a background of constitutional change and challenges throughout the United Kingdom.

Rishi Sunak marked his first anniversary as Prime Minister on 25 October. The legacy of his predecessors continued to dog him over the summer. Boris Johnson’s resignation from parliament in June – covered in the last issue of Monitor – triggered a by-election in his constituency of Uxbridge and South Ruislip. The Conservative Party hung on there, but lost four other by-elections in safe seats, three of which were called due to reasons related to Johnson’s departure. Meanwhile, the Covid-19 inquiry revealed what many saw as chaos at the heart of government.

Sunak sought to reset his image in September, as a Prime Minister focused on making the right long-term decisions. He acknowledged that ‘people in our country are frustrated with our politics’, saying, ‘I know that they dislike Westminster game playing, the short termism, and the lack of accountability.’ He pledged ‘a wholly new kind of politics’ with ‘space for a better, more honest debate about how we secure the country’s long-term interest.’ Announcing a shift in net zero policy, he added, ‘in a democracy, we must also be able to scrutinise and debate those changes’.

These were virtuous sentiments, chiming strongly with much of what defenders of core democratic and constitutional principles have been pressing for in recent years. But aspects of the speech appeared to undermine them. Some dropped policies had never actually existed. Sunak’s call for accountability and scrutiny was delivered on the first day of a parliamentary recess, leaving MPs unable to question him on his plans for almost a month. The Commons Speaker, Lindsay Hoyle, responded with a sharply worded rebuke.

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Why the UK government must take a different approach to restoring devolution in Northern Ireland

Alan Whysall discusses the prospects for the return of the Northern Ireland political institutions this autumn. He finds limited grounds for optimism and concludes that the responsibility for salvaging the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement settlement may now fall to the next British government. This post picks up themes from the author’s two most recent papers for the Constitution Unit, called Northern Ireland’s Political Future (NIPF) and The Agreement at 25.

As the July issue of Monitor recorded, visits from US President Joe Biden and other notables to celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement had little apparent effect on Northern Ireland politics; nor did local government elections, at which Sinn Féin emerged triumphant. The principal Agreement institutions remained in abeyance, vetoed by the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), which remains concerned about the Northern Ireland Protocol and Windsor Framework. At the time of writing, tensions are growing over policing, potentially deepening the political standoff. Northern Ireland meanwhile is being governed without government by civil servants who have very limited authority, together with occasional interventions from London.

Will devolution come back?

Before the summer, many commentators believed that the DUP would reach a deal in the autumn, claiming credit for aspects of the Windsor Framework, to bring back the institutions. This remains possible – many DUP careers depend on their existence. There have been suggestions of progress behind the scenes in the last few days. But it is now harder to be confident. Stasis until the UK general election seems possible, while the political, social and economic fabric of Northern Ireland deteriorates. Why?

First, the DUP may find compromise over the Protocol difficult. Negotiations are apparently going on between the party and the government, informed by a private 18-page DUP wish list. Its public demands for action on the Protocol, and on the threats it sees in it to Northern Ireland’s constitutional position, have been vaguely expressed, but the implication is that they are substantial. It seems unlikely that London can do very much to satisfy them without reopening the Protocol or the Agreement itself: and it has warned that it cannot do significantly more. So DUP supporters may be disappointed in any feasible compromise, and according to polling, they largely endorse the hard line taken so far. Senior party figures may be obdurate too, whatever the leader, Jeffrey Donaldson, wants: the former deputy leader, Lord (Nigel) Dodds of Duncairn, spoke vehemently of the ‘many unresolved and outstanding problems’ created by the Framework, suggesting London was merely peddling spin.

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Perspectives on the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement: new evidence and insights

The Constitution Unit today publishes a new report examining diverse perspectives on the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement. Through interviews, focus groups, and documentary analysis, it reveals different understandings, preferences, hopes, and fears, in Northern Ireland and beyond. As efforts continue to restore Northern Ireland’s power-sharing institutions, authors Alan Renwick and Conor J. Kelly argue that only by listening to these many viewpoints can progress be made.

Recent months have seen numerous celebrations marking the 25th anniversary of the Belfast or Good Friday Agreement. After decades of violence, the Agreement brought peace and relative political stability to Northern Ireland. Emerging after years of effort by both the British and Irish governments, and actors in Northern Ireland, it was approved by large majorities in referendums in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. It is a unique and carefully constructed document, and it remains the cornerstone of consensual politics in Northern Ireland today.

Yet the Agreement also faces serious challenges. Some aspects have not functioned as imagined in 1998, or indeed been implemented at all. The main ‘Strand 1’ institutions established through the Agreement – the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive – have repeatedly collapsed or been suspended. They last functioned in early 2022, and negotiations to restore them are ongoing as we write. Tensions generated by Brexit and the Protocol have created a period of fractious politics that has been deeply destructive of trust. As Alan Whysall has repeatedly warned on this blog, the situation is grave.

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