Tag Archives: scottish parliament

Protecting the rule of law in public health emergencies  

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The Covid-19 pandemic tested the UK’s capacity to respond to a crisis, including its ability to maintain the rule of law. The Independent Commission on UK Public Health Emergency Powers considered how far current legal frameworks and parliamentary procedures protect the rule of law and human rights, and how far they promote accountability, transparency and parliamentary control of executive action. Its final report and recommendations are summarised here by Katie Lines.  

Towards the end of this week, on 18 July, the UK Covid-19 Inquiry will publish its first interim report on the UK’s resilience and preparedness for the coronavirus pandemic. ‘Resilience and preparedness’ is one of many topics the UK Inquiry aims to cover in its terms of reference, which include health and social care, and economic responses to Covid-19. However, the constitutional and rule of law dimensions of the UK’s Covid-19 response fall outside the Inquiry’s key areas of focus, as do parliamentary proceedings during the pandemic. These items are also not central to the Scottish Covid-19 Inquiry’s investigations. 

To ensure that the constitutional dimensions of the Covid-19 pandemic receive independent scrutiny, in 2022 the Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law established the Independent Commission on UK Public Health Emergency Powers. The Commission published its report on 15 May this year after 15 months of intensive work by the 12 Commissioners, chaired by former Court of Appeal judge Sir Jack Beatson. The Commission considered both written and oral evidence, and comments on their preliminary findings, from 82 individuals and organisations across the UK and in 10 other jurisdictions. The report’s 44 recommendations for change cover the design of legislation, the role of parliaments, the clarity and certainty of emergency public health laws, the enforcement of public health restrictions, and the management of a public health emergency in a country with devolved governments and legislatures. This blog highlights some of the Commission’s key recommendations. 

The role of parliaments 

The Commission has significant concerns about the extent to which the UK Parliament and the three devolved legislatures were able to provide appropriate scrutiny and oversight of government law-making during the Covid-19 pandemic. A number of its recommendations focus on enhancing the role of parliaments.  

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Devolution in the 2024 party manifestos 

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The parties contesting the general election have now published their manifestos, allowing exploration and comparison of their constitutional proposals. In this fourth post in a series on the manifestos, Patrick Thomas examines the commitments on devolution, and considers what these might mean for the future of the UK. 

It has now been a quarter of a century since the devolved institutions in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales were established. Twenty-five years on, devolution remains a live issue in all but one of the 2024 manifestos. But this inclusion of the constitutional questions around devolution is where the commonalities largely stop.  

The 2024 manifestos present four different visions and approaches in the area of devolution. The Conservative Party displays a hesitancy and even hostility towards devolution, and an instinctive desire to assert Westminster power. The Labour Party, on the other hand, clearly likes the system it created in 1998 and so sets out a vision for reasserting the status quo. The Liberal Democrats seek to take devolution much further, by making the UK a federal state. And the Scottish National Party and Plaid Cymru share a vision of ever greater devolution, at least partly in hope that it will further their end goal of independence from the UK. Two other manifestos do not present a vision for devolution, but in very different ways. The Green Party manifesto acknowledges the importance of devolution but seeks to stay out of the debate, while supporting freedom of choice. Reform UK, on the other hand, simply ignores devolution entirely. 

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In praise of fixed-term parliaments

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The surprise general election may leave many suddenly nostalgic for the principle of fixed-term parliaments. The original central arguments for fixed terms have been reawakened. In this post, Meg Russell and Robert Hazell revisit these long-standing arguments, summarise the birth and death of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011, and argue that – on the basis of UK and international experience – we should consider returning Westminster to fixed terms. 

The lengthy and debilitating speculation about when Rishi Sunak might call the general election may have reminded many of the arguments in favour of fixed-term parliaments. His shock announcement on 22 May that such an election would take place in July only reinforces those views. This blog post revisits the arguments for fixed terms, reminds readers of how the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 (FTPA) was created and abolished, and argues for reintroduction of the principle of fixed terms – albeit with flexibility to allow early elections on occasion, as applies in many other democracies (and existed under the FTPA). 

The arguments for fixed-term parliaments 

The following is a summary of points in favour of the principle of fixed-term parliaments: 

  • Allowing the government to decide the timing of elections provides an unjustified incumbency advantage. 
  • It also confers disproportionate power on the executive over parliament. 
  • A fixed election cycle is better for both civil service and electoral administration planning, and encourages more long-term thinking in government. 
  • Fixed terms are also better for political parties, prospective parliamentary candidates, and the regulation of election spending. 
  • Speculation about an early election may unnecessarily unsettle commercial and economic decisions. 
  • Parliamentary business, including the work of select committees, can be planned and carried through with less risk of interruption.  

These are not our words; they are drawn (mostly verbatim) from the report of the cross-party parliamentary Joint Committee on the Fixed-term Parliaments Act (paragraph 17), published in March 2021. Based on recent experience, some of them may now feel very familiar. 

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The new voting system for mayors and PCCs: how it affects democracy

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This month’s elections for mayors and police and crime commissioners were contested under a revised voting system. In a post published yesterday, Alan Renwick found that this change had a substantial impact on the results, to the benefit of the Conservatives. Here, he concludes that it also harmed democracy. 

Elections of mayors and police and crime commissioners (PCCs) were previously held under the Supplementary Vote (SV) system, where each voter could express first and second preferences. Now they take place using First Past the Post (FPTP), where there is a vote for a single candidate. The previous post in this series showed that this change produced a marked shift in the outcome of the elections held earlier this month, and that it did so entirely to the benefit of the Conservatives.  

That a change in the rules should favour those in power who instigated it is already cause for concern: democracy requires a level playing field. But ministers might defend the reform on the basis that the new system is superior on democratic grounds to its predecessor and that it was introduced fairly. Both of these claims therefore require interrogation. How do the two systems compare in terms of democratic quality? And was the process through which the change in voting system came about appropriate?  

Which voting system is more democratic? 

As I outlined in a blogpost published when the bill changing the voting system was before parliament in 2021, ministers argued that FPTP is the more democratic system: SV, they said, allows losing candidates – those coming second in terms of first preferences – to win. But this argument is circular: it works only if we have already accepted the FPTP definitions of ‘winner’ and ‘loser’.  

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What should happen when MPs resign? Why the Commons should have control of the departure of its members and MPs should not be offered post-dated peerages

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The resignation of Nadine Dorries prompted questions about how, and in what circumstances, an MP should leave office. In this post (the first of two), former senior House of Commons official David Natzler argues that it is wrong for the executive to have the final say over MPs’ departures, and that MPs should not be offered peerages until after they have left the Commons.

On 25 August the backbencher and former Cabinet minister Nadine Dorries, MP for Mid Bedfordshire, announced that she had formally applied for the position of Crown Steward and Bailiff of the Chiltern Hundreds. The appointment was duly made on 29 August and she ceased thereby to be a member of the House of Commons. The writ for a by-election was ordered when the Commons returned from its summer recess on 4 September, with delayed effect until 12 September: unlike the writ for Rutherglen and Hamilton West caused by the successful recall petition against Margaret Ferrier, which was ordered at the same sitting but with immediate effect. As a result, the by-election to replace Dorries will not be held until 19 October. This was in the news primarily because more than 10 weeks earlier, on 9 June, Dorries stated that she had informed the Conservative Chief Whip that she was ‘standing down as the MP for Mid Bedfordshire with immediate effect’. That day saw the publication of the resignation honours list of former Prime Minister Boris Johnson, and both she and fellow Johnson loyalist Nigel Adams had been widely tipped to receive peerages. Neither did, apparently following doubts expressed by the House of Lords Appointments Commission (HOLAC). Johnson announced his resignation as an MP later on 9 June and was appointed to the Chiltern Hundreds on 12 June. Adams announced his resignation on 10 June – using identical words to Dorries about ‘standing down with immediate effect’ –  and was duly appointed as Steward of the Manor of Northstead on 13 June.

It soon became clear that Dorries had not actually resigned and that she had no immediate intention of doing so. On 14 June she said that it was still ‘absolutely my intention to resign’ but that she was awaiting information she had sought from the Cabinet Office and HOLAC on her non-appointment to the House of Lords. On 29 June she stated on her weekly TalkTV show that ‘I’ve resigned… I’ll be gone long before the next general election.’ Criticism mounted from Conservative MPs, and within her constituency, most conspicuously from first Flitwick and then Shefford town councils, both of whom published letters they had sent to her. These focused primarily on allegations that she was failing in her duties to her constituents, both in terms of her failure over a period of many months to speak or vote or attend the House of Commons, and of her refusal to hold constituency surgeries or play an active role in the constituency. Rishi Sunak suggested during an LBC radio interview on 2 August that her constituents were not being properly represented, and thereafter several ministers and backbench Conservatives were similarly critical. She continued however to receive the Conservative whip. And of course, she continued to receive her salary. 

Political drama aside, does this story hold any lessons for the way parliament and the constitution should function? I believe that it illustrates several issues, although they are not all capable of resolution: specifically, the grant of peerages to MPs; the practice and process used by MPs to resign their seats; the expectations of attendance of MPs at Westminster; and MPs’ work for and in their constituencies. The first two of these matters will be covered in this post. The latter two will be discussed in a post that will appear on this blog tomorrow.

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