On 25 May the Constitution Unit invited three electoral experts to give their analysis on the results of the recent devolved elections in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. In this post Artur Foguet Gonzalez summarises their key insights.
The fifth round of elections to the devolved parliaments and assemblies in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland took place on 5 May. On 25 May the Constitution Unit hosted three electoral experts – Professors Ailsa Henderson, Roger Scully and Cathy Gormley-Heenan – to digest the results. This post summarises the key points that were raised by the speakers.
Scotland: Professor Ailsa Henderson, University of Glasgow
Scotland awoke the morning after the election to two significant results: the Scottish National Party (SNP) was still the largest party in Holyrood but no longer held a majority, whilst Labour’s decline continued as it fell behind the Conservatives to become the third largest party in Scotland. Ailsa Henderson used her data from the Scottish Election Study (SES) to explain these results.
For the SNP three factors explain their continued popularity: the constitution, valence and leadership. Though the data shows that the constitution is not top of voters’ agenda, it also shows that voters are very unlikely to back a party that does not share their view on independence, so whilst the constitution may not be driving voter choice, it is a constraining factor. The SNP was the only party likely to collect votes from those who had supported independence in the 2014 referendum, whilst No voters were split between multiple parties. On valence, when voters were asked which party they trusted most on particular issues the SNP came top, not only on ‘standing up for Scotland’ but on every single issue. Nicola Sturgeon, meanwhile, remains an extremely popular figure.
Plans for expanding the powers of the Scottish Parliament have developed rapidly since the Scottish referendum. Jim Gallagher takes advantage of the pause afforded by Parliament’s summer recess to take stock of the Scotland Bill’s progress, and consider the stability of increased decentralisation in the longer term.
Parliament’s summer recess is a good time to catch breath and reflect on the breakneck process of the Scotland Bill. This is constitutional legislation, but proceeding at the speed of an express train.
Express delivery of new powers for the Scottish Parliament was promised during the referendum campaign. The pro-union parties promised – in what was to become the Smith commission – to agree plans in very short order; then they made ‘The Vow’ about what those plans would contain (in, of all places, the Daily Record). The timetable demanded draft legislation before the general election, and a bill introduced immediately thereafter. All of this has duly happened.
The Scotland Bill is very similar to the pre-election draft, with changes to address points of criticism. It is faithful to the Smith recommendations: Virtually complete devolution of income tax – Check. Assignment of half of VAT – Check. Declaration of constitutional permanence for the Scottish Parliament, and legislative basis for (what we must still call) the Sewel Convention – Check. Devolving £2.5 billion of benefits – Check. So from any perspective this is major stuff.
After a dramatic referendum and UK general election, the Scottish remain divided on both independence and on whether to increase tax and public spending, while the English are becoming increasingly vocal in the devolution debate.Jim Gallagher considers the possibilities of a constitutional relationship that will satisfy Scottish aspirations and also be acceptable to the UK as a whole.
This is the second in a series of posts based on the Unit’s latest report, Devolution and the Future of the Union, publishedhere.
Within the last year the Scottish people have said two apparently contradictory things. They want to stay in the United Kingdom, and they want to be represented by the SNP. In Holyrood, the SNP exercise dominant control over both Parliament and government. In Westminster, they will be the overwhelming Scottish voice, but will control nothing.
The partisan politics of the general election have been extraordinary. The Labour vote collapsed, and the SNP showed remarkable skill in building a coalition of voters, some for independence, others perhaps against austerity. But this tells us less about overall Scottish attitudes on either question than meets the eye. Scotland remains divided on both independence and on whether to increase tax and public spending, and not on the lines you might expect. Many independence supporters are anything but high spending socialists.
Alan Trench calls for a more systematic approach to intergovernmental relations between the devolved and UK governments. He argues that leaving matters to be handled in ad hoc, reactive, unstructured way is no longer an option.
Intergovernmental relations are key to making devolution work effectively. The Scottish Parliament, National Assembly for Wales and Northern Ireland Assembly all operate in a wider context of governance across the UK, and how their functions overlap with those of the UK government (and each other) is vital for all four governments and all UK citizens. The Smith Commission’s recent report pays a good deal of attention to the need to ‘beef up’ intergovernmental co-ordination as part of the package of further devolution.
The UK government is not very interested in managing intergovernmental relations, however. It put in place an attenuated under-institutionalised set of mechanisms in 1999, and has allowed these to weaken or fall further into disuse since then. The key institution is the Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC). Plenary meetings of this body ceased altogether between 2002 and 2008; they have been more or less annual since then, but are characterised by grandstanding rather than productive work. The JMC’s ‘Domestic’ format has nearly ceased to function, as so few policy issues concern more than one devolved government. The only established format of the JMC which does meet regularly, and does more or less what it was expected to, is the EU format which helps formulate the UK ‘line’ for major EU Council meetings, though there are problems even there. In reality, most intergovernmental issues are bilateral, and with few exceptions they are dealt with in an ad hoc, casual way, out of sight of public or legislatures. As a result many important issues slip through the net.
Federalism has rarely been seen as an attractive option by the British political class. Yet it may be the only solution to the deep imbalances which will come with radical new powers for the Scottish Parliament if the Smith Commission proposals are implemented, writes Stephen Tierney.
The Smith Commission Reportissued on Thursday promises a restructuring of the United Kingdom which may prove to be more significant than the devolution settlement of 1997-98 itself; the acquisition of extensive tax and welfare powers would make Scotland one of the most autonomous regions in western Europe.
Notably the UK’s economic and fiscal coherence has hitherto been a key factor in allowing the asymmetrical and ad hoc nature of devolution to embed itself without any great disruption to the constitutional structures of the central state. With the dismantling of this system it seems that a tipping point might well be reached for our lop-sided and messy system of territorial government. The Smith Commission proposals, if implemented, will have knock-on consequences for several fundamental features of the UK constitution: parliamentary supremacy, the idea of the House of Commons as a national chamber for Britain, possibly the nature and composition of the House of Lords, and the relative freedom of the UK Government in its dealings with the devolved executives. It is perhaps ironic therefore, but I believe also inevitable, that a process which was designed studiously to avoid the federal question will now bring federalism to the table as possibly the only medium term solution to the deep imbalances which will come with further, radical powers for the Scottish Parliament.
How does Smith raise the federal question?
Federalism has rarely been seen as an attractive option by the British political class, and its feasibility as a constitutional project for Britain is certainly not beyond question. But some kind of federal solution will surely be needed to deal with two related issues: the extent to which Scotland’s representation within the House of Commons, so far only marginally affected by devolution (reduced from 72 to 59 by way of the Scotland Act 1998 as amended), will appear ever more anomalous as the Scottish Parliament’s powers expand; and the very real risk that as Scotland becomes ever more detached from Westminster, the Union will become largely irrelevant to many Scots. The latter is far more dangerous since it could well mean that Scottish independence is in the longer term now more rather than less likely. If this is true the unionist parties, which make up the majority of the Smith ‘Commission’ (which was in reality an inter-party bargaining group), risk seizing defeat from the jaws of referendum victory.
Stephen Tierney expresses concerns over the Smith Commission timetable, highlighting that the speed leaves little time for appropriate due diligence and detracts from the democratic credibility of the process. He argues that there is a need for restraint, and a more independent and inclusive review over a longer period.
In the month of November the Smith Commission is set to draw up the most significant programme of constitutional change for the United Kingdom since 1998. Already the period within which citizens could submit their views on this process has passed; the Commission having set a deadline of 5 p.m. on 31 October.
Such a rapid process runs counter to both the due diligence that is surely needed before any decision is taken to restructure the UK tax (and possibly welfare) systems so radically and the due process which ought to accompany such a seminal constitutional development. Unfortunately the principles of deliberative constitutional decision-making and popular democratic engagement which figured strongly in the recent independence referendum are unlikely to gain much traction in the current rush to change.
The referendum campaign was indeed a remarkable period of citizen empowerment. The turnout of 84.7% is only one dimension of this; in a deeper way many citizens were greatly invigorated by the referendum and the role they had in discussing and ultimately in making such a huge decision. The Smith Commission process, by contrast, bears all the hallmarks of a return to elite-led constitutional change; and it is deeply ironic that the impetus for such a rapid and party-led process should be the independence referendum itself. As the 18th of September approached and the polls seemed to tighten, the leaders of the main unionist parties issued ‘The Vow’, promising more powers for the Scottish Parliament and setting out a firm timetable for change.
October’s seminar at the Constitution Unit entitled ‘The Day After Judgement: Scotland and the UK after the Referendum’responded to the vote on independence held in Scotland on 18 September. Professor Jim Gallagher and Professor Iain McLean discussed the future of the UK Union and the devolution of power from Westminster to Holyrood. Julian Payne reports.
At the Scottish independence referendum on 18 September more than 55% of Scots voted in favour of remaining in the United Kingdom. Last week, at the latest Constitution Unit seminar, the repercussions of this decision were discussed by Professor Jim Gallagher and Professor Iain McLean, both distinguished academics with extensive experience in devolution. The speakers emphasised that following the referendum it would be wrong to assume that we can revert to ‘business as usual’. Instead, what is required is a system of devolution for Scotland that is in line with the Union that was defended in the referendum.
The question of a referendum was first raised in 2007 when the Scottish National Party (SNP) formed a minority government in Scotland. Polling data going back to 1999 suggested that an independence referendum was never going to yield a majority yes vote. Why did the SNP say they wanted a referendum when the Scottish Parliament did not have the legal power to hold one and data suggested they were going to lose anyway? According to Prof. McLean, the insistence on a referendum for Scottish independence can be attributed to ‘cheap talk’ – it cost nothing to say and it would be voted down in the Scottish Parliament anyway. However, the election of an SNP majority administration in Edinburgh in 2011 and the promise of a referendum in the SNP manifesto meant that there was no turning back.