What should happen when MPs resign? Why the Commons should have control of the departure of its members and MPs should not be offered post-dated peerages

The resignation of Nadine Dorries prompted questions about how, and in what circumstances, an MP should leave office. In this post (the first of two), former senior House of Commons official David Natzler argues that it is wrong for the executive to have the final say over MPs’ departures, and that MPs should not be offered peerages until after they have left the Commons.

On 25 August the backbencher and former Cabinet minister Nadine Dorries, MP for Mid Bedfordshire, announced that she had formally applied for the position of Crown Steward and Bailiff of the Chiltern Hundreds. The appointment was duly made on 29 August and she ceased thereby to be a member of the House of Commons. The writ for a by-election was ordered when the Commons returned from its summer recess on 4 September, with delayed effect until 12 September: unlike the writ for Rutherglen and Hamilton West caused by the successful recall petition against Margaret Ferrier, which was ordered at the same sitting but with immediate effect. As a result, the by-election to replace Dorries will not be held until 19 October. This was in the news primarily because more than 10 weeks earlier, on 9 June, Dorries stated that she had informed the Conservative Chief Whip that she was ‘standing down as the MP for Mid Bedfordshire with immediate effect’. That day saw the publication of the resignation honours list of former Prime Minister Boris Johnson, and both she and fellow Johnson loyalist Nigel Adams had been widely tipped to receive peerages. Neither did, apparently following doubts expressed by the House of Lords Appointments Commission (HOLAC). Johnson announced his resignation as an MP later on 9 June and was appointed to the Chiltern Hundreds on 12 June. Adams announced his resignation on 10 June – using identical words to Dorries about ‘standing down with immediate effect’ –  and was duly appointed as Steward of the Manor of Northstead on 13 June.

It soon became clear that Dorries had not actually resigned and that she had no immediate intention of doing so. On 14 June she said that it was still ‘absolutely my intention to resign’ but that she was awaiting information she had sought from the Cabinet Office and HOLAC on her non-appointment to the House of Lords. On 29 June she stated on her weekly TalkTV show that ‘I’ve resigned… I’ll be gone long before the next general election.’ Criticism mounted from Conservative MPs, and within her constituency, most conspicuously from first Flitwick and then Shefford town councils, both of whom published letters they had sent to her. These focused primarily on allegations that she was failing in her duties to her constituents, both in terms of her failure over a period of many months to speak or vote or attend the House of Commons, and of her refusal to hold constituency surgeries or play an active role in the constituency. Rishi Sunak suggested during an LBC radio interview on 2 August that her constituents were not being properly represented, and thereafter several ministers and backbench Conservatives were similarly critical. She continued however to receive the Conservative whip. And of course, she continued to receive her salary. 

Political drama aside, does this story hold any lessons for the way parliament and the constitution should function? I believe that it illustrates several issues, although they are not all capable of resolution: specifically, the grant of peerages to MPs; the practice and process used by MPs to resign their seats; the expectations of attendance of MPs at Westminster; and MPs’ work for and in their constituencies. The first two of these matters will be covered in this post. The latter two will be discussed in a post that will appear on this blog tomorrow.

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Can muscular unionism save the Union?

Several UK politicians have been described as embracing a ‘muscularform of unionism, which includes taking a hard line against the possibility of constituent parts of the UK leaving the Union. As Iain McLean warns, muscular unionism can look like ‘know your place unionism’ and history has shown that such a muscular approach can backfire and hasten the very secession it seeks to prevent.

The phrase ‘muscular unionism’ is new but the concept is not. As Prime Minister, Boris Johnson called Scottish devolution ‘a disaster north of the border’. Liz Truss said while campaigning for the Conservative leadership that she would ‘ignore’ the ‘attention seeker’, First Minister Nicola Sturgeon. She was true to her word, never contacting Sturgeon or Mark Drakeford, First Minister of Wales, during her premiership. Lord (David) Frost, who served as a member of Johnson’s Cabinet, recently wrote:

The Scottish “government” is not the government of a state in confederation with England. It is a subordinate entity within the UK, with powers granted to it by the UK government and Parliament, and ultimately subject to the supremacy of that Parliament.

It does indeed sound muscular, but it ended in tears and self-contradiction last time, and there is no reason to expect differently this time. The UK government would be well advised to become a little weedier than PMs Johnson or Truss. Rishi Sunak contacted Sturgeon and Drakeford on his first full day in office as Prime Minister. Is this a hopeful sign?

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As the House of Commons begins to look at a new employment model for MPs’ staff, we should look to other legislatures to see what we can learn from them

A Speaker’s Conference has been established to determine if changes need to be made to the employment arrangements for MPs’ staff. How the UK’s other legislatures manage and recruit their staff can help inform that process. As part of a long-term project on MPs’ staff, Rebecca McKee analyses how three of the UK’s legislatures recruit, employ and pay members’ staff.   

While their precise roles vary, legislators almost everywhere require support staff in order to do their job effectively. In the UK, these staff and their employment arrangements have become the focus both of public attention and internal scrutiny, through a series of reviews in Westminster and the devolved parliaments of Scotland and Wales. Later this year, in the House of Commons, the Speaker’s Conference on the employment of Members’ staff will consider other options for staffing arrangements as those currently in place in are only one of a range of possibilities.

This post outlines the current staffing arrangements in three of the UK’s parliaments – the House of Commons, Scottish Parliament and Senedd Cymru – and the key similarities and differences in their employment arrangements. The post covers the key areas of governance, division of roles and salaries and recruitment in each area. It also briefly highlights other possible options from legislatures elsewhere.

Devolved parliaments

Referendums in 1997 paved the way for the creation of the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales, the latter being renamed the Senedd Cyrmu in 2020 following the Senedd and Elections (Wales) Act 2020. 

Both of these bodies adopted staffing arrangements similar to those of Westminster, whereby each member employs their own staff within a statutory regulatory framework covering some, but not all, terms and conditions. Each has a designated body responsible for determining the structure and rules on staffing and administering payrolls. The material they produce is a combination of guidance to members – as office holders who employ their staff, there is a balance to be struck between setting rules for best practice and encroaching on the autonomy of the member as the employer – and mandatory policies, such as the rules to be followed when members claim money for staff salaries.

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The Elections Bill’s proposals on Electoral Commission governance: risks to electoral integrity and devolution

The Elections Bill has been subject to both criticism and praise, as discussed by Emilia Cieslak on this blog, and a panel of experts at a recent Unit seminar. In this post, Unit Deputy Director Alan Renwick identifies the threats to electoral integrity and devolution posed by the clauses of the bill that propose changes to the governance of the Electoral Commission.

The Elections Bill, currently before parliament, seeks to change many aspects of electoral law. Provisions to introduce voter ID requirements at polling stations have garnered most attention. But changes to the governance of the Electoral Commission also raise serious concerns. As currently formulated, they threaten both to weaken the vital independence of the elections watchdog and to violate the principles of the devolution settlement in Scotland and Wales.

Electoral Commission governance: principles and current practice

The Electoral Commission carries out a range of functions in overseeing elections and referendums and regulating campaign spending. As I have argued previously – in common with many others, not least the Committee on Standards in Public Life (CSPL) in a report published in July – the independence of the elections watchdog is vital to electoral integrity. If the government of the day can skew election or referendum conduct to suit its own ends, fairness – and thus democracy – is undermined. The Electoral Commission should, of course, be accountable too. An appropriate balance of independence and accountability is needed.

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