Tag Archives: orders in council

What is constitutional monarchy, and what is its role in the UK? 

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Constitutional monarchies are governed by elected parliaments and governments; but a monarch remains head of state and plays various important roles. Lisa James and Robert Hazell explain the UK monarchy’s constitutional role, its impact, and the questions that would need to be addressed should the UK ever decide to replace it. 

Background 

A constitutional monarchy is a system in which the head of state is a monarch, but that person does not rule the country. Governing is undertaken instead by an elected parliament and government. In the UK, the monarch’s involvement in politics has gradually diminished over the centuries, to the point where they effectively no longer exercise political power.  

The UK is not alone in having a constitutional monarchy. There are seven other monarchies in Europe, which are very similar to the UK system. The main difference is one of size: the UK has a much larger population than most European monarchies, and a larger royal family to service it.  

The UK’s monarchy is also uniquely international: the British monarch is head of state for 14 other ‘realms’ such as Canada, Australia, Jamaica and Papua New Guinea. 

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Public appointments: what are they, and why do they matter?

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Public appointments – senior appointments made by ministers to various public service roles – are vital to the working of government, but some have attracted controversy in recent years. Lisa James explains how public appointments work, and how they might be reformed.

Background

Public appointments – various senior appointments made by ministers to public bodies – can have a major impact on how well the public sector operates. Though the system often works smoothly, recent years have seen some high-profile controversies linked to public appointments, notably those surrounding Paul Dacre’s application to be chair of Ofcom, and the appointment of Richard Sharp as chair of the BBC. These and other cases have raised questions about whether the system now needs additional safeguards.

Why do public appointments matter?

These appointments include senior roles across a wide range of public bodies – including delivery or policy advisory bodies, regulators and funders, as well as departmental non-executive directors. They also include individual roles (for example, commissioners for victims, further education, or children).

The holders of public appointments can therefore have a major impact on the successful delivery of policy and services. A well-functioning public appointments process, which can engage and deliver the best candidates, matters for the quality of governance. This is demonstrated in countries where control over appointments has allowed backsliding leaders (i.e. those who seek to erode democracy) to install allies in key positions.

Given that the holders of public appointments are so important to the working of government, ministers understandably want to be confident that these posts are held by people who are in sympathy with their aims and approach. But it is important for public trust – and successful delivery – that appointments are also made on merit, and cronyism or patronage is guarded against.

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Parliament’s watchdogs: independence and accountability of five constitutional regulators

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The Unit today published a new report, Parliament’s Watchdogs: Independence and Accountability of Five Constitutional Regulators. Robert Hazell explains that public awareness of these regulators is low and the position of some of them in public life is precarious. He calls for several measures, including putting the CSPL on a statutory footing, protecting watchdogs from dismissal, and repealing the legislation allowing the government to produce a strategy statement for the Electoral Commission.

Origins of this study

The constitutional reforms of the last 25 years have seen an upsurge in the number of constitutional watchdogs. The Constitution Unit anticipated these developments from the start, with an early report on constitutional watchdogs in 1997 (Unit report no. 10). This interest was continued by Oonagh Gay and Barry Winetrobe, who wrote two major reports on watchdogs: Officers of Parliament: Transforming the Role (Unit report no. 100, 2003) and Parliament’s Watchdogs: At the Crossroads(Unit report no. 144, 2008).

Today sees the launch of a new report, Parliament’s Watchdogs: Independence and Accountability of Five Constitutional Regulators, (Unit report 195), by Marcial Boo, Zach Pullar and myself. Marcial Boo, former Chief Executive of IPSA, joined the Constitution Unit in late 2020 as an honorary research fellow. We asked him to do a study of those watchdogs which are directly sponsored by parliament, working with Zach Pullar, a young law graduate who has since become a Judicial Assistant in the Court of Appeal. There is an obvious tension with watchdogs whose role is to scrutinise the executive (like the Independent Adviser on Ministers’ Interests), being themselves appointed and sponsored by the government. Less obvious, but just as fundamental, is the tension for watchdogs whose role is to regulate the behaviour of parliamentarians, being themselves appointed and sponsored by parliament.

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Arrests, constitutional tensions and the UK government’s relations with Overseas Territories

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Overseas Territories flags (CC BY 2.0) by Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office.

The arrest of the Premier of the British Virgin Islands in April and a Commission of Inquiry’s finding of ‘parlous failings in governance’ have raised questions about the British government’s relations with and stewardship of its Overseas Territories. These issues are raised in moments of crisis, following natural disasters, acute periods in the several sovereignty disputes linked to the Territories, or headline-grabbing scandals. George Fergusson argues that they merit more regular review.

The decision on 8 June of a British official to reject the principal and firm recommendation of a Commission of Inquiry by a former Court of Appeal judge has produced little political or media stir. This is largely explained by the decision being one concerning a British Overseas Territory, in this case, the British Virgin Islands (BVI).

The recommendation was that a period of direct rule was needed to implement a series of urgent and radical reforms identified by Gary Hickinbottom’s damning report on corruption and ‘parlous failings in governance.’ As Hickinbottom wrote: ‘Such a suspension is not only warranted but essential, if the abuses which I have identified are to be tackled and brought to an end.’

The report’s publication was accelerated by several weeks after the dramatic arrest on 28 April of Andrew Fahie, the BVI’s premier, at Miami International Airport, together with the managing director of the BVI Port Authority, with all the classic movie trappings of a sting by the United States Drug Enforcement Agency.

Fahie’s arrest, unlike the decision on direct rule, was sensationally published across the British media. While the decision was formally made by the BVI’s Governor, John Rankin, this will have been in close consultation with Foreign Secretary Liz Truss and Amanda Milling, the minister responsible for Overseas Territories within the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO).

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