Where would an English Parliament be located?

Ongoing Constitution Unit research is exploring options for an English Parliament. The choice of location would have major practical implications, as well as being of high symbolic importance. Jack Sheldon sets out the factors that would need to be considered. He suggests that while a ‘dual mandate’ English Parliament would almost certainly meet at Westminster, a separately-elected body would most likely be located outside London.

Since last autumn Professor Meg Russell and I have been working on a research project exploring the options for an English Parliament. Although there have been various calls over the last 20 years to establish such a body, how might it actually be designed in practice? Unlike other issues relating to powers, functions, structure and composition, the decision on where to locate an English Parliament would not fundamentally affect constitutional arrangements. However, it would have major practical implications and be of high symbolic importance. This blog post focuses on the issues that would need to be considered in selecting a location and suggests how a decision might be reached.

The size of an English Parliament

Decisions on location would need to be made in light of the number of members an English Parliament would have. Our research has identified two competing models supported by proponents of an English Parliament, which point to different conclusions on this.

Under the ‘dual mandate’ model the English Parliament would be composed of members of the UK House of Commons that sit for English constituencies. The number of members would therefore be equal to the number of English Westminster MPs – currently 533, reducing to 501 if the proposed boundary changes are implemented.

Under the ‘separately-elected’ model a new directly-elected institution would be created. Considerations of cost-saving and consistency with the UK’s existing devolved legislatures mean that it would be likely to be a unicameral body of approximately 300 members. This would be sufficient to provide enough members to serve on committees and perform other parliamentary roles. If combined with a reduction in the size of the UK parliament, perhaps to around 350 members, an increase in the overall number of elected politicians could be avoided.

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Legislation at Westminster launch seminar: senior parliamentary figures discuss the impact of parliament on government bills

Meg Russell and Daniel Gover’s new book Legislation at Westminster challenges received wisdom about the UK parliament’s influence on legislation. In contrast to common portrayals of Westminster as having only weak policy influence, Russell and Gover present evidence demonstrating strong influence, exercised in a variety of subtle ways. The findings were discussed at a seminar held in parliament on 15 November. Hannah Dowling and Kelly Shuttleworth report.

The UK parliament is frequently portrayed as little more than an ‘elaborate rubber stamp’ by journalists and even parliamentarians. Academics have tended to offer a slightly more nuanced view but nevertheless often present Westminster as a weak legislature and downplay its policy influence. A ground-breaking new book by Constitution Unit Director Professor Meg Russell and Daniel Gover questions the extent to which these assumptions hold true. The book represents the largest study of its kind for over 40 years.

On 15 November, a seminar was held in parliament to discuss Russell and Gover’s findings. The event was chaired by Lucinda Maer, Head of the Parliament and Constitution Centre at the House of Commons Library. Russell and Gover summarised their findings before responses from Labour peer Baroness (Patricia) Hollis of Heigham and David Natzler, the Clerk of the House of Commons.

Daniel Gover

Daniel Gover introduced the central research question Legislation at Westminster seeks to address: How influential is parliament on government legislation? In order to answer this, Russell and Gover analysed 12 case study government bills in the period 2005–2012 and logged the over 4000 amendments proposed. The bills were selected to represent the range of legislation laid before parliament and accordingly varied by sponsoring department, chamber of introduction, length and profile. A total of 120 interviews with ministers, members of the opposition, backbenchers, civil servants and outside groups were also conducted. Of the 4361 amendments proposed, 886 were government amendments; 95% of these were passed, compared to 4% of non-government amendments. On the face of it, these figures seem to support the popular notion of parliament as weak and dominated by the executive.

However, by dividing the amendments into ‘strands’, i.e. collections of similar amendments made at different stages of the legislative process, Russell and Gover were able to trace their origins, which revealed a more nuanced picture of parliamentary power. There were 2050 strands identified, of which 300 were successful. Of these 300 strands only 55% were government-initiated. When  strands comprising only small technical changes were omitted, this dropped to 45% – with 55% initiated by non-government actors,. Amongst these groups, the opposition initiated the most strands (1604), of which 112 were successful. Although government backbenchers initiated fewer strands, 36 of 304 were successful – a higher success rate than the opposition. There were also 155 strands introduced by non-party affiliated actors, primarily in the Lords, of which 12 were successful. Gover stressed the importance of cross-party work, emphasising that strands demonstrating cross-party support had a higher success rate than those without.

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The Constitutional Standards of the Constitution Committee: how a code of constitutional standards can help strengthen parliamentary scrutiny

The Constitution Unit has today published a third edition of its report on the Constitutional Standards of the House of Lords Constitution Committee. The report contains a code of constitutional standards based on past Constitution Committee reports, which provide detailed guidance on the application of constitutional principles to legislative proposals. Robert Hazell and Dawn Oliver argue that such a code is particularly needed in the 2017 parliament and could have significantly improved the drafting of the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill.

Today the Constitution Unit has published a third edition of its report on the Constitutional Standards of the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution. The report contains a code of constitutional standards based on almost 200 reports from the Constitution Committee, published between its creation in 2001 and the end of the last (2016–17) parliamentary session. The standards provide detailed guidance on the application of constitutional principles to legislative proposals, and cover a range of subjects, including the rule of law, delegated legislation, the separation of powers and individual rights.

The use of a code of soft law constitutional standards is particularly needed in the 2017 parliament. Standards of the type set out in our report could have significantly improved the drafting of the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill. Such a code could also be used by parliamentary committees of either House to enhance the scrutiny of the delegated legislation needed to prepare the statute book for Brexit.

The European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

The European Union (Withdrawal) Bill is providing a showcase of parliament’s ability to scrutinise constitutional legislation. It is packed with provisions that raise matters of fundamental constitutional principle, from the rule of law to Henry VIII powers to devolution. A good number of the amendments reflect arguments made by the Constitution Committee, which unusually reported before the bill received its second reading in the Commons.

The government has been criticised by some, including Hannah White from the Institute for Government, for failing to engage meaningfully with parliament before the bill was introduced to the Commons. The government is now making concessions in order to avoid defeats. Engagement with an officially recognised code of standards could have enabled the government to avoid these difficulties. The Constitution Committee’s recommendations are rarely framed in absolute terms. Many of the standards demand forms of justification for departures from constitutional principles. Even when the committee’s standards go beyond justification, they often demand changes that relate to drafting or the inclusion of safeguards, neither of which normally frustrates the policy aims of a bill.

The basic case for the use of standards is that it can enable basic constitutional concerns to be addressed systematically at the earliest possible stage. This was a point made by the Constitution Committee itself in its recent report on the legislative process:

We continue to believe that there would be merit in producing a set of standards that legislation must meet before it can be introduced.

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Labour’s ‘motion for a return’: what and why?

Opposition days have become a source of controversy in the early months of the 2017 parliament, with government MPs repeatedly abstaining on Labour motions. Such motions are usually non-binding. However, last week Labour attempted a different approach, tabling what is called a ‘motion for a return’. Andrew Defty explains what happened.

An opposition day debate last Wednesday saw the Labour Party deploy an obscure piece of parliamentary procedure which may force the government into releasing its Brexit impact studies. By means of a little-known procedure called a motion for a return, Labour transformed a non-binding opposition day motion into a binding resolution of the House. Labour’s approach caused some confusion in the House of Commons and had parliamentary observers reaching for a copy of Erskine May in order to determine what exactly had happened and what it meant. This post examines the background to Labour’s parliamentary trap and the implications for the government.

The government’s approach to opposition days

The background to what happened on Wednesday lies in the government’s approach to opposition day debates in this parliament. Opposition days provide a rare opportunity for opposition parties to set the parliamentary agenda. There are 20 opposition days in each parliamentary session. These are usually divided between opposition parties, in the last session Labour had 17 of these while three were allocated to the SNP. Each day is then often divided in two to allow for more subjects to be debated. On Wednesday last week, Labour tabled two motions for discussion, one dealing with armed forces pay and the other on the release of the Brexit impact studies.

Opposition days provide an opportunity for opposition parties to table a motion on a subject they consider to be important. Government ministers must come to the House and respond to the motion, speaking at the beginning and end of the debate. The government may also table an amendment in an attempt to overturn the motion, usually by changing its meaning. There is usually then a vote. Governments with a majority can usually be assured of defeating an opposition day motion, but even if a government is defeated, opposition day motions are non-binding and the government is not required to respond or make any policy changes as a result.

In the current parliamentary session the government has decided to adopt a strategy of not contesting opposition day motions. Although ministers come to the chamber to respond and Conservative MPs participate in opposition day debates, Conservative MPs, presumably under instruction from the Whips, have not been voting against the opposition motion. The reasons for this are not entirely clear, but are almost certainly a consequence of governing without a majority. It certainly saves the government from going to the trouble of marshalling its MPs into the chamber for a non-binding vote which they are likely to lose anyway. It may also be designed to ensure that Labour’s victory in such votes is somewhat pyrrhic. This point was made by the Conservative MP, Peter Bone, following a government defeat on a recent opposition day motion in which Conservative MPs abstained, when he claimed that although the opposition had won the vote, the Conservatives could not be said to have lost.

This strategy of abstaining in votes on opposition day motions has, however, caused some consternation in the chamber of the House of Commons. Following a government defeat on an opposition day motion on universal credit on 18 October, there was criticism from both sides of the House at the government’s decision not to contest the vote in order to enable it to ignore the outcome. The Conservative MP, Sir Edward Leigh, complained that the government’s approach risked reducing the chamber to the level of a ‘university debating society’, adding, ‘what is the point of the House of Commons if we just express opinions for the sake of it? Surely when we vote, it should have some effect.’ The Speaker was also particularly exercised by the government’s apparent neglect of Parliament, noting that, ‘it is blindingly obvious that this is an unusual situation about which there is strong opinion’ and that it would be ‘respectful to the House’ if a minister were to come to the House and explain the government’s thinking.

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Monitor 67: Brexit blues

The latest issue of Monitor, the Constitution Unit’s regular newsletter, has been published today. The issue covers all of the major UK constitutional developments over the past four months, a period that has seen several rounds of Brexit talks, the introduction and second reading of the EU (Withdrawal) Bill, the publication of the Burns review on the size of the House of Lords, plus much else besides. The front page article is reproduced here. You can read the full issue at this link

The previous issue of Monitor was published just after the surprise result of the snap general election. The Prime Minister was back at the helm, but with a reduced number of MPs, and dependent on a confidence and supply arrangement with the Northern Ireland Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). We noted that the road ahead looked rocky.

So it has proved to be – though Theresa May remains in post, and the real parliamentary showdowns seem still to come. The Prime Minister has been dealt an exceptionally difficult hand – managing legislation on Brexit of unprecedented constitutional complexity, alongside the fractious negotiations with the EU, while leading a divided party in a House of Commons in which she has no partisan majority. Over the summer, and particularly during the party conference season, her leadership was regularly questioned, but must gain some stability from the fact that few would really want to be in her shoes. Meanwhile, rumours suggest that she has used the threat of a Boris Johnson premiership to coax other EU leaders to the negotiating table.

As discussed on pages 2–3, the official Brexit negotiations have made slow progress. Despite Theresa May’s attempted injection of momentum through her Florence speech in September, EU partners have not yet agreed to move on to ‘Phase II’ (i.e. post-Brexit trade arrangements), and a serious sticking point remains the so-called ‘divorce bill’. Partly as a consequence, the prospect of a ‘no deal’ outcome has increasingly been talked up. This is presented by some in the Conservative Party as a necessary negotiating strategy to get the EU-27 to give the UK what it wants, but others seem to view it with a degree of relish. Meanwhile, business groups appear to be increasingly concerned.

One thing that remains little-known is the state of public opinion, and how that may develop. While the June 2016 referendum came up with a Leave result, today’s question of what Leave should mean is a good deal more complex. As such, it is not readily suited to opinion polling. Here the results of the Citizens’ Assembly on Brexit, run by a team led from the Constitution Unit and funded by the ESRC (see page 15), can shed some useful light. Assembly members, who included more Leave than Remain supporters, expressed a preference for the kind of bespoke trade deal that the government says it is seeking. But members were very clear that if this cannot be achieved, a ‘no deal’ outcome was undesirable. They preferred that the UK remained a member of the Single Market and Customs Union to this. Politicians should reflect on such findings carefully, because boxing themselves in to no deal could prove electorally dangerous.

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Report of the Lord Speaker’s Committee on the size of the House of Lords: a real opportunity for progress on reform

Yesterday saw publication of the report of the Lord Speaker’s Committee on the Size of the House of Lords, which recommended moving to a chamber of no more than 600 members, appointed for 15-year terms. This follows years of controversy about the growing size of the Lords, which currently stands at over 800. Sir David Beamish, formerly the most senior official in the House of Lords, argues that the proposals offer the best opportunity for years for some small progress on the knotty issue of Lords reform.

The recommendations of the Lord Speaker’s Committee on the Size of the House of Lords, published yesterday, offer the best opportunity for many years to reform the membership of the House of Lords in a way that can – and should – achieve sufficient consensus across the political spectrum. The committee’s recommendations for reform without the need for legislation are both thoughtful and ingenious.

House of Lords reform has usually been stymied by lack of agreement on what should replace the existing second chamber. It has generally proved impossible to get a majority for any one proposed reform. The most striking exception was the removal of some 650 hereditary peers in 1999, thanks to the 1997 Labour manifesto having included a specific commitment. But that was billed as the first stage of a two-stage reform, and that second stage remains elusive.

The 1999 Royal Commission on Reform of the House of Lords, chaired by Lord Wakeham, undertook what might be called a ‘zero-based review’ of the second chamber, looking at what functions were appropriate to a second chamber, what powers were needed to perform those functions, and only then how the second chamber should be constituted. It was affirming for the House of Lords that the recommendations on functions and powers were generally for little change – a proposal for a Constitution Committee was quickly implemented without awaiting wider reform – and ever since then the debate on Lords reform has focused primarily on composition. The issue of powers resurfaced briefly after the House upset the Conservative government in October 2015 by failing to approve the Tax Credits (Income Thresholds and Determination of Rates) (Amendment) Regulations, leading to a review by Lord Strathclyde of the Lords’ powers in relation to secondary legislation. However, the Brexit referendum led to a change of priorities, and Lord Strathclyde’s proposals were put on the back burner. With the government’s loss of its Commons majority in June 2017, it seems unlikely that those proposals could now be implemented even if the government wished.

Against a background of no likelihood of major Lords reform in the next few years, the impact on the House of large numbers of appointments of life peers by successive prime ministers (with the honourable exception of Gordon Brown) became a matter of serious concern to members. The increase in numbers led to increased costs, pressure on resources (including seating in the chamber – attendance at prayers boomed when members realised that that was the only way to be sure of a seat at question time), and a significant negative impact on the House’s reputation.

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A helping hand? Tracking changes in support to all-party parliamentary groups since 2001

There are now over 600 All-Party Parliamentary Groups in the UK parliament, with the number having more than doubled since 1997. In this post Paul Thomas discusses the monetary and in-kind support these informal groups receive, suggesting that most could not operate without it. He compares information about APPGs in 2001 and 2017, finding that the level of support from NGOs and charities has increased significantly. This may go someway to explaining the growth in APPG activity.

In addition to the formal system of cross-party select committees, Westminster is home to a vast number of informal bodies known as all-party parliamentary groups (APPGs) that bring together MPs and peers from different parties to collaborate on issues of shared concern. APPGs have attracted increased media and political attention in recent years due to their explosive rate of growth, increasing policy advocacy, and concerns about the support they receive from external stakeholders. At present, this external assistance is estimated to be worth nearly £6 million per year, and critics are especially concerned about the potential influence of corporations or business groups on APPG activities.

As part of a broader research project comparing the growth and influence of APPGs in Canada and the UK, I examined whether these three trends are related – that is, whether the recent growth of British APPGs results from increased interest from external stakeholders who see the groups as vehicle to influence policy. My findings indicate that external support, and especially the rising support from charities and NGOs, has indeed contributed to the expansion of APGs in recent years. Moreover, much of the growth in support for APPGs has been through in-kind contributions, which often includes outside organizations managing group activities and writing their reports. These results suggest that concerns over corporate influence on APPGs may be somewhat misplaced, with NGOs and charities not only providing more funds that corporations or business associations, but doing so in a way that makes it easier for them to influence APG activities.

An introduction to all-party parliamentary groups

APPGs are divided into two main types: those focused on relations with other countries, and subject groups that deal with specific policy issues, regions of the UK, or stakeholder communities. The first APPG, the Parliamentary and Scientific Committee, was established in the 1930s. The number in operation then grew steadily over the following decades to reach 242 in 1996. However, following the 1997 election this growth accelerated, with the total hitting 592 prior to the 2010 election. While slowing, as shown in Figure 1, this expansion continues, especially among subject groups. There were 631 APPGs registered in May 2017: 132 country groups, 496 subject groups, and three sports clubs (for ease of analysis, these clubs are considered with the subject groups).

APPGs have no formal role in the parliamentary processes for either scrutiny or legislation. Many are largely passive, serving to facilitate the exchange of information between and among parliamentarians and stakeholders through e-mail lists or occasional receptions. Yet a growing number have distinct policy objectives or agendas. These groups employ a variety of tools to achieve their goals, with their members sponsoring parliamentary debates, conducting select committee-style inquiries, and introducing private members’ bills. While determining the exact reasons behind a government decision can be challenging, pressure from APPGs has contributed to policy changes in areas as diverse as cyclingtobacco control, fuel duty, and the prevention of anti-Semitism.

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