The role of judges in judicial appointments in Ireland

The Irish government has proposed a bill to reform the method by which the country appoints its judges. Patrick O’Brien discusses the proposals, and argues that several of the criticisms levelled against the bill lack force.

Judicial appointments in Ireland are shortly due to be put on a more formal footing. When the Irish Judicial Appointments Commission Bill 2022 is enacted, it will provide for an appointments commission designed in the image of many similar bodies that have been developed in common law jurisdictions in the last 30 years. The bill has, however, been the subject of recent criticism from the Chief Justice, Donal O’Donnell, who has questioned the composition of the proposed Commission.

Judicial appointments have been something of a saga in Irish politics in the last few years. The current system is widely regarded as inadequate and has been the subject of repeated proposals for reform in the past decade. An independent Judicial Appointments Advisory Board (JAAB), chaired by the Chief Justice, receives and comments on applications for judicial office from outside the judiciary but leaves appointments essentially to the political discretion of the government, which in theory (though all the evidence suggests, not in practice) leaves open the possibility of a more politicised judiciary. Promotions of existing judges are not considered by the JAAB at all. It is generally accepted, therefore, that appointments require reform. The current bill is the second to be put to the Oireachtas (Irish Parliament) since 2017. The 2017 bill was demanded as the price of entering coalition government by Shane Ross, a campaigning journalist and then an independent TD. This bill would have created a rather unwieldy body with 13 members and a lay majority and chair, as well as a number of sub-committees which would be called into being depending on the nature of the appointment. For a small jurisdiction which makes only a handful of judicial appointments each year, the system was significantly over-designed.

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The Constitutional Reform Act 2005 led to greater judicial independence: politicians and parliament must continue to support it

As part of an ongoing inquiry, the Lords Constitution Committee has sought evidence as to whether ‘the amendment of the role of the Lord Chancellor by the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (CRA), and the resulting separation of powers between the judiciary and the Government, [have] been successful’. Robert Hazell argues that the 2005 reforms led to greater judicial independence, a political achievement that requires continuing support from politicians and parliament.

The House of Lords Constitution Committee is currently undertaking an inquiry into the role of the Lord Chancellor and the Law Officers, in which it seeks to answer a number of questions, including whether ‘the amendment of the role of the Lord Chancellor by the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (CRA), and the resulting separation of powers between the judiciary and the Government, [have] been successful’. Through written evidence, submitted with Professor Kate Malleson, I have attempted to answer that question. Our answers were based upon the main findings and conclusions of a three-year research project on the Politics of Judicial Independence, funded by the AHRC. The research explored the impact of the greater separation of powers introduced by the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (CRA). Our principal conclusion – as explained in our 2015 book on the subject – was that judicial independence and judicial accountability have emerged stronger, not weaker; but that greater separation of powers requires increased engagement by the judiciary with other branches of government.

The changes made by the Constitutional Reform Act 2005

Until 2005 the head of the judiciary was a Cabinet minister, the Lord Chancellor. In an extraordinary breach of separation of powers, he could also sit as a judge in the UK’s highest court. The CRA removed the Lord Chancellor as head of the judiciary, handing that responsibility to the Lord Chief Justice in line with an agreement struck in the Concordat of 2004. The division of powers between the executive and judiciary was further refined in 2008 in a Framework Document for the management of the Courts Service (revised and updated in 2011 to incorporate the Tribunals Service). The CRA also created a new Supreme Court, and established the Judicial Appointments Commission.

The new politics of judicial independence are more formal, fragmented, and politicised

The old politics were informal, depending on regular meetings between the Lord Chancellor and senior judges; closed, in that these were virtually the only contacts between the judiciary and the government; and secretive, with both sides preserving each other’s confidences. They were also consensual and conservative, in that neither side wanted to change the system. The ‘new’ politics, by contrast, are much more formal. The CRA required more formal structures and processes to handle the relationships between more separate branches of government. We now have the Judicial Appointments Commission, Judicial Appointments and Conduct Ombudsman, and Judicial Conduct Investigations Office: all products of the CRA. The new formal processes include regular meetings between the judiciary and other branches of government, with the innovation of six-monthly meetings between the LCJ and Prime Minister, the introduction of regular meetings with senior officials in parliament, and annual appearances by the LCJ and President of the Supreme Court before the Constitution Committee.

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The anatomy of democratic backsliding: could it happen here?

The term ‘backsliding’ has been coined to describe the phenomenon by which leaders who come to office within a democratic framework, only to attack some of democracy’s core features when in office. Stephan Haggard and Robert R Kaufman outline some of the key features of ‘backsliding’, discuss how and why it can take hold, and whether there are warning signs that such a process could happen in the UK. 

During the presidency of Donald Trump, American democracy suffered the most serious challenge it has faced since the country’s Civil War. Trump and his administration inflamed divisions that jeopardise the rights of women and minorities; attacked the press; defied oversight; sought to stack the judiciary and law enforcement agencies with partisan loyalists; challenged the integrity of the electoral system, and ultimately stoked a violent challenge to the democratic transfer of power. These threats were different from conventional forms of democratic reversion, such as the coup d’etat. Instead, they reflected a more insidious process that has come to be known as ‘backsliding,’ in which illiberal leaders rise to power within a democratic framework and attack core features of democracy from within.

Because the United States occupies a unique position at the heart of the international system, backsliding there commanded worldwide attention. But the United States was hardly alone. In a new study, we identified at least 15 other countries in which duly-elected democratic governments recently moved along similar paths. Not all of these paths lead all the way to autocracy; in the United States, democracy survived the Trump era badly damaged but intact. But depending on the metric used, more than half of these cases slid into ‘competitive authoritarian rule’: systems in which elections persisted but were manifestly rigged. Notably, although many of the failed democracies we examined were weakly institutionalised at the outset (for example, Bolivia, Ukraine, and Zambia), others such as Hungary, Poland, and Venezuela were once considered relatively robust democratic regimes.

These cases raise the question of whether similar adverse developments could occur in other seemingly stable democracies. Could they perhaps even happen in the UK? 

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Miller 2/Cherry and the media – finding a consensus? 

thumbnail_20190802_092917.jpgprofessor_hazell_2000x2500_1.jpg Despite the UK Supreme Court managing to find unanimity regarding the legality of the attempted prorogation of parliament in  September, the rest of the country, including its national newspapers, appeared to divide along Leave/Remain lines regarding the correctness of the judgment. Sam Anderson and Robert Hazell analyse how the national press discussed the political and constitutional questions raised by the judgment.

The government’s resounding defeat in the Supreme Court is one example of the rolling constitutional drama that breaks in the news almost daily. However, when it comes to media coverage of these stories, the key consideration is almost always ‘What impact will this have on Brexit?’ Issues are reported through the Leave/Remain divide, with popular news outlets framing events for their audiences. This post seeks first to examine the extent to which this has occurred with the prorogation case by looking at eight national newspaper editorials, and the way they have framed the political implications of the judgment. Then, using the same editorials, we will examine whether there is consensus around important constitutional issues that have arisen in this case, such as the proper role of the Court and the importance of the independence of the judiciary. We coded the editorials on both these questions, and found that the case was framed by almost all the papers to some degree through a Brexit lens, and that there is a lack of consensus on the constitutional issues.  

The political questions

The first issue was coded on a scale of -5 to five. Zero reflects the position of the Court: that the judgment concerned the specific prorogation issue, but was neutral with regards to the political implications of the decision. Editorials which argued the judgment would have negative political implications for the government and the Brexit process were assigned a negative number up to -5, depending on the extent they engaged in direct criticism of the judgment, and promoted the government’s policy of getting Brexit done. Editorials that argued that the judgment would have positive political implications for the government and Brexit process were assigned a positive number up to five, depending on the extent to which they were directly critical of the government and its Brexit policies. All eight articles were independently coded by two researchers. Where discrepancies occurred, a mid-point was taken. 

Paper Implications for Brexit 
Sun -5
Mail -4
Express -2
Telegraph  -1.5
Times  0.5
FT  2
Independent 3
Guardian  4.5

 

Looking qualitatively, there were three overarching positions taken. Of the eight publications, four were critical of the judgment and its  potential political implications. The Sun described the Prime Minister as the victim of a ‘staggering legal coup and accused the Court of having done the bidding of Remainers. The Daily Mail was less virulent, but still argued the case was a victory for Remainers, and emphasised how the judgment allowed MPs (including ‘masochistically intransigent Eurosceptic zealots) to continue to try and block the will of the electorate. The Daily Express was less direct but warned politicians that the case should not be used as a way to try to avoid Brexit. The Daily Telegraph made the only substantive comments on the case, noting pointedly that the Supreme Court overruled the High Court’s finding of non-justiciability, and gave some explanation for the prorogation: the government had only been ‘trying to carry out the democratic will’ of the people as expressed in the referendum.  Continue reading