‘Gendered Vulnerability’ and representation in United States politics

com.google.Chrome.9qkdtj (1)The United States is in the midst of its 2018 midterm election cycle, and one of the most striking features of this year’s elections is the unusually high number of women who have elected to run for office. The U.S. falls short of many of its peers in terms of gender representation in government, but women seem poised to make gains this November. Jeffrey Lazarus and Amy Steigerwalt discuss their new book, Gendered Vulnerability: How Women Work Harder to Stay in Office, which argues women’s perception of a more difficult electoral landscape leads them to adopt distinct, and more constituent-oriented, legislative strategies than their male counterparts.

Elections in the US

In the United States, elections are much more candidate-centered than in many European countries. In most U.S. elections, candidates decide for themselves whether to run for office, and do not need the approval of party leaders. Candidates raise their own campaign funds (at the Congressional level candidates need a lot of money, more than $1 million U.S. at least), and are also responsible for conducting the re-election campaign itself. Additionally, U.S. candidates contest two elections in each cycle – first a primary election in which candidates within a party compete against each other for the right to be the party’s nominee, and later a general election in which the several nominees compete for the office in question. Altogether, politicians in the United States have huge electoral responsibilities which they shoulder largely on their own.

U.S. politicians therefore use the perks and powers of their office to help themselves win re-election. For members of Congress, this takes many forms. For example, members devote a lot of energy to procuring government spending which benefits their local communities, and they work to impress constituents as much as to make good national policy. Members have a formal budget for communicating with constituents and travelling back and forth between Washington and their home communities so they can attend local events and meet with local groups. Members also have staff devoted specifically to helping constituents solve problems they’re having with the federal bureaucracy.

In our book, we argue that female members of Congress are much more constituent-oriented than male members are, leading them to do all of these things more than men do. Continue reading

The EU (Withdrawal) Bill raises questions about the role of smaller opposition parties in the legislative process

leston.bandeira.thompson.and.mace (1)The EU (Withdrawal) Bill’s return to the Commons saw SNP MPs protest about their voices having been excluded from the debate. Louise Thompson explains how parliamentary procedures can indeed restrict debate for smaller opposition parties, and considers whether something ought to be done about it.

Following the first session of the EU (Withdrawal) Bill’s return to the Commons, most newspaper headlines focused of the battle between Theresa May and the group of backbench Conservative rebels seeking concessions from the government about parliament’s ‘meaningful vote’ on the Brexit deal. The front page of The National instead highlighted the lack of debate on the devolution clauses within the bill, which was limited to just 15 minutes, as well as the fact that only one SNP MP was able to speak. Just a few hours later, every single SNP MP walked out of the Commons chamber during Prime Minister’s Questions (PMQs) in protest about this issue – and the Speaker’s refusal to allow a vote that the House sit in private to discuss it. It’s not unknown for the SNP to deploy tactics like this in the chamber and it raises interesting questions about the role of smaller opposition parties in the Commons.

The parliamentary position of small ‘o’ opposition parties

When it comes to opposition in the House of Commons, it’s easy to focus attention solely on the ‘Official’ Opposition. But there are four (or five, or six) other opposition parties, depending on where you position the DUP and Sinn Fein. Just as parliamentary architecture in the Commons privileges a two-party system (with the green benches facing each other in adversarial style, the despatch boxes for the use of the government and official opposition party only), parliamentary procedures also help to underpin a system which seems to prioritise the ‘Official Opposition’. Hence, the guarantee of questions at PMQs.

Continue reading

Why we need a Committee for Future Generations in the House of Lords

88q98 (1)The Foundation for Democracy and Sustainable Development has proposed that the House of Lords establish a Committee for Future Generations to review legislation. It is hoped that such a body would reduce the short-termism that can creep into legislative and executive decision-making. Graham Smith explains why this Committee is needed and how it could work in practice.

The problem of short-termism in democratic politics is well understood. Psychologically, we all tend to prioritise more immediate concerns over long term considerations. Our electoral cycles of four to five years mean that politicians and political parties typically think in those timescales. Long-term issues are often complex and thus are difficult to deal with in the policy silos of government. Future generations by definition are not present and thus have no direct representation within decision making processes.

Some of the most challenging issues we face run against these tendencies, requiring us to take a long-term perspective and consider the interests of future generations. Rapid technological development, inter-generational economic opportunity, welfare and social care provision, or environmental challenges such as climate change all fit into ‘the too difficult box – the big issues that politicians can’t crack’ identified by former Labour minister Charles Clarke. The problem of ‘short-termism’ in politics was explored in detail by the international Oxford Martin Commission for Future Generations in its 2013 report, Now for the Long Term. The Commission recommended that, as a matter of urgency, governments invest in ‘innovative institutions… independent of the short-term pressures facing governments of the day but appropriately accountable to the political system in question.’ Such institutions ‘should be charged with conducting systematic reviews and analysis of longer-term issues.’ Continue reading

What is the Salisbury convention, and have the Lords broken it over Brexit?

downloadThe European Union (Withdrawal) Bill returns to the Commons today for consideration of the numerous amendments made during its eventful passage though the Lords. Some commentators have accused the Lords of exceeding their constitutional authority, with the Salisbury convention being cited in defence of this position. David Beamish discusses how the convention operates and argues that the Lords have not breached it so far.

The European Union (Withdrawal) Bill has prompted much discussion of the role of the House of Lords in passing legislation, including references such as this to the Salisbury convention:

‘ …the Lords has effectively torn up the Salisbury convention: that manifesto promises by the governing party should not be blocked by an unrepresentative upper house’.

That passage, from an article in The Times by Matt Ridley, who sits in parliament as an elected hereditary peer, relates to the amendments made by the Lords to the Withdrawal Bill and in relation to the proposal for a ‘Leveson Two’ inquiry. A day later, Iain Martin wrote in The Times:

‘This week there was the worst illustration of the problem yet. The Commons thought that it had settled the question of press freedom, when it voted against moves to hold yet another inquiry into the press. But the Lords had another go on voting down the government, in breach of the convention that bills which enact manifesto commitments should be passed by the Lords.’

It is perhaps ironic that this ‘convention’ is now being cited in relation to the difficulties which the House is making for a Conservative government. It was originally introduced by a Conservative opposition which dominated the House of Lords following the election in 1945 of a Labour government with a large Commons majority but only a small representation in the Lords, which then consisted entirely of hereditary peers.  Continue reading

Ten Things to Know about the next Accession and Coronation

robert.hazell.350x350com.google.Chrome.j5urj9Last month Robert Hazell and Bob Morris published two reports about the next Accession and Coronation, which were discussed in a previous blog. Along the way they gathered a lot of extra information, which has now been publishedwhich has now been published on the Monarchy pages of the Constitution Unit website. The following represents a selection of the most frequently asked questions.

1. Will Prince Charles become King Charles III?

Not necessarily. He is free to choose his own regnal title. King Edward VII chose Edward as his regnal title, although hitherto he had been known by his first name of Albert. King Edward VIII also chose Edward as his regnal title, although he was known to his family and friends as David. Prince Charles’s Christian names are Charles Philip Arthur George. Instead of becoming King Charles he might choose to become King George VII, or King Philip, or King Arthur, although Clarence House has denied this in the past.

2. Will the Duchess of Cornwall become Queen Camilla?

Under common law the spouse of a King automatically becomes Queen. But there are two possible reasons why Camilla, who is currently the Duchess of Cornwall, might not assume the title. The first is the argument voiced by the Daily Mirror and Mail Online, that Camilla cannot become Queen because her 2005 civil marriage to Prince Charles was not valid. The argument runs as follows: because the Marriage Acts from 1753 have explicitly excepted royal marriages from their provisions, the only valid marriage which a member of the royal family could contract in England was a religious marriage in the Church of England. The Lord Chancellor in 2005 defended the validity of the Prince’s civil marriage, as did the Registrar General. But if Camilla became Queen, it might provoke further legal challenges. Continue reading

Drawing boundaries: the problem of gerrymandering in the US

briffault.300 (1)Recently, courts at both the federal and state level have been forced to get involved in the process of defining electoral borders in the US, as organisations across the country have started legal claims designed to overturn what they see as unfair electoral maps. Richard Briffault explains what is meant by gerrymandering, how it has been challenged in the past and what the Supreme Court is currently being asked to decide.

Identifying the problem

Gerrymandering refers to the practice of manipulating the boundaries of electoral districts to favour particular candidates, parties or interest groups. It arises out of –and has become increasingly significant in American politics because of – five factors.

First, members of the United States House of Representatives and of the chambers of both houses of all state legislatures are elected from single-member districts with the winner selected on a first-past-the-post basis. In other words, there is no proportional representation.

Second, electoral constituencies must be redrawn every ten years in light of the decennial census so that the districts have relatively equal populations.

Third, legislative redistricting is typically undertaken by partisan officials. In most states, the state legislature redistricts itself as well as the state’s congressional districts. A number of states have created so-called independent redistricting commissions, but most of those commissions consist of partisan officials, such as the legislative leaders of the major parties, or their appointees. Only a handful of states use truly non-partisan or independent commissions.

Fourth, until now there has been no federal constitutional constraint on partisan gerrymandering. Continue reading

Crisis, headache, or sideshow: how should the UK government respond to the Scottish parliament’s decision to withhold consent for the Withdrawal Bill?

 

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Different political actors have responded to the decision by the Scottish Parliament to withhold its consent for the UK government’s showpiece EU (Withdrawal) Bill in very different ways. Professor Nicola McEwen discusses the options open to both the Scottish and UK governments. 

After much deliberation, the Scottish Parliament voted by 93-30 to withhold consent for the EU (Withdrawal) Bill, the main piece of UK legislation paving the way for Brexit. Labour, the Liberal Democrats and the Greens accepted the SNP government’s charge that the Bill undermines the devolution settlement and the principles on which it was founded. On the same day, the National Assembly for Wales voted by 46-9 to grant consent for the Bill, with the Welsh government arguing that the amended clause 15 (formerly clause 11) and the agreement they reached with the UK government ‘defended and entrenched’ devolution. Only Plaid Cymru disagreed.

Consent was sought from both legislatures following the convention (usually referred to as the Sewel convention) that the UK parliament will not normally legislate in devolved areas, or alter devolved powers, without their agreement. The Withdrawal Bill alters the devolution settlements by placing a new constraint on devolved legislatures and ministers to avoid acting incompatibly with ‘retained EU law’, even in policy fields which otherwise fall within their remit. In its original form, this constraint was placed upon all retained EU law, with provision to release the constraint once it was agreed that there was no need to preserve a common UK legislative or regulatory framework. In its amended form, the Bill requires the UK government to specify in regulations the areas to which the restriction will apply. It introduced a time limit – UK ministers have two years from Brexit day to bring forward new regulations, and these would last for no more than five years. The amendment also places a duty on UK ministers to await a ‘consent decision’ before tabling the regulations, but herein lies the controversy. Whereas the Sewel convention assumes that consent means agreement, Clause 15 empowers UK ministers to proceed even if the ‘consent decision’ is to withhold consent. Continue reading