Options for an English Parliament: policy powers and financial arrangements

Ongoing Constitution Unit research is exploring options for an English Parliament. Two of the most fundamental questions concern what policy powers such a body would have and financial arrangements. Jack Sheldon suggests that an English Parliament would be likely to have policy and fiscal powers resembling those of the Scottish Parliament, and that a new funding formula would be required to cover the costs of devolved services. These developments would have major implications not only for England but also for the other parts of the UK.

Since last autumn Professor Meg Russell and I have been working on a research project exploring the options for an English Parliament. Although there have been various calls over the last 20 years to establish such a body, how might it actually work in practice? Two of the most fundamental questions, which have major implications for other aspects of institutional design, concern what policy powers an English Parliament would have and what kind of financial arrangements would be possible. This blog post focuses on these questions.

What English Parliament supporters have said

English Parliament supporters emphasise restoring equality among the UK’s nations, in light of what they see as the unfairness of present devolution arrangements. It is thus unsurprising that they have often set the powers of the Scottish Parliament as a benchmark. The Campaign for an English Parliament (CEP) state prominently on their website that they campaign for an institution ‘with powers at least as great as those of Scotland’. This demand has been echoed by MPs who are in favour, including David Davis, Frank Field and John Redwood. In the aftermath of the Scottish independence referendum Redwood wrote that ‘As we seek to put into legislation what Gordon Brown called Home Rule for Scotland we must do the same for England’.

To the extent that they have addressed finance, advocates of an English Parliament have focused on criticism of the Barnett Formula, which provides more generous per capita government spending in Scotland than in England. Eddie Bone of the CEP has linked the continued use of the formula to ‘closures of A&E departments and council services across England’. Frank Field has likewise been highly critical of the formula, saying that ‘it is totally unacceptable that the poor in [his] constituency should be less well supported than the poor in Scottish constituencies’. Proponents have said less about what sort of financial arrangements they envisage following an English Parliament’s establishment.

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The electoral system for an English Parliament: options and implications

Ongoing Constitution Unit research is exploring options for an English Parliament. One essential question for such a body is the choice of electoral system. In this post Jack Sheldon and Meg Russell focus on the possible implications of using FPTP as compared to using AMS or another proportional system. They conclude that the choice of system would have substantial effects on an English Parliament’s likely political dynamics.

Since last autumn we have been working on a research project exploring the options for an English Parliament. Although there have been various calls over the last 20 years to establish such a body, how might it actually work in practice? One question that would need to be addressed is the choice of electoral system. In this post we focus on the possible implications of alternative systems.

Models for an English Parliament and likely electoral systems

Our research has identified two primary models for an English Parliament. Some proponents, including Conservative MPs John Redwood and Andrew Rosindell, want a ‘dual mandate’ body, whereby members of the UK House of Commons sitting for English constituencies would meet as the English Parliament on certain days. This clearly implies that members of the English Parliament would be chosen by first past the post (FPTP), at least so long as it continues to be used for UK general elections.

The alternative model is for a separately-elected English Parliament, equivalent to the existing devolved legislatures elsewhere in the UK. Proponents of this kind of change have generally said little about the choice of electoral system. FPTP has not been used for any new institutions in recent years and so a proportional system is more likely. AMS is used in both Scotland and Wales, and given these precedents it seems the most likely system to be adopted. A major part of the rationale for establishing an English Parliament is to bring more coherence and symmetry to the UK’s constitutional arrangements. UKIP’s 2017 election manifesto, which included a proposal for a separately-elected English Parliament, explicitly suggested that an English Parliament should be elected under AMS, while in correspondence  with the authors senior Campaign for an English Parliament figures have stated that ‘the electoral systems for all the devolved administrations should be the same’.

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Options for an English Parliament: lessons from existing decentralised states

Jack_SheldonMeg-Russell

Last year the Constitution Unit began work on a project exploring the options for an English Parliament. As part of this research we are examining arrangements in other decentralised states, particularly those which are federal, to draw out lessons for the design of political institutions were an English Parliament to be established. Jack Sheldon and Meg Russell summarise some early findings.

Last autumn we began work on a research project exploring the options for an English Parliament. As outlined in a previous blog post, calls for an English Parliament have long existed, but frequently been dismissed by academics and mainstream politicians. However, in recent years the salience of questions concerning England’s constitutional status has increased and as a result the idea has gained new supporters. Despite this no detailed analysis of the design options for an English Parliament – including key questions such as its possible powers, structure and location – has previously been undertaken. We are aiming to close this gap and plan to publish a report in late 2017.

As part of our research we are examining constitutional arrangements in existing decentralised states, including those which are federal. In this blog post we present some early findings from a survey of arrangements in the 22 states that are listed as federations by the Forum of Federations. The establishment of an English Parliament would not necessarily imply a federal arrangement for the UK, but certainly something like it – with separate legislative institutions for the four historic nations. When drawing out comparative lessons, looking at existing federal states is therefore an obvious place to start.

What are federations and when are they established?

The term federalism covers a wide range of political systems in which legislative powers are divided between state and sub-state levels (see Dardanelli and Kincaid, 2016, for further discussion of the definition). Among the 22 federations listed by the Forum of Federations there are 11 parliamentary systems, nine presidential or semi-presidential systems and two that fall into none of these categories. Even within these categories there is great variation in institutional structures.

The classic early federations – the United States, Australia and Canada, for example – were comprised of existing autonomous political systems. ‘Coming together’ federations of this type remain more numerous than ‘holding together’ federations formed from previously unitary states (for discussion of this distinction see Stepan, 1999). However, the latter category has grown in the post-1945 period. Examples of ‘holding together’ federations include Belgium and India, whilst Spain – though not strictly a federation – has moved in an increasingly federal direction. Were it to move in the direction of a more federal structure the UK would not, therefore, be out of step with developments elsewhere.

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What might an English Parliament look like? The Constitution Unit is consulting on the design options

Jack_SheldonMeg-RussellThe Constitution Unit has recently begun work on a new project examining the design options for an English Parliament. This was once seen as an unrealistic proposal but support has grown in recent years and it therefore now deserves to be taken more seriously. Nonetheless many major questions about what an English Parliament might actually look like remain unaddressed. In this post Jack Sheldon and Meg Russell set these questions out and invite views on them through a consultation that is now open and will close on 27 January 2017.

Calls for an English Parliament have long existed, but frequently been rejected by academics and mainstream politicians. Although a Campaign for an English Parliament was set up in 1998, as the devolved institutions were being established for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, the idea did not get off the ground. A central argument has been that such a parliament, thanks to representing almost 85 per cent of the UK’s population, would, in the words of the 1973 Kilbrandon Commission on the Constitution, result in a Union ‘so unbalanced as to be unworkable’ (para 531). As critics such as Vernon Bogdanor (p. 13) have pointed out, no major existing federation has a component part this dominant, and unbalanced federal systems (e.g. the former USSR and Yugoslavia), have tended to fail. Elites have thus often proposed devolution within England, rather than to England as a whole, as the preferred solution to the ‘English question’, and considered an English Parliament an unrealistic proposal. As the Constitution Unit’s Robert Hazell wrote in 2006, ‘An English Parliament is not seriously on the political agenda, and will never get onto the agenda unless serious politicians begin to espouse it’.

Growing salience of the English question

But various factors have increased the salience of questions around England’s place in the devolution settlement, and the idea of an English Parliament has gained new friends as a result. One factor is the gradually greater powers of the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly beyond those bestowed in the 1990s – including legislative powers in an increasing number of fields and significant tax-raising powers. This means that a growing amount of business at Westminster concerns England (or sometimes England and Wales) alone. In turn, this brings the famous ‘West Lothian question’, concerning the voting rights of MPs elected from the devolved nations, more to the fore. The Conservative government consequently introduced a form of ‘English votes for English laws’ (EVEL) in 2015, through changes to House of Commons standing orders. But the new arrangements have been rejected by opposition parties, so might not survive a change of government. Furthermore, the version of EVEL that has been introduced does not actually prevent Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish MPs from vetoing English-only legislation. It is therefore far from clear that this will prove to be a satisfactory long-term solution.

Another contributing factor is growing interest in the future of the Union pre- and post- the 2014 Scottish independence referendum. Various unionist politicians, pundits and other political observers have considered how Scottish demands for greater autonomy may be satisfied within the UK, and federalism is being increasingly discussed. The EU referendum result has led some such as Professor Jim Gallagher (Director-General, Devolution Strategy at the Cabinet Office from 2007–10) to suggest that the devolved nations, whilst remaining within the UK, might each pursue different relationships with the EU post-Brexit. Heavyweight political support for something similar has come from former Prime Minister Gordon Brown and former Shadow Foreign Secretary Douglas Alexander. The threat of a second Scottish independence referendum, announced by First Minister Nicola Sturgeon in the immediate aftermath of the Brexit vote and repeated since, means the government needs to take such proposals seriously. This would clearly require the consequences for England to be addressed.

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UK constitutional reform: No means Yes?

Meg-Russell

Although a Yes vote would have meant a very obvious change to the existing constitutional structure of the UK, the consequences of the No vote will still be complex and profound. The outcome has already put contentious issues such as the West Lothian question back on the agenda, writes Meg Russell.

This article originally appeared in the Observer. A version is available on the Guardian website.

The constitutional consequences of a Yes vote in Scotland would have been momentous, leading to months – possibly years – of fraught negotiation with uncertain consequences. But the consequences of no for the rest of the UK may, paradoxically, be even more complex and profound.

Since establishment of the Scottish Parliament in 1999 the ‘West Lothian question’ – Scottish MPs voting on legislation not affecting Scotland – and wider ‘English questions’ have rumbled on but rarely reached centre stage. They were temporarily sidelined by announcement of the independence referendum. Had Scotland voted yes, their urgency would have declined. Controversies over Scottish MPs at Westminster would clearly have ended with their departure, however painful that might have been.

A No vote was always going to put these issues back on the agenda, particularly because the status quo ante was not an option. Under the Scotland Act 2012, a No vote was already to hand substantial new powers to the Scottish Parliament, particularly over taxation. During the campaign, political leaders went far further, promising additional devolved powers including on welfare and tax. This has angered Conservative MPs.

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