Tag Archives: Independent Complaints and Grievance Scheme

Recall petitions: process, consequences, and potential reforms

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A recall petition is currently open in Wellingborough, which could lead to MP Peter Bone being recalled by his constituents, followed by a by-election. This is the fifth such petition in as many years. Tom Fleming outlines how the UK’s recall system works, summarises its effects to date, and outlines possible areas for reform.

How do recall petitions work in the UK?

A system for ‘recalling’ MPs was first introduced in the UK by the Recall of MPs Act 2015, which came into force in March 2016. This legislation was introduced by the Conservative and Liberal Democrat coalition government, following commitments to some kind of recall procedure in both parties’ 2010 election manifestos.

In short, recall is a process by which voters are empowered to remove (i.e. ‘recall’) their MP prior to a general election if they are found to have committed certain types of serious wrongdoing.

Under section 1 of the 2015 Act, the recall process is triggered whenever an MP meets one of three conditions:

  • receiving a criminal conviction that leads to a custodial sentence (though sentences of more than a year already lead to disqualification from being an MP, under the Representation of the People Act 1981),
  • being suspended from the House of Commons for at least 10 sitting days (or two weeks) after a report from the Committee on Standards (or another committee with a similar remit), or
  • being convicted of making false or misleading expenses claims under the Parliamentary Standards Act 2009.

If any of these conditions is met, a recall petition is opened for six weeks in the affected MP’s constituency. If 10% of registered voters sign the petition by the deadline, the seat is declared vacant, and a by-election is held to elect a new MP (though the recalled MP remains free to stand again as a candidate). If the petition fails to reach the 10% threshold, no by-election is held and the MP retains their seat.

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Parliamentary standards: priorities for the new Commissioner 

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In this blog post, the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards, Daniel Greenberg CB, discusses the key themes of his first months in post, providing a snapshot of the top issues he and his team are working on. The Commissioner’s Annual Report 2022-23 was published on 12 July.

Engagement and outreach are priorities for my five-year term, as I hope to explore and address the causes of low public engagement with the political system and parliament.

In my first annual report, which was published this week, I describe the work my team and I are undertaking to support this work, including a series of Principles in Practice seminars, in and outside Westminster, that explore how the Seven Principles of Public Life (that underpin the Code of Conduct for MPs, and which are also known as the Nolan Principles) already inspire the day-to-day workings of MPs’ offices. Appendix 5 of the report includes anonymised case studies drawn from MPs’ offices, to share and inspire examples of principles-driven best practice.

My report also contains my reflections, informed by my engagement with the hundreds of emails, letters and calls my office receives from members of the public each month, on two of the most prevalent topics of complaint that I receive: MPs’ responsiveness to constituency correspondence; and the language and tone of some MPs’ expression of views and opinions.

MPs’ responsiveness to constituency correspondence

I am concerned about the very large number of complaints that I receive about lack of responsiveness to constituency correspondence, which suggest that there is a general perception on the part of some members of the public that some MPs are not attaching sufficient importance to responding to enquiries and other correspondence from constituents.

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Parliament’s watchdogs: independence and accountability of five constitutional regulators

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The Unit today published a new report, Parliament’s Watchdogs: Independence and Accountability of Five Constitutional Regulators. Robert Hazell explains that public awareness of these regulators is low and the position of some of them in public life is precarious. He calls for several measures, including putting the CSPL on a statutory footing, protecting watchdogs from dismissal, and repealing the legislation allowing the government to produce a strategy statement for the Electoral Commission.

Origins of this study

The constitutional reforms of the last 25 years have seen an upsurge in the number of constitutional watchdogs. The Constitution Unit anticipated these developments from the start, with an early report on constitutional watchdogs in 1997 (Unit report no. 10). This interest was continued by Oonagh Gay and Barry Winetrobe, who wrote two major reports on watchdogs: Officers of Parliament: Transforming the Role (Unit report no. 100, 2003) and Parliament’s Watchdogs: At the Crossroads(Unit report no. 144, 2008).

Today sees the launch of a new report, Parliament’s Watchdogs: Independence and Accountability of Five Constitutional Regulators, (Unit report 195), by Marcial Boo, Zach Pullar and myself. Marcial Boo, former Chief Executive of IPSA, joined the Constitution Unit in late 2020 as an honorary research fellow. We asked him to do a study of those watchdogs which are directly sponsored by parliament, working with Zach Pullar, a young law graduate who has since become a Judicial Assistant in the Court of Appeal. There is an obvious tension with watchdogs whose role is to scrutinise the executive (like the Independent Adviser on Ministers’ Interests), being themselves appointed and sponsored by the government. Less obvious, but just as fundamental, is the tension for watchdogs whose role is to regulate the behaviour of parliamentarians, being themselves appointed and sponsored by parliament.

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