Since taking office, Keir Starmer has used his opening answer at Prime Minister’s Questions very differently from his predecessors. In this post, Ruxandra Serban and Tom Fleming explore how Starmer’s approach to opening PMQs compares to that of other post-1997 Prime Ministers.
Continue reading
The main party manifestos have now been published, allowing exploration and comparison of their constitutional proposals. In this second post in a series on the manifestos, Meg Russell looks at the parties’ commitments on parliamentary reform. What are they promising, and what are the prospects for these proposed changes?
Yesterday on this blog, Lisa James reviewed the constitutional proposals presented by the political parties in their 2024 general election manifestos. Unsurprisingly, parliamentary reform is a key area that appears in several of them. Most parties include aspirations to reform the House of Lords, and some make other commitments on the House of Commons, or the overall power of parliament. This second post in the Constitution Unit’s manifesto series reviews these proposals, reflecting on their origins, merits, and prospects for implementation. It starts with the power of parliament as a whole, before moving to the Commons, and then the Lords.
The power of parliament
It is primarily the Liberal Democrats that give space to parliament’s overall place in the constitution – an area subject to significant recent controversy. The Brexit referendum of 2016 led to fierce clashes in parliament, and unusually high-profile arguments about both parliamentary procedure and the limits of the government’s prerogative power. Brexit also raised new questions about parliament’s powers over policy matters that returned to the UK following its exit from the European Union.
Continue reading
Recent events have led to renewed discussion about the convention that parliament should have a formal role in authorising military action, which Keir Starmer at one point proposed to codify in legislation. Robert Hazell argues that placing the existing convention on a statutory footing is unwise, and calls on parliament and the government to work together in creating a ‘shared vision’ of how the convention should operate.
Tony Blair’s decision to support the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 has cast a long shadow over every subsequent leader of the Labour party. Keir Starmer opposed the Iraq war, and one of ten pledges he promised as part of his 2020 leadership campaign was to introduce a Prevention of Military Intervention Act. He subsequently specified on The Andrew Marr Show: ‘I would pass legislation that said military action could be taken if first the lawful case for it was made, secondly there was a viable objective and thirdly you got the consent of the Commons’.
Starmer was reminded of this pledge when he was interviewed about the UK airstrikes against the Houthi rebels in Yemen. He told Laura Kuenssberg on 14 January that his proposal for military action to require the support of the Commons only meant sustained military action involving troops on the ground, rather than targeted airstrikes like those in the Red Sea:
If we are going to deploy our troops on the ground, then parliament should be informed: there should be a debate, the case should be made, and there should be a vote… What I wanted to do was to codify the convention: the Cabinet Manual has a convention… it could be in a law or it could be by some other means.
Continue reading
Alan Whysall discusses the prospects for the return of the Northern Ireland political institutions this autumn. He finds limited grounds for optimism and concludes that the responsibility for salvaging the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement settlement may now fall to the next British government. This post picks up themes from the author’s two most recent papers for the Constitution Unit, called Northern Ireland’s Political Future (NIPF) and The Agreement at 25.
As the July issue of Monitor recorded, visits from US President Joe Biden and other notables to celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement had little apparent effect on Northern Ireland politics; nor did local government elections, at which Sinn Féin emerged triumphant. The principal Agreement institutions remained in abeyance, vetoed by the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), which remains concerned about the Northern Ireland Protocol and Windsor Framework. At the time of writing, tensions are growing over policing, potentially deepening the political standoff. Northern Ireland meanwhile is being governed without government by civil servants who have very limited authority, together with occasional interventions from London.
Will devolution come back?
Before the summer, many commentators believed that the DUP would reach a deal in the autumn, claiming credit for aspects of the Windsor Framework, to bring back the institutions. This remains possible – many DUP careers depend on their existence. There have been suggestions of progress behind the scenes in the last few days. But it is now harder to be confident. Stasis until the UK general election seems possible, while the political, social and economic fabric of Northern Ireland deteriorates. Why?
First, the DUP may find compromise over the Protocol difficult. Negotiations are apparently going on between the party and the government, informed by a private 18-page DUP wish list. Its public demands for action on the Protocol, and on the threats it sees in it to Northern Ireland’s constitutional position, have been vaguely expressed, but the implication is that they are substantial. It seems unlikely that London can do very much to satisfy them without reopening the Protocol or the Agreement itself: and it has warned that it cannot do significantly more. So DUP supporters may be disappointed in any feasible compromise, and according to polling, they largely endorse the hard line taken so far. Senior party figures may be obdurate too, whatever the leader, Jeffrey Donaldson, wants: the former deputy leader, Lord (Nigel) Dodds of Duncairn, spoke vehemently of the ‘many unresolved and outstanding problems’ created by the Framework, suggesting London was merely peddling spin.
Continue readingA Constitution Unit report by Meg Russell, Hannah White and Lisa James, published jointly with the Institute for Government, provides a menu of constitutional reform options ahead of political parties’ manifesto preparation. Its chapters will be published in summary form on this blog throughout August, with this third excerpt identifying potential changes relating to the territorial constitution.
Recent years have been unsettled ones in UK territorial politics, with structural pressures following the Brexit vote, and other tensions between the centre and the devolved institutions. Meanwhile, the devolution arrangements for England remain an incomplete patchwork.
While wholesale reform may be complex and contentious, much can be done to mitigate the tensions that exist within the existing framework. There is widespread recognition that cooperation between the UK government and devolved institutions could be improved, and some positive steps in this direction have already been taken. With the fiercest battles about the implementation of Brexit now over, opportunities exist for strengthening interparliamentary arrangements. The governance arrangements for England could also be made more transparent and coherent.
Continue reading