Recall petitions: process, consequences, and potential reforms

A recall petition is currently open in Wellingborough, which could lead to MP Peter Bone being recalled by his constituents, followed by a by-election. This is the fifth such petition in as many years. Tom Fleming outlines how the UK’s recall system works, summarises its effects to date, and outlines possible areas for reform.

How do recall petitions work in the UK?

A system for ‘recalling’ MPs was first introduced in the UK by the Recall of MPs Act 2015, which came into force in March 2016. This legislation was introduced by the Conservative and Liberal Democrat coalition government, following commitments to some kind of recall procedure in both parties’ 2010 election manifestos.

In short, recall is a process by which voters are empowered to remove (i.e. ‘recall’) their MP prior to a general election if they are found to have committed certain types of serious wrongdoing.

Under section 1 of the 2015 Act, the recall process is triggered whenever an MP meets one of three conditions:

  • receiving a criminal conviction that leads to a custodial sentence (though sentences of more than a year already lead to disqualification from being an MP, under the Representation of the People Act 1981),
  • being suspended from the House of Commons for at least 10 sitting days (or two weeks) after a report from the Committee on Standards (or another committee with a similar remit), or
  • being convicted of making false or misleading expenses claims under the Parliamentary Standards Act 2009.

If any of these conditions is met, a recall petition is opened for six weeks in the affected MP’s constituency. If 10% of registered voters sign the petition by the deadline, the seat is declared vacant, and a by-election is held to elect a new MP (though the recalled MP remains free to stand again as a candidate). If the petition fails to reach the 10% threshold, no by-election is held and the MP retains their seat.

The House of Commons Library has provided an excellent briefing setting out these provisions in much greater detail.

What consequences has the recall system had so far?

The recall system has had surprisingly significant consequences, given early complaints that it would be too weak and that the conditions for triggering a recall petition were very unlikely to be met.

The most visible consequence of this new system is that recall petitions have been triggered on five occasions (with Wellingborough being the fifth). While the first such petition (North Antrim, 2018) failed to reach the 10% threshold, the subsequent three all led to by-elections: in Peterborough (2019), Brecon and Radnorshire (2019), and Rutherglen and Hamilton West (2023). Each of these by-elections returned a new MP to the Commons, either because the incumbent was disowned by their former party and didn’t stand as a candidate, or – as in Brecon and Radnorshire – because the incumbent stood but lost (despite being reselected by the Conservative Party).

However, the 2015 Act has also had consequences even when its formal processes haven’t been used. In particular, several MPs have resigned when facing a sanction that would trigger the Act’s provisions, meaning a recall petition was never opened.

This has happened on four occasions to date, with the resignations of Owen Paterson (North Shropshire, 2021), Christian Matheson (City of Chester, 2021), Boris Johnson (Uxbridge and South Ruislip, 2023), and Chris Pincher (Tamworth, 2023). All four cases related to the second trigger – suspension from the Commons – but saw the MPs in question resign before the Commons had formally approved their suspension (or, in some cases, before the relevant committee had recommended it).

It is hard to know whether these resignations were really motivated by anticipation of the recall process, or whether suspension from the Commons alone would have produced the same outcome. This is a difficult question to answer, as even the MPs themselves cannot know how they might have behaved differently under alternative procedures.

However, we can gain some insight by asking how frequently MPs resigned in similar circumstances before the Recall of MPs Act came into force. Between 1997 and 2016, there were eight instances of MPs being suspended for at least two weeks or ten sitting days on the recommendation of the Standards and Privileges Committee (based on data from the House of Commons Library). All eight MPs served their suspension without resigning to trigger a by-election. Differences among the cases notwithstanding, this comparison suggests that the prospect of a recall petition can play a role in encouraging suspended MPs to resign pre-emptively.

The UK’s recall process has therefore been more impactful than some expected, leading directly to three MPs leaving the Commons, and indirectly to as many as four more. This may be partly due to subsequent changes in the regulation of MPs’ standards, and particularly the introduction in 2018 of an Independent Complaints and Grievances Scheme (ICGS) and various recent revisions to the MPs’ Code of Conduct. Parliament now has more tools for investigating and sanctioning MPs’ personal (mis)conduct, and therefore more opportunities to trigger the recall process. However, this point shouldn’t be overstated – of the five recall petitions and four resignations mentioned above, only two cases involved findings under the ICGS.

How could the recall system be reformed?

The 2015 Act has therefore had more significant consequences than its strongest critics feared, and has been praised as an effective piece of legislation. This seems welcome given the clear public appetite for strong regulation of politicians’ ethical standards. However, there have nonetheless been various suggestions for how the recall process might be reformed, including:

  • Standardising the number of signing places. Rather than specifying a fixed number of places where a recall petition may be signed in person (as well as postal signatures), the 2015 Act allows up to a maximum of ten. After the 2018 North Antrim recall petition only used three sites, Professor Jonathan Tonge suggested that using the maximum permitted number could have increased turnout. Subsequent petitions have used more signing sites, but the apparent inconsistency between each petition has generated further critical comment, including in the press. The challenge here is how to establish some kind of consistency while taking account of wide variation in constituencies’ size and population density.
  • Shortening the signature period. The Electoral Commission’s report on the two 2019 recall petitions suggested that the government consider a shorter signing period, possibly of four weeks rather than six. This would reduce the costs and resources involved, and would also mean swifter resolution of the uncertainty around the constituency’s future representation. While a shorter period would reduce voters’ opportunities to sign the petition, the Commission’s evidence shows that most signatures are made in the early part of the signing period. Indeed, the recent Rutherglen and Hamilton petition cleared the 10% threshold within two weeks but had to remain open for a further month before any counting could begin.
  • Creating more flexible triggers. The former chair of the Commons Committee on Standards, Chris Bryant (who is currently a Labour shadow minister), has suggested that in some cases it may be disproportionate for a suspension of 10 days to trigger a recall petition. His recent book, Code of Conduct, highlighted that the 2015 Act has led to the committee considering shorter suspensions to avoid the recall process. His suggested solution was to give the committee flexibility to recommend longer suspensions without automatically triggering a recall petition. However, this change could prove politically difficult to implement, especially if the public interpreted it as a way for MPs to shelter their colleagues from public accountability.
  • Creating additional triggers. There have been a number of proposals for creating new ways to trigger a petition. In 2020, Conservative MP Anthony Mangnall used a ‘10-minute rule bill’ to propose that recall be triggered by MPs voluntarily switching political parties (as his predecessor as MP for Totnes had done). More recently, recall was raised as a potential way to remove MPs who are perceived to be insufficiently active. Apparently sparked by the case of Nadine Dorries’ non-resignation, an online petition to ‘Make MPs who are absent from their constituency and Parliament subject to recall’ received over 13,000 signatures. There were also several more specific proposals to suspend Dorries for a period sufficient to trigger recall proceedings. Any attempt to institute this kind of rule on a permanent basis faces the fundamental challenge of defining what constitutes ‘adequate’ attendance by an MP, given the inevitable variation in how MPs understand their role and prioritise different activities.

Away from specific proposals, there have been more general calls for the recall system to be reviewed. The Electoral Commission suggested this in 2019 and 2023, as did the Standards Committee in its 2023 report which led to the Rutherglen and Hamilton recall petition (although the relevant paragraph was only agreed after a vote which saw an 8-4 split in favour). That committee has now taken the initiative itself, with the recall system one of the subjects covered by its review of the overall ‘House of Commons standards landscape’. It remains to be seen whether the Labour Party will propose any changes in this area as part of its proposed wider overhaul of standards regulation.

Calls for reform may grow louder if the coming months see more recall petitions which draw attention to the current system’s shortcomings. However, the 2015 Act prohibits recall petitions being opened within six months of the next scheduled general election. As the next election must occur no later than January 2025, this rules out any further recall petitions after the middle of 2024.

About the author

Tom Fleming is a Lecturer in British and Comparative Politics at UCL.

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