Tag Archives: Committee on Standards and Privileges

Parliament’s watchdogs: independence and accountability of five constitutional regulators

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The Unit today published a new report, Parliament’s Watchdogs: Independence and Accountability of Five Constitutional Regulators. Robert Hazell explains that public awareness of these regulators is low and the position of some of them in public life is precarious. He calls for several measures, including putting the CSPL on a statutory footing, protecting watchdogs from dismissal, and repealing the legislation allowing the government to produce a strategy statement for the Electoral Commission.

Origins of this study

The constitutional reforms of the last 25 years have seen an upsurge in the number of constitutional watchdogs. The Constitution Unit anticipated these developments from the start, with an early report on constitutional watchdogs in 1997 (Unit report no. 10). This interest was continued by Oonagh Gay and Barry Winetrobe, who wrote two major reports on watchdogs: Officers of Parliament: Transforming the Role (Unit report no. 100, 2003) and Parliament’s Watchdogs: At the Crossroads(Unit report no. 144, 2008).

Today sees the launch of a new report, Parliament’s Watchdogs: Independence and Accountability of Five Constitutional Regulators, (Unit report 195), by Marcial Boo, Zach Pullar and myself. Marcial Boo, former Chief Executive of IPSA, joined the Constitution Unit in late 2020 as an honorary research fellow. We asked him to do a study of those watchdogs which are directly sponsored by parliament, working with Zach Pullar, a young law graduate who has since become a Judicial Assistant in the Court of Appeal. There is an obvious tension with watchdogs whose role is to scrutinise the executive (like the Independent Adviser on Ministers’ Interests), being themselves appointed and sponsored by the government. Less obvious, but just as fundamental, is the tension for watchdogs whose role is to regulate the behaviour of parliamentarians, being themselves appointed and sponsored by parliament.

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Arguments over the Ministerial Code and the role of the Independent Adviser on Ministers’ Interests are far from over

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Recently announced changes to the Ministerial Code demonstrate that the government is unlikely to place it on a statutory basis any time soon. Sir Peter Riddell argues that although some of the revisions are sensible, the new Code demonstrates the government’s determination to assert the privileges of the executive and reflects an increasingly presidential view of the Prime Minister’s role.

The Independent Adviser on Ministers’ Interests is neither fully independent nor entirely an adviser. His hybrid, anomalous position reflects wider tensions between ministers and advisers on standards which have been exacerbated under the current administration – and are unlikely to change after Boris Johnson won a confidence vote on Monday to ensure his survival as Conservative leader and Prime Minister. These tensions have reflected an increasing assertion by the Prime Minister of a presidential view of his role based on the mandate of the ballot box, as distinct from accountability to parliament. The limited changes in the latest version of the Ministerial Code only go a small way to address these concerns.

The public arguments over the Ministerial Code and the Independent Adviser have only partly been caused by the casual attitude of the current Prime Minister towards standards in public life, as highlighted by the repeated frustrations expressed by Lord (Christopher) Geidt, the current Adviser. That has led to widely supported calls from the Committee on Standards in Public Life (CSPL) for a strengthening of his powers.

As with so much in standards in public life, the evolution of the Ministerial Code (originally the more prosaic Questions of Procedure for Ministers) and the creation of the Adviser’s role in 2006 have been the result of a series of allegations and scandals. These exposed the limitations of previous informal understandings and conventions and underlined the need for more formal codes of conduct and independent investigation. The Ministerial Code combines operational guidance about how business in government should be conducted and a list of expectations about ministers’ ethical behaviour in office, based on the seven principles of public life (also known as the Nolan principles).

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Improving standards of conduct in public life

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In November, the Constitution Unit hosted Lord (Jonathan) Evans, Chair of the Committee on Standards in Public Life, to discuss its new report, ‘Upholding Standards in Public Life’. Lisa James summarises the discussion.

In November, the Committee on Standards in Public Life (CSPL) published its report Upholding Standards in Public Life, the result of a year-long review of the system of standards bodies regulating the UK government. Following the report’s publication, the Constitution Unit hosted a webinar with CSPL’s Chair, Lord (Jonathan) Evans, to discuss the findings. The event also followed closely behind the parliamentary standards scandal over then-MP Owen Paterson, in which the government was forced to U-turn after trying to overturn the House of Commons Standards Committee’s findings against Paterson on allegations of inappropriate lobbying.

The summary below reflects Lord Evans’ remarks and conversation with the Unit’s Director, Meg Russell. A full video of the event, including the audience Q&A, is available on our YouTube page.

Lord Evans began by introducing CSPL and the reasoning behind the Standards Matter 2 inquiry. CSPL is an independent advisory body, with an independent majority and a minority of party-political members. Established by then Prime Minister John Major in the wake of the cash-for-questions scandal, it was originally conceived as an ‘ethical workshop’ for the public sector. Continuing the metaphor, Lord Evans suggested that CSPL’s recent inquiry might be seen as an ‘MOT’ of the regulatory system for government: a wide-ranging review of the whole system, in an attempt to identify problems and suggest improvements. Focusing on ethical standards, the committee did not recommend radical change, but identified a number of moderate, ‘common-sense’ reforms to strengthen the system. These fell into three broad categories: stronger rules; greater independence for regulators; and a stronger compliance culture within government.

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The Elections Bill’s proposals on Electoral Commission governance: risks to electoral integrity and devolution

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The Elections Bill has been subject to both criticism and praise, as discussed by Emilia Cieslak on this blog, and a panel of experts at a recent Unit seminar. In this post, Unit Deputy Director Alan Renwick identifies the threats to electoral integrity and devolution posed by the clauses of the bill that propose changes to the governance of the Electoral Commission.

The Elections Bill, currently before parliament, seeks to change many aspects of electoral law. Provisions to introduce voter ID requirements at polling stations have garnered most attention. But changes to the governance of the Electoral Commission also raise serious concerns. As currently formulated, they threaten both to weaken the vital independence of the elections watchdog and to violate the principles of the devolution settlement in Scotland and Wales.

Electoral Commission governance: principles and current practice

The Electoral Commission carries out a range of functions in overseeing elections and referendums and regulating campaign spending. As I have argued previously – in common with many others, not least the Committee on Standards in Public Life (CSPL) in a report published in July – the independence of the elections watchdog is vital to electoral integrity. If the government of the day can skew election or referendum conduct to suit its own ends, fairness – and thus democracy – is undermined. The Electoral Commission should, of course, be accountable too. An appropriate balance of independence and accountability is needed.

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