Rebuilding and renewing the constitution: elections and public participation

Posted on August 30, 2023 by The Constitution Unit

A new Constitution Unit report by Meg Russell, Hannah White and Lisa James, published jointly with the Institute for Government, provides a menu of constitutional reform options ahead of political parties’ manifesto preparation. Its chapters have been published on this blog throughout August, with this final excerpt identifying potential changes relating to elections and public participation.

Democracy rests ultimately on popular sovereignty. But the bond of trust between the public and their representatives – which is essential for healthy democratic governance – has become increasingly frayed. Public engagement with the political process has long been a cause for concern, and there is a desire to boost public trust and participation. In recent years, particular concerns have been voiced about the government’s attitudes towards the Electoral Commission, its policies on public protest and on voter ID, and a change in the electoral system for local mayors that appeared to be motivated by partisan gain. At a more mundane but nonetheless important level, there are also long-running challenges to the fair and effective administration of elections.

A range of reforms to elections, the conduct of campaigns, and the wider role of the public in processes of policymaking have been proposed to tackle these concerns. Some improvements could be made immediately. A number of others would require legislation, but would be largely uncontroversial, or could be implemented fairly straightforwardly through other means. Proposals for more fundamental change – most obviously to the Westminster voting system, and party funding – would be much more contested.

Quick win

The Elections Act 2022 empowered ministers to prepare a ‘strategy and policy statement’ for the Electoral Commission. Experts widely view the existence of such a statement as a threat to the Commission’s independence. Three Commons committees sharply criticised the government’s first draft, leading to revisions. Ministers should not proceed further with designating a strategy and policy statement for the Electoral Commission. Rather, they should simply affirm their commitment to the Commission’s independence and welcome its work. Should a statement be designated, a future government should withdraw it.

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Parliamentary standards: priorities for the new Commissioner

Posted on July 13, 2023 by The Constitution Unit

In this blog post, the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards, Daniel Greenberg CB, discusses the key themes of his first months in post, providing a snapshot of the top issues he and his team are working on. The Commissioner’s Annual Report 2022-23 was published on 12 July.

Engagement and outreach are priorities for my five-year term, as I hope to explore and address the causes of low public engagement with the political system and parliament.

In my first annual report, which was published this week, I describe the work my team and I are undertaking to support this work, including a series of Principles in Practice seminars, in and outside Westminster, that explore how the Seven Principles of Public Life (that underpin the Code of Conduct for MPs, and which are also known as the Nolan Principles) already inspire the day-to-day workings of MPs’ offices. Appendix 5 of the report includes anonymised case studies drawn from MPs’ offices, to share and inspire examples of principles-driven best practice.

My report also contains my reflections, informed by my engagement with the hundreds of emails, letters and calls my office receives from members of the public each month, on two of the most prevalent topics of complaint that I receive: MPs’ responsiveness to constituency correspondence; and the language and tone of some MPs’ expression of views and opinions.

MPs’ responsiveness to constituency correspondence

I am concerned about the very large number of complaints that I receive about lack of responsiveness to constituency correspondence, which suggest that there is a general perception on the part of some members of the public that some MPs are not attaching sufficient importance to responding to enquiries and other correspondence from constituents.

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The Constitutional Reform Act 2005 led to greater judicial independence: politicians and parliament must continue to support it

Posted on April 27, 2022 by The Constitution Unit

As part of an ongoing inquiry, the Lords Constitution Committee has sought evidence as to whether ‘the amendment of the role of the Lord Chancellor by the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (CRA), and the resulting separation of powers between the judiciary and the Government, [have] been successful’. Robert Hazell argues that the 2005 reforms led to greater judicial independence, a political achievement that requires continuing support from politicians and parliament.

The House of Lords Constitution Committee is currently undertaking an inquiry into the role of the Lord Chancellor and the Law Officers, in which it seeks to answer a number of questions, including whether ‘the amendment of the role of the Lord Chancellor by the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (CRA), and the resulting separation of powers between the judiciary and the Government, [have] been successful’. Through written evidence, submitted with Professor Kate Malleson, I have attempted to answer that question. Our answers were based upon the main findings and conclusions of a three-year research project on the Politics of Judicial Independence, funded by the AHRC. The research explored the impact of the greater separation of powers introduced by the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (CRA). Our principal conclusion – as explained in our 2015 book on the subject – was that judicial independence and judicial accountability have emerged stronger, not weaker; but that greater separation of powers requires increased engagement by the judiciary with other branches of government.

The changes made by the Constitutional Reform Act 2005

Until 2005 the head of the judiciary was a Cabinet minister, the Lord Chancellor. In an extraordinary breach of separation of powers, he could also sit as a judge in the UK’s highest court. The CRA removed the Lord Chancellor as head of the judiciary, handing that responsibility to the Lord Chief Justice in line with an agreement struck in the Concordat of 2004. The division of powers between the executive and judiciary was further refined in 2008 in a Framework Document for the management of the Courts Service (revised and updated in 2011 to incorporate the Tribunals Service). The CRA also created a new Supreme Court, and established the Judicial Appointments Commission.

The new politics of judicial independence are more formal, fragmented, and politicised

The old politics were informal, depending on regular meetings between the Lord Chancellor and senior judges; closed, in that these were virtually the only contacts between the judiciary and the government; and secretive, with both sides preserving each other’s confidences. They were also consensual and conservative, in that neither side wanted to change the system. The ‘new’ politics, by contrast, are much more formal. The CRA required more formal structures and processes to handle the relationships between more separate branches of government. We now have the Judicial Appointments Commission, Judicial Appointments and Conduct Ombudsman, and Judicial Conduct Investigations Office: all products of the CRA. The new formal processes include regular meetings between the judiciary and other branches of government, with the innovation of six-monthly meetings between the LCJ and Prime Minister, the introduction of regular meetings with senior officials in parliament, and annual appearances by the LCJ and President of the Supreme Court before the Constitution Committee.

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Democracy and the draft Online Safety Bill: the report of the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee

Posted on March 4, 2022 by The Constitution Unit

The publication of a draft Online Safety Bill has enabled two parliamentary committees to engage in detailed pre-legislative scrutiny. The conclusions of a special joint committee were discussed in earlier posts by its Chair, Damian Collins and Alex Walker. Here, Alex analyses the findings of the second report on the draft bill, authored by the DCMS Committee, and analyses the points of contention between the two reports.

Parliament has been giving close attention to the landmark Online Safety Bill since it was published in draft in May 2021. In December, the joint committee set up to consider the draft bill published its report. I considered its recommendations in the first part of this two-part series on the scrutiny of the draft bill. The Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) Select Committee has since published its take on the draft legislation. As the DCMS committee commented, it is welcome that the bill was published in draft, and is receiving such comprehensive pre-legislative scrutiny. Whilst the government is of course not required to accept the recommendations of the committees, failing to address gaps they have both identified would not be a constructive response to the pre-legislative process.

One such gap (highlighted previously on this blog) is that of online harms to democracy. Whilst they diverge on a number of points, the DCMS committee and the joint committee share the analysis that this is a serious issue which the bill should address. In this piece, I consider the DCMS committee’s proposals to address online threats to democracy and look at how they differ from those of the joint committee. Both approaches to improving this aspect of the bill are worthy of careful consideration and the government should not use the points of difference as a way to avoid taking action.

Content that undermines democracy should be in scope

Constitution Unit Deputy Director Alan Renwick and I argued in written evidence to the DCMS committee that online harms to democracy should be addressed in the legislation. The committee agreed. The government’s own 2019 Online Harms white paper detailed the dangers that online activity such as the viral spread of disinformation could pose to democracy. But the measures the white paper set out to address this issue were later abandoned, leaving the draft bill with a considerable blind spot. Both the DCMS committee and the joint committee concluded that leaving this gap unfilled would be a mistake. However, the two committees recommended different changes to the legislation.

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The Joint Committee on the Draft Online Safety Bill: steps in the right direction for democracy

Posted on January 27, 2022 by The Constitution Unit

The government’s draft Online Safety Bill does little to protect democracy from damage caused by online actors, despite a previous commitment to take action. Alex Walker argues that this was an error. Here, he analyses the December report of the parliamentary joint committee tasked with examining the bill. A post in early February will critique the conclusions and recommendations of the DCMS select committee, which published its report earlier this week.

In December, the joint committee tasked with scrutinising the government’s draft Online Safety Bill published its report, the conclusions of which were outlined by its Chair, Damian Collins, on this blog. The committee recommended significant overarching changes to the draft bill, which represents the first major attempt in the UK at online regulation.

Since its publication in May 2021, the draft bill has been subject to extensive criticism, including on this blog. In previous posts, I’ve highlighted that it fails to address online threats to democracy. The government’s 2019 Online Harms white paper acknowledged the seriousness of this issue and set out measures to tackle it. These proposals were then later abandoned.

Positively, the committee noted the government’s change of direction and concluded to the contrary that online harms to democracy should be tackled by legislation. Whilst the committee’s recommendations have their own limitations, if adopted they would better protect democratic processes from online harm than at present.

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