Tag Archives: rishi sunak

What should happen when MPs resign? Why the Commons should have control of the departure of its members and MPs should not be offered post-dated peerages

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The resignation of Nadine Dorries prompted questions about how, and in what circumstances, an MP should leave office. In this post (the first of two), former senior House of Commons official David Natzler argues that it is wrong for the executive to have the final say over MPs’ departures, and that MPs should not be offered peerages until after they have left the Commons.

On 25 August the backbencher and former Cabinet minister Nadine Dorries, MP for Mid Bedfordshire, announced that she had formally applied for the position of Crown Steward and Bailiff of the Chiltern Hundreds. The appointment was duly made on 29 August and she ceased thereby to be a member of the House of Commons. The writ for a by-election was ordered when the Commons returned from its summer recess on 4 September, with delayed effect until 12 September: unlike the writ for Rutherglen and Hamilton West caused by the successful recall petition against Margaret Ferrier, which was ordered at the same sitting but with immediate effect. As a result, the by-election to replace Dorries will not be held until 19 October. This was in the news primarily because more than 10 weeks earlier, on 9 June, Dorries stated that she had informed the Conservative Chief Whip that she was ‘standing down as the MP for Mid Bedfordshire with immediate effect’. That day saw the publication of the resignation honours list of former Prime Minister Boris Johnson, and both she and fellow Johnson loyalist Nigel Adams had been widely tipped to receive peerages. Neither did, apparently following doubts expressed by the House of Lords Appointments Commission (HOLAC). Johnson announced his resignation as an MP later on 9 June and was appointed to the Chiltern Hundreds on 12 June. Adams announced his resignation on 10 June – using identical words to Dorries about ‘standing down with immediate effect’ –  and was duly appointed as Steward of the Manor of Northstead on 13 June.

It soon became clear that Dorries had not actually resigned and that she had no immediate intention of doing so. On 14 June she said that it was still ‘absolutely my intention to resign’ but that she was awaiting information she had sought from the Cabinet Office and HOLAC on her non-appointment to the House of Lords. On 29 June she stated on her weekly TalkTV show that ‘I’ve resigned… I’ll be gone long before the next general election.’ Criticism mounted from Conservative MPs, and within her constituency, most conspicuously from first Flitwick and then Shefford town councils, both of whom published letters they had sent to her. These focused primarily on allegations that she was failing in her duties to her constituents, both in terms of her failure over a period of many months to speak or vote or attend the House of Commons, and of her refusal to hold constituency surgeries or play an active role in the constituency. Rishi Sunak suggested during an LBC radio interview on 2 August that her constituents were not being properly represented, and thereafter several ministers and backbench Conservatives were similarly critical. She continued however to receive the Conservative whip. And of course, she continued to receive her salary. 

Political drama aside, does this story hold any lessons for the way parliament and the constitution should function? I believe that it illustrates several issues, although they are not all capable of resolution: specifically, the grant of peerages to MPs; the practice and process used by MPs to resign their seats; the expectations of attendance of MPs at Westminster; and MPs’ work for and in their constituencies. The first two of these matters will be covered in this post. The latter two will be discussed in a post that will appear on this blog tomorrow.

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Why the UK government must take a different approach to restoring devolution in Northern Ireland

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Alan Whysall discusses the prospects for the return of the Northern Ireland political institutions this autumn. He finds limited grounds for optimism and concludes that the responsibility for salvaging the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement settlement may now fall to the next British government. This post picks up themes from the author’s two most recent papers for the Constitution Unit, called Northern Ireland’s Political Future (NIPF) and The Agreement at 25.

As the July issue of Monitor recorded, visits from US President Joe Biden and other notables to celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement had little apparent effect on Northern Ireland politics; nor did local government elections, at which Sinn Féin emerged triumphant. The principal Agreement institutions remained in abeyance, vetoed by the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), which remains concerned about the Northern Ireland Protocol and Windsor Framework. At the time of writing, tensions are growing over policing, potentially deepening the political standoff. Northern Ireland meanwhile is being governed without government by civil servants who have very limited authority, together with occasional interventions from London.

Will devolution come back?

Before the summer, many commentators believed that the DUP would reach a deal in the autumn, claiming credit for aspects of the Windsor Framework, to bring back the institutions. This remains possible – many DUP careers depend on their existence. There have been suggestions of progress behind the scenes in the last few days. But it is now harder to be confident. Stasis until the UK general election seems possible, while the political, social and economic fabric of Northern Ireland deteriorates. Why?

First, the DUP may find compromise over the Protocol difficult. Negotiations are apparently going on between the party and the government, informed by a private 18-page DUP wish list. Its public demands for action on the Protocol, and on the threats it sees in it to Northern Ireland’s constitutional position, have been vaguely expressed, but the implication is that they are substantial. It seems unlikely that London can do very much to satisfy them without reopening the Protocol or the Agreement itself: and it has warned that it cannot do significantly more. So DUP supporters may be disappointed in any feasible compromise, and according to polling, they largely endorse the hard line taken so far. Senior party figures may be obdurate too, whatever the leader, Jeffrey Donaldson, wants: the former deputy leader, Lord (Nigel) Dodds of Duncairn, spoke vehemently of the ‘many unresolved and outstanding problems’ created by the Framework, suggesting London was merely peddling spin.

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Scrutinising delegated legislation: what can Westminster learn from other parliaments?

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Recent years have seen increasing expressions of concern about whether the UK Parliament has adequate procedures for scrutinising delegated legislation. In a recent article in Political Quarterly, Tom Fleming and Tasneem Ghazi explore the lessons which might be learned from how other parliaments approach that challenge. This blog summarises those lessons.

There is wide concern about the increasing use of delegated legislation in the UK. Delegated legislation is normally made by ministers, rather than parliament. Historically, it has been used to fill in the details of broader policy frameworks set out in primary legislation. But recent years have seen a growing trend of ministers using delegated legislation to implement major policy decisions. This was highlighted as an issue during the Brexit process and Covid-19 pandemic. It has continued under the Sunak government, as shown by the recent bills on industrial action and retained EU law both containing significant delegated powers.

This trend has led to renewed attention being paid to the UK parliament’s system for scrutinising delegated legislation (which mostly takes the form of ‘statutory instruments’). By its nature, this legislation receives less extensive scrutiny than primary legislation. But especially when these statutory instruments (SIs) contain significant policy content, it is important that MPs and peers have sufficient opportunities and means to scrutinise them. That scrutiny may confer greater legitimacy and further government accountability to parliament. It may also highlight technical and policy flaws and ensure that a range of voices are heard in the policy-making process.

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The impact of Brexit on UK policy on Northern Ireland

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Conor Kelly and Etain Tannam argue that Brexit reversed much of the progress of past decades in Northern Ireland by signifying a return by the UK government to a unilateral approach that prioritised traditional sovereignty in both its relations with the Irish government and with devolved governments. They conclude that Brexit has deeply destabilised the political settlement in Northern Ireland.

In the first 5 months of 2023, Northern Ireland was rarely far from our front pages as the Windsor Framework was negotiated between the UK government and European Commission in February, and the world’s media descended on Belfast for the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement’s 25th-anniversary celebrations in April. Yet, the Stormont institutions remain suspended, and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) has thus far refused to accept the Windsor Framework as the basis for returning to power-sharing.

To understand Brexit’s impact on the government’s policy, one must examine if joint UK-Irish EU membership between 1973 and 2016 impacted UK policy to Northern Ireland. We argue that while the Europeanisation of UK government policy towards Northern Ireland can be overstated, it had an indirect impact on the peace process by influencing the strategy of its key architect, former Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) leader John Hume. In particular the EU’s model of  institutionalised cooperation and consensual policy-making has echoes in the 1998 Agreement. Thus, the process of de-Europeanisation since 2016 has had a severely negative effect on political stability within Northern Ireland and UK-Irish relations.

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