Northern Ireland’s political institutions: time for change?

The Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee has published a report on the effectiveness of the institutions established by the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement. Alan Whysall argues that it is a much-needed contribution to informed debate. Its proposals for institutional change are unlikely to be implemented as cast. But similar reforms may be essential to the survival of the Agreement settlement.

Politics in Northern Ireland has been deadlocked for almost two years, leaving the institutions established by the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement unable to function. The Assembly does not meet; ministers have not been appointed to form an Executive; government is carried on by civil servants with very limited powers, with occasional interventions from London; there is financial disarray.

The leader of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), Jeffrey Donaldson, whose veto has led to the deadlock, has appeared for some months to be edging towards lifting it, despite profound differences of view between DUP leadership figures. Matters seemed to be coming to a head last week following publication of a British government offer to the main political parties of a financial package if devolution resumes. But it is now clear there will be no DUP decision before Christmas – although the Secretary of State, while announcing an improved financial package, declared that talks on resuming devolution were over: the government’s final offer was on the table. 

Into this context, the Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee published a timely report on the functioning of – and possible reforms to – the Agreement institutions. Though the report passed largely unnoticed outside Northern Ireland, this is much more than geekery. Institutional reforms may be essential to ensuring stable and effective government in the future, whatever the result of the current negotiations. Change will not be easy, however: the DUP opposed the report’s recommendations, and Sinn Féin appears cool towards them (see below). So the consensus that has generally been sought for changes to the Agreement is by no means present.

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Why the UK government must take a different approach to restoring devolution in Northern Ireland

Alan Whysall discusses the prospects for the return of the Northern Ireland political institutions this autumn. He finds limited grounds for optimism and concludes that the responsibility for salvaging the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement settlement may now fall to the next British government. This post picks up themes from the author’s two most recent papers for the Constitution Unit, called Northern Ireland’s Political Future (NIPF) and The Agreement at 25.

As the July issue of Monitor recorded, visits from US President Joe Biden and other notables to celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement had little apparent effect on Northern Ireland politics; nor did local government elections, at which Sinn Féin emerged triumphant. The principal Agreement institutions remained in abeyance, vetoed by the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), which remains concerned about the Northern Ireland Protocol and Windsor Framework. At the time of writing, tensions are growing over policing, potentially deepening the political standoff. Northern Ireland meanwhile is being governed without government by civil servants who have very limited authority, together with occasional interventions from London.

Will devolution come back?

Before the summer, many commentators believed that the DUP would reach a deal in the autumn, claiming credit for aspects of the Windsor Framework, to bring back the institutions. This remains possible – many DUP careers depend on their existence. There have been suggestions of progress behind the scenes in the last few days. But it is now harder to be confident. Stasis until the UK general election seems possible, while the political, social and economic fabric of Northern Ireland deteriorates. Why?

First, the DUP may find compromise over the Protocol difficult. Negotiations are apparently going on between the party and the government, informed by a private 18-page DUP wish list. Its public demands for action on the Protocol, and on the threats it sees in it to Northern Ireland’s constitutional position, have been vaguely expressed, but the implication is that they are substantial. It seems unlikely that London can do very much to satisfy them without reopening the Protocol or the Agreement itself: and it has warned that it cannot do significantly more. So DUP supporters may be disappointed in any feasible compromise, and according to polling, they largely endorse the hard line taken so far. Senior party figures may be obdurate too, whatever the leader, Jeffrey Donaldson, wants: the former deputy leader, Lord (Nigel) Dodds of Duncairn, spoke vehemently of the ‘many unresolved and outstanding problems’ created by the Framework, suggesting London was merely peddling spin.

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Perspectives on the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement: new evidence and insights

The Constitution Unit today publishes a new report examining diverse perspectives on the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement. Through interviews, focus groups, and documentary analysis, it reveals different understandings, preferences, hopes, and fears, in Northern Ireland and beyond. As efforts continue to restore Northern Ireland’s power-sharing institutions, authors Alan Renwick and Conor J. Kelly argue that only by listening to these many viewpoints can progress be made.

Recent months have seen numerous celebrations marking the 25th anniversary of the Belfast or Good Friday Agreement. After decades of violence, the Agreement brought peace and relative political stability to Northern Ireland. Emerging after years of effort by both the British and Irish governments, and actors in Northern Ireland, it was approved by large majorities in referendums in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. It is a unique and carefully constructed document, and it remains the cornerstone of consensual politics in Northern Ireland today.

Yet the Agreement also faces serious challenges. Some aspects have not functioned as imagined in 1998, or indeed been implemented at all. The main ‘Strand 1’ institutions established through the Agreement – the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive – have repeatedly collapsed or been suspended. They last functioned in early 2022, and negotiations to restore them are ongoing as we write. Tensions generated by Brexit and the Protocol have created a period of fractious politics that has been deeply destructive of trust. As Alan Whysall has repeatedly warned on this blog, the situation is grave.

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The Belfast/Good Friday Agreement at 25: the need for coherent engagement in London

Alan Whysall, author of the Constitution Unit’s recent paper on The [Belfast/Good Friday] Agreement at 25, looks at immediate political prospects in Northern Ireland. The next few months may decide whether the Agreement has a future and London, he suggests, must show sustained commitment and leadership. Getting the institutions back is the starting point for reviving the Agreement, but there is much more to do.

For over a year, the DUP, the largest unionist party in Northern Ireland, has prevented the Assembly and Executive from functioning, in its dispute over the Northern Ireland Protocol and Windsor Framework. Hardliners urge it on, though other unionists oppose the veto on government.

The crux of the unionist objections varies within and between parties. Some emphasise the Irish sea border, the inconveniences of which may be significantly alleviated by the Framework. Others focus on constitutional fundamentals, as they see them: the continuing role of EU law and the European Court of Justice (because Northern Ireland remains within the European Single Market for goods) and the alleged impact of the Protocol on its place in the Union. Some speak of Northern Ireland as an EU ‘colony’; some now openly reject the Agreement. They see refusing to enter government as ‘leverage’ with London (implying the slightly odd characterisation of their participation in self-government as a favour to others).

Meanwhile civil servants run the administration, but without legal authority to take new policy initiatives – and doubtful legitimacy for making contentious decisions. That has just come to the fore with a difficult budget, set from London in the absence of an Executive, embodying real term cuts of 6.4%. Civil servants may be expected to decide where the impact should fall, and are objecting publicly.

Where will the negotiation lead?

Political movement is unlikely before the 18 May local government elections. The DUP may want to negotiate on the Windsor Framework; measures safeguarding the Union; and other sweeteners (including, as always, money). But there are serious limits to what is possible. The present government in London is unlikely to reopen the Framework – there may be flexibilities around implementation, but anything more risks reviving conflict with Brussels. The government has promised ‘legal reassurances’ about Northern Ireland’s place within the Union, but how much more it can offer is doubtful (it is already expressly protected: broadening the guarantee to prevent changes unionists object to would be strongly resisted).

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Northern Ireland: dangers and opportunities for London

Northern Ireland is again governed by civil servants. Alan Whysall argues that London’s self-interest requires it to give Northern Ireland serious attention in coming months. But success may require more effort and time than is currently envisaged, and a return to the approach that led to the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement. Not making this commitment could have grave consequences for the entire Union, not just Northern Ireland.

This blog draws on the Unit’s report on Northern Ireland’s Political Future, published in May (hereafter referred to as the Report).

No government again

Northern Ireland has had no functioning Executive since the DUP’s withdrawal of its First Minister, in protest at the Northern Ireland Protocol, in February. The party declined to appoint a deputy First Minister following Assembly elections in May – when, for the first time, Sinn Féin emerged the largest party, entitled to the First Minister post (the DUP deny their refusal to appoint has anything to do with this, but Sinn Féin and others are sceptical). Government was carried on by ministers on a caretaker basis, unable to make controversial or crosscutting decisions, amid social and economic challenges often (as in the NHS) worse than in England. There is no budget and a £660 million overspend (exacerbated by the absence of an Executive). The DUP also blocked meetings of the Assembly.

On 28 October, with no Executive formed, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Chris Heaton-Harris, came under a duty to hold further Assembly elections, before mid-January. By law, the caretaker ministers have now lost office, and civil servants are in charge.

Few wanted the elections, however, and either by his own decision or the Prime Minister’s, the Secretary of State announced emergency legislation on 9 November to put them off for 6, potentially 12 weeks. They could be avoided by the DUP agreeing to appoint an Executive by 8 December (19 January if extended). The legislation would also underpin civil servants’ powers, set a budget and enable the Secretary of State to reduce the pay of members of the Northern Ireland Assembly (MLAs).

Political prospects

The issue of the Northern Ireland Protocol remains intractable. The DUP refuses to return to devolution until it changes fundamentally; it appeared unimpressed by the threat to reduce MLA pay. The EU is willing to discuss implementing the Protocol more flexibly, but not to rewriting it.

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