How should the Lord Chancellor and law officers safeguard the rule of law within government?

Posted on March 31, 2023 by The Constitution Unit

The government has now published its response to the Constitution Committee’s report on the role of the Lord Chancellor and government law officers, making clear it will take no action based on the committee’s recommendations. Will Knatchbull discusses the key findings of the report and argues that in some cases the committee has expressed clear policy preferences but then declined to recommend mechanisms to implement them.

The House of Lords Constitution Committee published its report on the role of the Lord Chancellor and the law officers (legal ministers as a collective) on 18 January. Since the changes made by the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, further reforms have been considered in reports from the Lords Constitution Committee and the Commons Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, a government consultation and a white paper. Ultimately, very little reform or reversal has occurred since the 2005 Act, and the government’s response to the report (published on 17 March), made clear that it will not review the existing arrangements.

The overall message of this latest report makes three important and related points: the value of the rule of law, the centrality of the legal ministers in being seen to uphold it within government, and the required character of the legal ministers to be able to do so. It is well summarised in this paragraph:

The thread running through this report is that the rule of law is vitally important to the health of our democracy. Whatever formal reforms might be contemplated, appointing those with the correct character, authority, intellect and independence is the best way to ensure that the Lord Chancellor and the Law Officers are able to defend it. [emphasis added]

This is an important statement and one that cannot easily be disputed. This blogpost will briefly examine three elements of the report: the engagement with the international rule of law, the nature of the role of Lord Chancellor and possibilities for reform of the role of the law officers. I will suggest the report is a step in the right direction. However, it may be too trusting of the political system and the politicians operating in it to produce and appoint individuals of the correct experience and calibre that would enable them to be the fierce guardians of the rule of law that the report envisages.

Continue reading →

The Intelligence and Security Committee and its role in democratic accountability

Posted on July 24, 2020 by The Constitution Unit

Dominic Grieve, former Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee, discusses whether or not reform of the committee is desirable or sensible following the dual controversies of the delayed release of its report on Russia and the government’s unsuccessful attempt to whip committee members into supporting its choice of Chair.

The recent controversy over the election of a new Chair for the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (ISC) and the longer running saga of the failure to publish its report on the threat from Russia, has put the spotlight on both the constitution and work of an organisation that usually attracts limited attention.

Prior to 1989 the existence of all three of the UK’s intelligence agencies, the Security Service (MI5), the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) and Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) was not even avowed, despite their existence being common knowledge. While from 1989, a degree of scrutiny started for the work of the Security Service (MI5), as a result of the Security Service Act, there was also no system of parliamentary scrutiny of their activities. Any question raised in parliament on a topic of national security involving the operational work of all three of the agencies would not and will still not normally be answered.

In 1994 the government of John Major put the work of all the agencies on a statutory footing with the Intelligence Services Act. This also made provision for the establishment of an Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament to oversee their work. But this was effectively confined to their expenditure, administration and policy. The ISC had no power to investigate specific operations. The ISC was also answerable to the Prime Minister and not to parliament, even if it was composed of parliamentarians. Although the cross-party composition of nine members involved input from the leaders of the Opposition and of the third largest party in the Commons, appointment was at the discretion of the PM, who also chose the Chair. The ISC reported to the PM, who decided what if anything of any report might be published. There was criticism that the relationship between the ISC and the PM and the agencies was too close and that it did not have the independence needed to provide proper oversight. When after 2005 concerns grew about both UK involvement in US unlawful detention and rendition and in the handling of counterterrorism, the government allowed the ISC to widen its remit, by agreement, to allow it to look into some past operational matters. Continue reading →

The Constitution Unit turns 25!

Posted on June 15, 2020 by The Constitution Unit

This year, 2020, marks a full 25 years since the foundation of the Constitution Unit. It has been a hugely eventful period, both in terms of real-world constitutional change and controversies, and in terms of the Unit’s own work. To mark our silver anniversary, we are celebrating some of the key ways in which the Unit has contributed to public debates, and helped to inform policy change, over this period. What better way to celebrate 25 years than with 25 of our most notable achievements?

Note that this post reproduces the text from a new page on our website celebrating our 25 years. That contains a full set of 25 images, so some readers may prefer to access the website version.

1. Hitting the ground running

Robert Hazell founded the Constitution Unit in 1995, with funding from six charitable trusts, to help with detailed planning for big constitutional reforms following a possible change of government. The initial research team included Graham Leicester (from the Foreign Office), Nicole Smith (Home Office) and Katy Donnelly. The Unit published seven book-length reports the following year: the first on how to prepare and deliver a big constitutional reform programme, and others on devolution to Scotland, Wales and the English regions, reform of the House of Lords, human rights legislation, and the conduct of referendums (the latter recommending the establishment of an Electoral Commission). From 1997, the new Labour government began to implement its constitutional reform programme, which often reflected Unit recommendations. Responding to the intense reform activity in government, the Unit published 17 further reports in 1998 and 20 more in 1999.

2. Monitor goes to print

In September 1997 the Unit published the first issue of Monitor, its regular bulletin of constitutional news. Monitor continues today to provide an essential digest of political and constitutional changes three times a year, valued by over 4800 subscribers – if you are not among them, you can sign up here.

3. Reform of the House of Lords

From its earliest years, the Unit has fed in regularly to debates about reform of the House of Lords. It published ten briefings for the Royal Commission on the Reform of the House of Lords in 1999, several of them authored by the Unit’s future Director Meg Russell and drawing on analysis of overseas experience. In 2000, she published the book Reforming the House of Lords: Lessons from Overseas. This body of comparative research has influenced debates on second chamber reform in various other countries as well as the UK – including Canada, Italy and Japan. Meanwhile Meg’s 2013 book The Contemporary House of Lords is today’s definitive work on the chamber, underpinned by research funded by the ESRC.

Continue reading →

Monitor 74: Normality, or revolution?

Posted on March 9, 2020 by The Constitution Unit

alan.jfif (1) Monitor 74, the latest edition of the Unit’s regular news update on constitutional issues, was published this morning. Since the last edition in November, we have had a general election, a government reshuffle, a new parliament with new committee chairs, and the UK has left the European Union. The future does not look dull, either. The negotiations about the future relationship with the EU have only just begun, a Constitution, Democracy and Rights Commission has been promised, and both Labour and the Lib Dems face leadership elections that could alter the future course of both parties. Here, Meg Russell and Alan Renwick, the Unit’s Director and Deputy Director respectively, offer their take on the past four months – and what the future might hold for a majority government in uncertain times with as yet undefined opponents.

The result of December’s election was decisive – Boris Johnson’s Conservative government returned to power with a House of Commons working majority of 87. His election slogan of ‘get Brexit done’ helped cut through, including in many former Labour heartlands (although at the aggregate level more votes were cast for parties supporting a referendum than for those pledged to immediately deliver Brexit). The party’s renewed parliamentary strength has now allowed Johnson to deliver on that promise. His post-election European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill passed unamended, and the UK formally left the EU on 31 January.

In some respects the election result seemed to indicate a return to normality – the classic UK expectation of stable single-party majority government was fulfilled. After periods of coalition government between 2010 and 2015, a narrow and brittle Conservative majority between 2015 and 2017, and minority government from 2017 to 2019, ‘normal service’ could resume. There are 365 Conservative MPs to Labour’s 202, with the smaller parties that take their seats collectively on 75 (see page 5). Not only is Johnson’s parliamentary party larger than that in the previous parliament, it also seems likely to be more united – at least on the key issue of Brexit. The Conservative MPs that he stripped of the whip in September almost all either retired or were defeated. Former Conservatives running as independents or for other parties, including Dominic Grieve, David Gauke, Anna Soubry and Sarah Wollaston were all swept away.

There is hence some scope for politics to settle down, and the high-profile clashes of the last three years have probably been left behind. The government will be keen to shift the focus from Brexit to its domestic agenda. Indeed, guidance has apparently been issued in Whitehall to discourage use of the term ‘Brexit’ at all. Furthermore, changes to the final implementing legislation (see page 4) mean that the new parliament will have little formal control over the shape of the UK’s future relationship with the EU. The transition period seems unlikely to be extended beyond the end of the year.

Yet it would be an overstatement to suggest that parliament will now become boring. The UK–EU negotiations (see page 3) will certainly raise controversies. And discontent on the Conservative benches is already showing on matters such as the HS2 railway line, the role of Chinese tech giant Huawei in the UK’s 5G network, and levels of taxation and spending. A desire to retain the party’s expanded working class electorate may raise multiple tensions with its more traditional supporters.

At the same time, there are many big questions about the future of British politics and the constitution. The government was elected on a manifesto hinting at wide-ranging constitutional reforms. The now famous page 48 suggested a need to review ‘the relationship between the Government, Parliament and the courts; the functioning of the Royal Prerogative; the role of the House of Lords; and access to justice for ordinary people’, and promised a Constitution, Democracy and Rights Commission to do so. It also made various more specific commitments, including scrapping the Fixed-term Parliaments Act (the topic of the Unit’s next public seminar), and changes to electoral rules (see page 9).

Whether and how fundamental questions of balance in the constitution will be addressed remains unknown. Continue reading →

Why the new Speaker may not always be able to play a straight bat

Posted on November 16, 2019 by The Constitution Unit

On 4 November, the House of Commons elected Lindsay Hoyle to serve as Speaker, following the resignation of John Bercow. It has been treated as accepted wisdom that a different approach to the Speakership is called for. However, Bercow has taken decisions about the Commons’ handling of Brexit in circumstances where several – or all – of the available choices were potentially controversial. Jack Simson Caird argues that his successor might therefore find that trying to ‘play a straight bat’ is not as easy or appropriate as it might appear.

Lindsay Hoyle is the new Speaker of the House of Commons. Hoyle, like many of his fellow candidates for the role, sought to emphasise that he would be very different from John Bercow. One of the main narratives around the election was that the Speaker should be, in the words of Chris Bryant, ‘an umpire and not a player’. All the candidates, including Hoyle, pledged to follow Bercow in standing up for backbenchers, but at the same time suggested that he had made procedural decisions in the 2017 parliament that were problematic. It is in that context that this post seeks to revisit some of the major decisions taken by Bercow during the last parliament. In the narrative established by the media and several of the candidates during the election for his successor, Bercow’s major Brexit decisions were portrayed as the product of his personality, and a desire to be the focal point of political debate. However, when the Speaker’s key decisions are examined in context, that narrative seems rather simplistic. If, after the general election, Lindsay Hoyle is faced with a minority government that is seeking to push through constitutional reforms in the face of opposition from large numbers of MPs, then he may find himself in the political spotlight. The analysis below suggests that in that context, balancing a commitment to be a champion of backbench MPs and the desire to play procedural decisions with a ‘straight bat’ may prove to be difficult in practice. Continue reading →

The Constitution Unit Blog

Tag Archives: Dominic Grieve

How should the Lord Chancellor and law officers safeguard the rule of law within government?

The Intelligence and Security Committee and its role in democratic accountability

The Constitution Unit turns 25!

Monitor 74: Normality, or revolution?

Why the new Speaker may not always be able to play a straight bat

The Constitution Unit Blog

Share this:

Like this:

Share this:

Like this:

Share this:

Like this:

Share this:

Like this:

Share this:

Like this: