Why Northern Ireland can’t afford a ‘do or die’ Brexit

nick.wright.jpgBoris Johnson is demanding that the Withdrawal Agreement is scrapped and renegotiated, and is insisting that he won’t meet EU leaders until they agree to this. The major source of contention is the backstop, which guarantees an open border on the island of Ireland post-Brexit, but ties the UK to the EU’s Customs Union. In a new Brexit Insights paper, Nicholas Wright assesses the politics of the backstop and ‘no deal’, and what all this means for Northern Ireland. 

During his leadership campaign, Prime Minister Boris Johnson engaged in an increasingly shrill rhetorical arms race with his rival, Jeremy Hunt, over who will be toughest with the EU in delivering Brexit. In particular, his ire was focused on the hated ‘Irish backstop’ which has come to symbolise all that Brexiters loathe about the Withdrawal Agreement. Indeed, Mr Johnson has promised to remove this element of the deal, declaring that if the EU will not renegotiate, then the UK will leave on 31 October, ‘deal or no deal’, suggesting that the costs of exiting in such circumstances will be ‘vanishingly inexpensive if you prepare’. Such claims fly in the face of reality and nowhere can this be seen more clearly than in Northern Ireland. Indeed, it is here that the consequences of Brexit and the trade-offs implicit in its delivery are most starkly revealed.

Since the beginning of the Brexit process, the UK government has been trying to reconcile the ‘Irish Trilemma’: UK departure from the EU’s single market and customs union; an open border between Northern Ireland and the Republic; and no new trade or regulatory barriers between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK. You can have any two, but a combination of all three is impossible. This matters because the 1998 Good Friday Agreement and all that has resulted from it were predicated on the open and invisible border and shared regulatory space that come with EU membership. These have underpinned efforts in Northern Ireland to chart a new pathway, not least by reducing the prominence and difficulty of complex questions around identity. Doing so has not been easy, something demonstrated by the collapse of power-sharing and suspension of the Assembly in Stormont. The prospect of changes to border arrangements – and particularly anything necessitating the re-establishment of any border infrastructure – therefore risks further undermining a fragile equilibrium that reflects Northern Ireland’s ‘relative peace but minimum reconciliation’. Continue reading

Divided but influential? The Exiting the European Union select committee


9caa65f1.ccfa.41f1.b3a9.c215903163f256529dfd.b7ad.416a.959b.ac44a05e40ceThe Select Committee on Exiting the European Union was formed in 2016 following the outcome of the EU referendum. Chaired by former International Development Secretary Hilary Benn, it is in many ways an outlier in the world of Commons committees. Philip Lynch and Richard Whitaker discuss what makes it so unusual and analyse how it has operated since its inception.

The Select Committee on Exiting the European Union (the DExEU committee, or Brexit committee) is one of the most divided since the creation of departmental select committees. Select Committees usually operate on a consensual basis, and unanimous reports are regarded as carrying more weight. Most reports are agreed without divisions. But the DExEU committee has seen divisions – formal votes on reports or amendments – on each of its reports, and eurosceptic members produced an alternative draft report in March 2018.

Of the committee’s 21 members, 14 campaigned for Remain in the 2016 EU referendum: six Labour, four Conservative, two SNP, one Liberal Democrat and one Plaid Cymru (see Table 1 below). Seven voted Leave: six Conservatives and one DUP.

Voting on DExEU committee reports

The DExEU and the Northern Ireland select committees are the only ones in which the Conservatives and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) together have a majority. However, they have rarely been able to take advantage of this, because the DExEU committee is not divided primarily along party lines. Continue reading

Voting for Brexit: the practical and constitutional barriers to getting consent for the withdrawal agreement before exit day

MIKEMASSARO.9198.CROPPED..hannah.114x133_0_MIK4282.cropped.114x133The government has repeatedly given assurances that parliament will be offered ‘a meaningful vote’ on the final Brexit deal, which is still being negotiated. In this post, Hannah White and Raphael Hogarth discuss the challenges of meeting that commitment and argues that the binary choice of ‘deal’ or ‘no deal’ is a false one. They also discuss some of the practical and constitutional issues raised by the government’s legislative plans to implement Brexit within a very short timeframe.

By October ministers hope to have negotiated a withdrawal agreement on the terms of the UK’s departure from the European Union, and a ‘framework for a future relationship’ on long-term UK-EU relations. To reach agreement with the EU on these documents in so little time will be a monumental challenge for the government – but when this challenge is complete, a new one begins. The government will then have to shepherd these documents through a number of processes in parliament.

Our new report, Voting on Brexit, sets out what the government has to do in order to get its deal through parliament, and give effect to that deal in domestic law. Below are seven key messages from that research.

1. The government’s timetable for getting its deal through parliament is ambitious

The government has promised to seek parliament’s approval for both the withdrawal agreement and the future framework in one go. However, there will be very little time in which to do so. The UK is currently set to leave the EU on 29 March 2019. That means that there will be only six months available for scrutiny and approval of the deal.

This should be enough time, providing nothing goes wrong. But if negotiations drag on past October, or parliament raises significant objections to the deal that require a renegotiation or referendum, or if the European Parliament raises its own objections, then the timetable could be unachievable. The government would need to consider seeking an extension of the Article 50 period in order to complete its negotiation and allow time for scrutiny and approval. Continue reading