Northern Ireland: challenges for the next Westminster government 

A new report from the Constitution Unit, Northern Ireland: Challenges for the Next Westminster Government, is published today. It sets out the challenges in Northern Ireland that will face a new government at Westminster, of whatever complexion, and urges a distinctly new approach. Here the author, Alan Whysall, Honorary Senior Research Associate at the Unit, introduces the report. 

The Northern Ireland political institutions resumed in February, and Northern Ireland has attracted predictably little attention in the rest of the UK since. The manifestos of the Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat parties contained little about Northern Ireland to surprise. 

Today’s new report suggests that Northern Ireland needs much sensitivity and some priority in London, however, among all the other problems the new government will need to deal with, including at times attention from Number 10. 

We cannot assume that the Agreement settlement is now back on the right path 

It should not be assumed that the institutions established under the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement are guaranteed to function stably after the election. There is still discontent within the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) over the deal that took the party back into government, and its support is down following that deal, and the abrupt departure from politics of its champion, former party leader Jeffrey Donaldson. Several DUP seats are too close to call in this election, including that of the new leader Gavin Robinson. 

Even if the institutions do survive, however, they are liable to be hindered, perhaps gravely, by continuing controversy over EU issues. 

Nor should it be assumed – as has often been the case in recent years – that if the institutions are in being, all is well with the wider Belfast/Good Friday Agreement settlement. 

The institutions have often delivered poor government, with difficult decisions repeatedly dodged. That is one of the reasons behind the financial crisis that has bitten Northern Ireland already, and is liable to return; and behind acute problems in the public services. 

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The (un)Conservative effect on the constitution: 2010-2024

This week sees the publication of Anthony Seldon and Tom Egerton’s new book, The Conservative Effect 2010-2024: 14 Wasted Years?. The book reviews the record of the Conservative Party in government across various topics. Constitution Unit Director Meg Russell contributed the book’s chapter on ‘Government, Parliament and the Constitution’, and summarises it here. 

A sustained period of Conservative government would normally be expected to usher in constitutional stability. But the reverse applied to most of the period 2010-24. During this time constitutional controversies were rarely far from the news, partly due to deliberately planned changes, but more often to radically shifting conventions and political behaviour. The direction of change was also very far from consistent. The initial coalition period primarily saw pressures towards greater constitutional pluralism, though Liberal Democrat ambitions were often held back by Cameron’s Conservatives. Later, any prospect of calm under single-party government was quickly punctured by Brexit, which eventually brought into question almost every aspect of the UK’s constitutional arrangements. Boris Johnson’s populist approach, in particular, was characterised by wholesale disregard for constitutional norms.  

In 2012 Philip Norton emphasised that Conservative traditions valued constitutional conventions, parliament, and a strong government tempered by checks and balances, and might contemplate change that would ‘maintain, not destroy, the system’. This suggests that, if one commonality can be discerned across the 2010-24 period of constitutional extremes, it is its largely unconservative nature. 

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Parliamentary reform in the 2024 party manifestos 

The main party manifestos have now been published, allowing exploration and comparison of their constitutional proposals. In this second post in a series on the manifestos, Meg Russell looks at the parties’ commitments on parliamentary reform. What are they promising, and what are the prospects for these proposed changes? 

Yesterday on this blog, Lisa James reviewed the constitutional proposals presented by the political parties in their 2024 general election manifestos. Unsurprisingly, parliamentary reform is a key area that appears in several of them. Most parties include aspirations to reform the House of Lords, and some make other commitments on the House of Commons, or the overall power of parliament. This second post in the Constitution Unit’s manifesto series reviews these proposals, reflecting on their origins, merits, and prospects for implementation. It starts with the power of parliament as a whole, before moving to the Commons, and then the Lords. 

The power of parliament 

It is primarily the Liberal Democrats that give space to parliament’s overall place in the constitution – an area subject to significant recent controversy. The Brexit referendum of 2016 led to fierce clashes in parliament, and unusually high-profile arguments about both parliamentary procedure and the limits of the government’s prerogative power. Brexit also raised new questions about parliament’s powers over policy matters that returned to the UK following its exit from the European Union. 

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The 2019 Conservative Party manifesto: were its pledges on the constitution delivered? 

The 2019 Conservative Party manifesto contained a number of constitutional policy commitments – on Brexit, UK institutions, elections, civil liberties, and devolution. As the manifestos for this year’s general election emerge, Lisa James assesses the delivery record of the 2019–24 Conservative governments against the pledges made in 2019. 

The 2019 Conservative Party manifesto contained a wide-ranging set of constitutional commitments. Since its publication much has changed – the UK has left the EU, experienced a global pandemic, and had three Prime Ministers and five Chancellors of the Exchequer. But delivery against manifesto commitments still matters, so with the 2019–24 parliament dissolved, now is the time to reassess the pledges that were made. 

Getting Brexit done 

The single highest profile – and titular – pledge of the manifesto was of course the promise to ‘get Brexit done’. The election followed a period of parliamentary deadlock, and the negotiation of Boris Johnson’s Brexit deal. The manifesto pledged to pass this deal, limit the length of the ‘transition period’ for negotiating new trade arrangements, end the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) over the UK, and end the supremacy of EU law. 

The Brexit deal was rapidly passed following the Conservative general election victory, and the UK left the EU on 31 January 2020. The pledge not to extend the transition period beyond the end of 2020 was also kept. The deal largely removed ECJ jurisdiction from the UK, but the court retained a continuing role in relation to Northern Ireland as a result of its treatment under Johnson’s Brexit deal (discussed further below). The supremacy of retained EU law (a special category of legislation derived from the UK’s EU membership) was ended by the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act 2023

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In praise of fixed-term parliaments

The surprise general election may leave many suddenly nostalgic for the principle of fixed-term parliaments. The original central arguments for fixed terms have been reawakened. In this post, Meg Russell and Robert Hazell revisit these long-standing arguments, summarise the birth and death of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011, and argue that – on the basis of UK and international experience – we should consider returning Westminster to fixed terms. 

The lengthy and debilitating speculation about when Rishi Sunak might call the general election may have reminded many of the arguments in favour of fixed-term parliaments. His shock announcement on 22 May that such an election would take place in July only reinforces those views. This blog post revisits the arguments for fixed terms, reminds readers of how the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 (FTPA) was created and abolished, and argues for reintroduction of the principle of fixed terms – albeit with flexibility to allow early elections on occasion, as applies in many other democracies (and existed under the FTPA). 

The arguments for fixed-term parliaments 

The following is a summary of points in favour of the principle of fixed-term parliaments: 

  • Allowing the government to decide the timing of elections provides an unjustified incumbency advantage. 
  • It also confers disproportionate power on the executive over parliament. 
  • A fixed election cycle is better for both civil service and electoral administration planning, and encourages more long-term thinking in government. 
  • Fixed terms are also better for political parties, prospective parliamentary candidates, and the regulation of election spending. 
  • Speculation about an early election may unnecessarily unsettle commercial and economic decisions. 
  • Parliamentary business, including the work of select committees, can be planned and carried through with less risk of interruption.  

These are not our words; they are drawn (mostly verbatim) from the report of the cross-party parliamentary Joint Committee on the Fixed-term Parliaments Act (paragraph 17), published in March 2021. Based on recent experience, some of them may now feel very familiar. 

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