The Maude report: institutional fixes for political problems

Cat Little today takes over as Cabinet Office permanent secretary at a time when how the centre of government operates is the subject of much debate. One recent report, overseen by former minister Francis Maude, was commissioned by the government and then shelved as soon as it was published. Max Emmett argues that it largely suggested institutional fixes to political problems and that successful reform will require strong ministerial support.

Introduction 

The Independent Review of Governance and Accountability in the Civil Service is not a plan for civil service reform. The report’s author, former Cabinet Office Minister, Lord (Francis) Maude of Horsham, was explicit at a event hosted by the Institute for Government that the report should not be understood as an attempt to fix the problems of the civil service, but contains recommendations for the preconditions needed for effective and long lasting change. Whilst Maude outlines a number of critiques of the civil service – its closed culture, reliance on generalists, churn and emphasis on policy over implementation, among others – his recommendations generally do not focus on solving these specific problems. 

What the Maude report aims to do is to provide both diagnosis and solutions to why these problems, well known and longstanding as they are, have not been effectively dealt with in government. The report highlights ineffective leadership and accountability for the civil service, in particular for the reform agenda, and an institutional centre ill-equipped to manage it. The proposed solutions include major reforms to the centre of government. Many of the functions of the Cabinet Office and the Treasury would be merged into a new Office of Management and Budget with the remaining cabinet support functions folded into an expanded Prime Minister’s department and the Treasury’s economic policy and tax raising functions remaining in a smaller more economy-focused department. The new Office of Management and Budget would be led by a permanent secretary-level civil servant who would act as the Head of the Civil Service and be responsible for driving forward the reform agenda. The Cabinet Secretary would lose their Head of the Civil Service role and retain their position as the most senior civil service advisor to the Prime Minister. 

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The civil service: what is its role?

Recent years have seen significant tensions between ministers and civil servants, with allegations of bullying by ministers and leaking by civil servants, and a number of permanent secretaries forced out. This has prompted debate about reform. Lisa James, Meg Russell, and Alan Renwick argue that any changes to the form and functions of the civil service should have at their heart the core civil service principles of integrity, honesty, objectivity and impartiality.

Background

The civil service is a vital part of the UK’s constitutional system, and is central to helping the government of the day to develop and implement policy. Nonetheless, there are perennial tensions and questions about its role, which have heightened in recent years. The volume and tenor of recent attacks by some politicians on the civil service have provoked particular concern.

This briefing explains the role of the UK civil service, and how it works with ministers. Some civil servants have frontline delivery roles – for example, jobcentre workers, border officials and prison officers. But the briefing focuses on those civil servants who work in central government departments, particularly those working with and around ministers on policy.

What is the role of the civil service?

The UK civil service is permanent and politically impartial. Civil servants continue in post when governments change, and are forbidden from offering political advice to ministers – a role performed instead by special advisers. They must also maintain individual impartiality (which precludes, for example, senior civil servants engaging in party political activities even outside their work).

However, the civil service is not independent. Its fundamental role is to serve actively the government of the day in policy development and delivery. This does not simply mean following ministers’ instructions: good governance requires ministers to draw on a range of objective, evidence-based advice and balanced perspectives before making decisions. Hence civil servants provide such advice on the pros and cons of policy options – even if that sometimes contains unwelcome messages. Civil servants also translate policy decisions into action, implementing the policy direction set by ministers.

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Arguments over the Ministerial Code and the role of the Independent Adviser on Ministers’ Interests are far from over

Recently announced changes to the Ministerial Code demonstrate that the government is unlikely to place it on a statutory basis any time soon. Sir Peter Riddell argues that although some of the revisions are sensible, the new Code demonstrates the government’s determination to assert the privileges of the executive and reflects an increasingly presidential view of the Prime Minister’s role.

The Independent Adviser on Ministers’ Interests is neither fully independent nor entirely an adviser. His hybrid, anomalous position reflects wider tensions between ministers and advisers on standards which have been exacerbated under the current administration – and are unlikely to change after Boris Johnson won a confidence vote on Monday to ensure his survival as Conservative leader and Prime Minister. These tensions have reflected an increasing assertion by the Prime Minister of a presidential view of his role based on the mandate of the ballot box, as distinct from accountability to parliament. The limited changes in the latest version of the Ministerial Code only go a small way to address these concerns.

The public arguments over the Ministerial Code and the Independent Adviser have only partly been caused by the casual attitude of the current Prime Minister towards standards in public life, as highlighted by the repeated frustrations expressed by Lord (Christopher) Geidt, the current Adviser. That has led to widely supported calls from the Committee on Standards in Public Life (CSPL) for a strengthening of his powers.

As with so much in standards in public life, the evolution of the Ministerial Code (originally the more prosaic Questions of Procedure for Ministers) and the creation of the Adviser’s role in 2006 have been the result of a series of allegations and scandals. These exposed the limitations of previous informal understandings and conventions and underlined the need for more formal codes of conduct and independent investigation. The Ministerial Code combines operational guidance about how business in government should be conducted and a list of expectations about ministers’ ethical behaviour in office, based on the seven principles of public life (also known as the Nolan principles).

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Partygate and the special advisers’ code of conduct: lessons for the new Downing Street Chief of Staff

Following the publication of Sue Gray’s report update, the Prime Minister announced his intention to reform the Downing Street machine. Robert Hazell, author of an authoritative study of the way special advisers work, argues that this presents an opportunity to revise the code of conduct that regulates their behaviour, and that incoming Chief of Staff Steve Barclay would be wise to take it.

Towards the end of his statement in the House of Commons on 31 January Boris Johnson said that he would ‘sort out what Sue Gray rightly calls the “fragmented and complicated” leadership structures of Downing Street’. He undertook to do two things:

  • create an Office of the Prime Minister, with a Permanent Secretary to lead Number 10.
  • review the civil service and special adviser codes of conduct to make sure that those codes are properly enforced.

Three days later Munira Mirza, the PM’s Head of Policy, resigned, swiftly followed by the resignations of Dan Rosenfield, the PM’s Chief of Staff, Martin Reynolds, Johnson’s Principal Private Secretary, and Jack Doyle, director of communications. On 5 February it was announced that the Cabinet Office Minister Steve Barclay was to be the new Chief of Staff. This blog is addressed to him, and the new Permanent Secretary in Number 10, as they consider what changes might be required to the Special Advisers’ Code of Conduct.  It draws upon the research done for a book by Ben Yong and myself, Special Advisers: Who they are, what they do, and why they matter, a year-long project including over 100 interviews with ministers, special advisers and senior officials.

The first point to make is that under the Ministerial Code and the Special Advisers’ Code of Conduct it is the PM who is responsible for the special advisers in No 10.  That is clearly spelled out in paragraph 3.3 of the Ministerial Code, and paragraph 9 of the Code of Conduct, which contain identical wording:

The responsibility for the management and conduct of special advisers, including discipline, rests with the Minister who made the appointment.

The Ministerial Code goes on to say:

Individual Ministers will be accountable to the Prime Minister, Parliament and the public for their actions and decisions in respect of their special advisers.

And the Code of Conduct states:

It is also the appointing Minister’s responsibility to ensure that their special adviser(s) adhere to this Code of Conduct.

With the previous paragraph in the Code of Conduct reminding Special Advisers that:

Special advisers are bound by the standards of integrity and honesty required of all civil servants as set out in the Civil Service Code.

So there is no wriggle room here.  If special advisers in Number 10 have fallen below the required standards of integrity and honesty, the PM is responsible; and the PM is accountable to parliament and the public for their conduct. But the second point to make is that although the PM may be ultimately responsible, to expect him to look after the management of all of his special advisers is completely unrealistic. The PM is an exceptionally busy person.  So it is a responsibility which must be delegated: the rest of this blog considers, to whom.  Should the management and conduct of special advisers be the responsibility of the Cabinet Secretary, the Permanent Secretary, or the Chief of Staff?

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Ministerial standards in Westminster and beyond

Ministerial standards and the mechanisms for enforcing them have been in the news more than usual over the course of the last twelve months, making clear the limitations of the current rules and systems of regulating ministerial behaviour. In May, the Unit hosted an expert panel to discuss how the standards regimes work in the UK, and what reforms might be desirable. Dave Busfield-Birch summarises the contributions.

On 24 May, the Constitution Unit hosted an online webinar entitled Ministerial Standards in Westminster and Beyond. Unit founder Robert Hazell chaired the event, which had three distinguished panellists: Alex Allan, former independent adviser to the Prime Minister on ministerial interests; Susan Deacon, a former minister in Scotland who also sat on the Scottish Parliament’s Standards and Procedures committees; and Richard Thomas, a member of the Advisory Committee on Business Appointments (ACOBA), which advises ministers and senior officials on potential conflicts of interest when they take up appointments after leaving Whitehall.

This post summarises the main contributions of the speakers: the full event, including the lively and informative Q&A, is available on our YouTube page.

Alex Allan

Alex Allan started his contribution by offering a little bit of history about the ‘rather strange document’ that is the Ministerial Code. Something similar to the Code has been in place since the Attlee government, but perhaps the most significant changes came in 1995 when the Committee on Standards in Public Life (CSPL) produced its first report, and outlined ‘Seven Principles of Public Life’, which are commonly referred to as the ‘Nolan principles’.

Another significant change came in 2007, when the Brown government published a paper on the governance of Britain, which resulted in the creation of the role of independent adviser on ministerial interests, a title held by Allan from 2011 until his resignation in 2020. Where there is an allegation about the conduct of a minister that the Cabinet Secretary feels warrants further investigation, the matter will be referred to the independent adviser. However, most of the work of the independent adviser is of little media interest, and involves dealing with declarations of ministers’ interests, which are examined by their permanent secretary and the propriety and ethics team at the Cabinet Office, before being examined by the independent adviser.

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