Tag Archives: 2016 Brexit referendum

Healthy political discourse: what is it and why does it matter?

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Healthy political discourse is vital for democracies to function well. In this post, Alan Renwick and Tom Fieldhouse set out five key elements of such discourse, highlight barriers that may be making achieving it increasingly difficult, and propose steps that policy-makers and others could take to support it.

Background

Healthy political discourse is a core feature of a well-functioning democracy. It can help to deliver many benefits to society, whereas unhealthy discourse has the potential to inflict great damage.

There is no definitive blueprint for what healthy discourse looks like. There is nevertheless widespread concern – in the UK and in many other countries – that the quality of political discourse is poor and that contemporary challenges, including polarisation and the nature of modern media, are placing it under increasing strain.

This briefing examines what healthy political discourse is and why it matters. It identifies some of the key factors that make maintaining healthy discourse difficult and highlights examples of unhealthy discourse. It considers what can be done to enable healthy discourse to flourish.

What is healthy political discourse?

Alongside other important constitutional principles – such as institutional checks and balances, free and fair elections, the rule of law, fundamental rights, and integrity and standards – healthy public discourse is an essential component of a well-functioning democracy.

Democracy is a process for making decisions. Citizens should be able to choose representatives who will serve their interests, and to hold those representatives to account for what they do. Policy-makers should be able to make and implement policy decisions that advance the public interest. People from all walks of life should feel included and able to participate actively. All these processes are underpinned by discourse – including discussion, debate, description, and commentary. This is generated by politicians, officials, campaigners, journalists, and members of the public. Healthy discourse enables such processes to run well, whereas unhealthy discourse inhibits them.

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Election spending limits: we’re going to spend, spend, spend (or are we)?

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Increasing the amount of money that political parties can spend during election campaigns might not sound sensible, but as Justin Fisher explains, the government’s proposal to do so seems reasonable in principle, but must be implemented with care to avoid disproportionately benefiting the two most popular parties.

On 20 July, Michael Gove, the Secretary of State responsible for overseeing party finance regulation, announced that party (and candidate) campaign spending limits for Westminster elections were to be increased in line with the value of money. This received little fanfare and was only touched upon briefly in the press the following month. This proposed change is both welcome and significant. So why is the change being proposed? To understand this, it is worth explaining how party spending limits are calculated.

Party Spending limits

Party (rather than candidate) spending limits were introduced by the Political Parties, Elections & Referendums Act 2000 (PPERA). Setting the period of regulation as 365 days before a general election, the act devised a formula for parties based on the number of constituencies in which a party fielded a candidate. The overall party spending limit was set at the number of seats contested multiplied by £30,000. Thus, at the 2019 general election, if a party fielded candidates in the 631 constituencies in Great Britain (assuming they did not contest the seat of the Speaker), the national party spending limit would be £18,930,000.

However, the sum per constituency (£30,000) set by PPERA in 2000 has never been adjusted for inflation. As a result, the national party limit is approximately 50% lower in real terms than when it was introduced. When accounting for whole-year inflation, the £18,930,00 spending limit equates to approximately £9,473,344 at 2022 prices. This erosion of the level in real terms has occurred over a period of relatively low inflation. So, given the relatively high rates of inflation experienced in 2023, this real-term figure will be even lower come the end of this year.

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The parliamentary battle over Brexit and the constitution

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Today sees the publication of a new book by the Unit’s Meg Russell and Lisa James, The Parliamentary Battle over Brexit. Here the authors summarise some of its key findings about why parliament was drawn into such controversy over the implementation of Brexit. They reflect on what these events teach us about our constitution, as well as what may need to change in order to avoid repeating such problems, and to mend the damage done.

The UK’s arguments over what became known as Brexit began long before the June 2016 referendum, and continued with increasing bitterness afterwards. Parliament was often central, both as a venue for such arguments, and in terms of disputes about its proper role. It and its members frequently faced criticism and blame. Our new book, published today, charts The Parliamentary Battle over Brexit, from the early pressures for a referendum, through disputes about the triggering of Article 50 and control of the House of Commons agenda, the repeated defeats of Theresa May’s deal, and Boris Johnson’s unlawful parliamentary prorogation, to the UK’s eventual departure from the EU following his deal. The book charts what happened, but also asks what went wrong and whether things could have been handled differently. It reflects on what these events teach us about the functioning of our constitution, and what if anything might need to change.

The book includes a wealth of detail about key political moments, and the roles of different individuals and groups. Here we focus on some of the bigger questions about the lasting legacy of the battles over Brexit for the culture and institutions of UK politics, and particularly for the place of parliament itself. A fuller version of this analysis appears in the final chapter of the book.

Referendums and public participation

The referendum of 23 June 2016 was only the third ever such UK-wide vote (the first being on European Community membership in 1975, and the second in 2011 on changing the House of Commons voting system). The handling of the referendum was the single biggest error of the Brexit process, from which many other difficulties flowed.

Unlike the 2011 referendum, which was underpinned by legislation setting out the detail of the proposed new voting system, no clear prospectus was offered to the voters for Brexit. Prime Minister David Cameron hoped to use the vote – described disapprovingly by the House of Commons Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee as a ‘bluff call’ referendum – to make the question of Brexit go away. Parliament never debated the substance of the question, the government did not detail the options, and civil servants were forbidden from preparing for a Leave vote. Leave campaigners argued at the level of principle, rather than on a specific plan. As one Brexit-supporting interviewee told us, ‘it was only [after the referendum] that different types of Brexit started coming to the fore. Soft Brexit and hard Brexit had never been canvassed before the referendum; the expressions were coined afterwards’. Issues that would soon come to dominate the agenda, such as membership of the Customs Union or Single Market, and crucially the Northern Ireland border, were barely mentioned during the campaign. This left the government – and parliament – in a very difficult position. The different options for Brexit had to be established only after the vote had taken place, and on this the voters had conveyed no clear instruction.

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Is a second referendum on Brexit possible? Seven questions that need to be answered

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jess_sargent.000alan_renwick.000Meg.Russell.000 (1)Two years on from the Brexit vote, the benefits of a second referendum are being hotly debated. In this post, Jess Sargeant, Alan Renwick and Meg Russell identify seven questions that should be considered before parliament decides whether a second Brexit referendum will take place.

Last week a Sky poll suggested that 50% of the public would favour a three-way referendum on the UK’s future relationship with the EU. This follows calls from key figures including Justine Greening, Dominic Grieve, and Tony Blair, as well as a campaign launched by The Independent for the public to be allowed a vote on the final deal. Number 10 has categorically rejected these calls, stating that there will be no further referendum on Brexit ‘in any circumstances’. Nonetheless, talk of a second referendum is likely to continue. Whether you are a supporter or an opponent of that proposal, there are some big important questions about the practicalities of such a referendum that need to be explored. This post sets out some of the most crucial questions. In further posts over the coming weeks, we will begin to explore some of the answers. Those posts will appear as a collection on our project page, which can bew viewed here.

1. Would it be possible to hold a referendum in the time available?

To hold a referendum in the UK, parliament must first pass primary legislation, which clearly takes time. To complicate matters, during the bill’s passage through parliament, the Electoral Commission must assess the ‘intelligibility’ of the proposed referendum question – which usually takes ten weeks. There are then other key steps after the bill has received royal assent. The Electoral Commission and the local authorities that must run the poll need sufficient time to prepare. Campaigners on both sides must be designated, and the current legislative framework – the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 (PPERA) – sets out a ten-week regulated campaign period.

The time taken to go through these steps in actual referendums has varied. The legislation for the 2016 EU referendum was introduced 13 months before polling day. For the 2011 AV referendum this was nine and a half months, with only 11 weeks between royal assent and the poll. If the UK is to leave the EU on 29 March 2019 (exit day), such long timescales clearly are not feasible. A big question is therefore, in the current exceptional circumstances, whether the time needed for each step can be compressed – and if so, by how much and with what consequences? For a new referendum to have public legitimacy, these are crucial questions demanding careful answers. Continue reading →