Tag Archives: Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee

Public appointments: what are they, and why do they matter?

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This is the first edition of this briefing. It has since been updated. Read the most up-to-date version and other briefings on the Constitution Unit’s website.

Public appointments – senior appointments made by ministers to various public service roles – are vital to the working of government, but some have attracted controversy in recent years. Lisa James explains how public appointments work, and how they might be reformed.

Background

Public appointments – various senior appointments made by ministers to public bodies – can have a major impact on how well the public sector operates. Though the system often works smoothly, recent years have seen some high-profile controversies linked to public appointments, notably those surrounding Paul Dacre’s application to be chair of Ofcom, and the appointment of Richard Sharp as chair of the BBC. These and other cases have raised questions about whether the system now needs additional safeguards.

Why do public appointments matter?

These appointments include senior roles across a wide range of public bodies – including delivery or policy advisory bodies, regulators and funders, as well as departmental non-executive directors. They also include individual roles (for example, commissioners for victims, further education, or children).

The holders of public appointments can therefore have a major impact on the successful delivery of policy and services. A well-functioning public appointments process, which can engage and deliver the best candidates, matters for the quality of governance. This is demonstrated in countries where control over appointments has allowed backsliding leaders (i.e. those who seek to erode democracy) to install allies in key positions.

Given that the holders of public appointments are so important to the working of government, ministers understandably want to be confident that these posts are held by people who are in sympathy with their aims and approach. But it is important for public trust – and successful delivery – that appointments are also made on merit, and cronyism or patronage is guarded against.

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Parliamentary scrutiny: what is it, and why does it matter?

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This is the first edition of this briefing. It has since been updated. Read the most up-to-date version and other briefings on the Constitution Unit’s website.

Parliamentary scrutiny is at the heart of UK politics. In this post, Meg Russell and Lisa James examine the four key methods of parliamentary scrutiny, and offer proposals on how to strengthen it, calling for better behaviour by government and strong engagement from backbenchers.

Background

Parliament lies at the heart of UK politics. The legislature is a core institution in any democracy, but is particularly important in the UK, due to our tradition of ‘parliamentary sovereignty’. The government is dependent on the confidence of the House of Commons, which can potentially remove it from office. Parliamentary consent is required for primary legislation, and parliament is a particularly central and important body in holding ministers to account day-to-day.

This makes scrutiny – the detailed examination of policy proposals, actions and plans – one of the essential roles of parliament. Other functions include representation, and serving as a space for national debate – which in turn feed into parliament’s scrutiny function.

This briefing summarises why parliamentary scrutiny matters, what different kinds of parliamentary scrutiny exist at Westminster, some recent concerns about the decline of scrutiny, and ways in which it can be protected and strengthened.

Why does parliamentary scrutiny matter?

The government is responsible for much day-to-day decision-making, in terms of national policy formulation and implementation. But the government itself is not directly elected, and depends for its survival on the continued confidence of the House of Commons. This makes parliament one of the central checks and balances in the constitution – arguably the most central one of all. To provide government accountability, one of the core functions of parliament is scrutiny.

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Rebuilding and renewing the constitution: the territorial constitution

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A Constitution Unit report by Meg Russell, Hannah White and Lisa James, published jointly with the Institute for Government, provides a menu of constitutional reform options ahead of political parties’ manifesto preparation. Its chapters will be published in summary form on this blog throughout August, with this third excerpt identifying potential changes relating to the territorial constitution.  

Recent years have been unsettled ones in UK territorial politics, with structural pressures following the Brexit vote, and other tensions between the centre and the devolved institutions. Meanwhile, the devolution arrangements for England remain an incomplete patchwork.  

While wholesale reform may be complex and contentious, much can be done to mitigate the tensions that exist within the existing framework. There is widespread recognition that cooperation between the UK government and devolved institutions could be improved, and some positive steps in this direction have already been taken. With the fiercest battles about the implementation of Brexit now over, opportunities exist for strengthening interparliamentary arrangements. The governance arrangements for England could also be made more transparent and coherent.  

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The report on Richard Sharp raises big constitutional questions

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The Heppinstall report into Richard Sharp’s appointment as BBC chair raised questions about possible reforms and has sparked calls for more far-reaching changes. Peter Riddell surveys such proposals, arguing that the merits of different options need to be carefully weighed.

The long-awaited report by Adam Heppinstall KC into the appointment of Richard Sharp as BBC chair has not only led to Sharp’s resignation, but also triggered a debate about changing how public appointments are made to reduce or eliminate the role of the Prime Minister. This links with many of the themes I discussed in my inaugural lecture at UCL on 26 April.

Having been Commissioner for Public Appointments at the time of Sharp’s appointment, I welcomed the setting up of the Heppinstall inquiry following the disclosure in January that Sharp had been involved – on his own account in a very limited way – in previously secret discussions about arranging financial support for Boris Johnson, the then Prime Minister, in autumn 2020 at the same time as he was applying to become BBC chair.

Heppinstall concluded that the original appointment process had been ‘good and thorough’ but that Sharp had breached the government’s Governance Code for Public Appointments by not disclosing to the advisory interview panel that he had met Johnson to inform him of his application and that he was going to meet Simon Case, the Cabinet Secretary, to attempt to introduce him to someone (Sam Blyth, a distant cousin of Johnson) who might assist the Prime Minister with his personal finances.  This created a potential conflict of interest and the risk of a perception that Sharp would not be independent from Johnson. The Sharp/Case meeting – and differences about what was said and recorded – has attracted considerable attention but is largely irrelevant, since Case never met nor contacted Blyth.

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