Tag Archives: permanent secretary

Rebuilding and renewing the constitution: the territorial constitution

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A Constitution Unit report by Meg Russell, Hannah White and Lisa James, published jointly with the Institute for Government, provides a menu of constitutional reform options ahead of political parties’ manifesto preparation. Its chapters will be published in summary form on this blog throughout August, with this third excerpt identifying potential changes relating to the territorial constitution.  

Recent years have been unsettled ones in UK territorial politics, with structural pressures following the Brexit vote, and other tensions between the centre and the devolved institutions. Meanwhile, the devolution arrangements for England remain an incomplete patchwork.  

While wholesale reform may be complex and contentious, much can be done to mitigate the tensions that exist within the existing framework. There is widespread recognition that cooperation between the UK government and devolved institutions could be improved, and some positive steps in this direction have already been taken. With the fiercest battles about the implementation of Brexit now over, opportunities exist for strengthening interparliamentary arrangements. The governance arrangements for England could also be made more transparent and coherent.  

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The civil service: what is its role?

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This is the first edition of this briefing. It has since been updated. Read the most up-to-date version and other briefings on the Constitution Unit’s website.

Recent years have seen significant tensions between ministers and civil servants, with allegations of bullying by ministers and leaking by civil servants, and a number of permanent secretaries forced out. This has prompted debate about reform. Lisa James, Meg Russell, and Alan Renwick argue that any changes to the form and functions of the civil service should have at their heart the core civil service principles of integrity, honesty, objectivity and impartiality.

Background

The civil service is a vital part of the UK’s constitutional system, and is central to helping the government of the day to develop and implement policy. Nonetheless, there are perennial tensions and questions about its role, which have heightened in recent years. The volume and tenor of recent attacks by some politicians on the civil service have provoked particular concern.

This briefing explains the role of the UK civil service, and how it works with ministers. Some civil servants have frontline delivery roles – for example, jobcentre workers, border officials and prison officers. But the briefing focuses on those civil servants who work in central government departments, particularly those working with and around ministers on policy.

What is the role of the civil service?

The UK civil service is permanent and politically impartial. Civil servants continue in post when governments change, and are forbidden from offering political advice to ministers – a role performed instead by special advisers. They must also maintain individual impartiality (which precludes, for example, senior civil servants engaging in party political activities even outside their work).

However, the civil service is not independent. Its fundamental role is to serve actively the government of the day in policy development and delivery. This does not simply mean following ministers’ instructions: good governance requires ministers to draw on a range of objective, evidence-based advice and balanced perspectives before making decisions. Hence civil servants provide such advice on the pros and cons of policy options – even if that sometimes contains unwelcome messages. Civil servants also translate policy decisions into action, implementing the policy direction set by ministers.

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The constitutional causes and consequences of the Truss-Kwarteng budget crisis

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Within weeks, Liz Truss’s premiership was plunged into economic and political turmoil due to Kwasi Kwarteng’s ‘mini budget’. But this crisis, suggests Meg Russell, has distinctly constitutional roots. Building on Boris Johnson’s legacy, Truss chose to sideline expert officials and regulators, and shut out her own MPs. The consequences that have since befallen her are a compelling advertisement for respecting – and rebuilding – appropriate constitutional checks and balances.

The Conservative Party conference, indeed the entirety of Liz Truss’s new premiership, has been severely destabilised by the market reaction to Chancellor Kwasi Kwarteng’s ‘mini budget’. Far from securing Truss her desired reputation for acting on the energy crisis and boosting the economy, and a positive bounce in the polls, Kwarteng’s 23 September ‘fiscal event’ saw the pound plunge, lenders withdraw mortgage products, and Labour achieve record poll leads. Faced with a mass rebellion by Conservative MPs, Kwarteng performed a U-turn on abolition of the top rate of income tax, while other parts of the package may face further such trouble ahead.

Fiscal policy is well beyond the usual scope of the Constitution Unit blog, or of this author. But the extent to which the unforced economic and political crisis built on foundations of poor constitutional and governance practice is striking. Boris Johnson played fast and loose with many constitutional norms, and Liz Truss seems quickly to have followed suit. But her now catastrophic position – with some Conservative MPs calling for the Prime Minister’s removal after less than a month in the job – demonstrates just how shortsighted and dangerous such behaviour can be.

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Partygate and the special advisers’ code of conduct: lessons for the new Downing Street Chief of Staff

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Following the publication of Sue Gray’s report update, the Prime Minister announced his intention to reform the Downing Street machine. Robert Hazell, author of an authoritative study of the way special advisers work, argues that this presents an opportunity to revise the code of conduct that regulates their behaviour, and that incoming Chief of Staff Steve Barclay would be wise to take it.

Towards the end of his statement in the House of Commons on 31 January Boris Johnson said that he would ‘sort out what Sue Gray rightly calls the “fragmented and complicated” leadership structures of Downing Street’. He undertook to do two things:

  • create an Office of the Prime Minister, with a Permanent Secretary to lead Number 10.
  • review the civil service and special adviser codes of conduct to make sure that those codes are properly enforced.

Three days later Munira Mirza, the PM’s Head of Policy, resigned, swiftly followed by the resignations of Dan Rosenfield, the PM’s Chief of Staff, Martin Reynolds, Johnson’s Principal Private Secretary, and Jack Doyle, director of communications. On 5 February it was announced that the Cabinet Office Minister Steve Barclay was to be the new Chief of Staff. This blog is addressed to him, and the new Permanent Secretary in Number 10, as they consider what changes might be required to the Special Advisers’ Code of Conduct.  It draws upon the research done for a book by Ben Yong and myself, Special Advisers: Who they are, what they do, and why they matter, a year-long project including over 100 interviews with ministers, special advisers and senior officials.

The first point to make is that under the Ministerial Code and the Special Advisers’ Code of Conduct it is the PM who is responsible for the special advisers in No 10.  That is clearly spelled out in paragraph 3.3 of the Ministerial Code, and paragraph 9 of the Code of Conduct, which contain identical wording:

The responsibility for the management and conduct of special advisers, including discipline, rests with the Minister who made the appointment.

The Ministerial Code goes on to say:

Individual Ministers will be accountable to the Prime Minister, Parliament and the public for their actions and decisions in respect of their special advisers.

And the Code of Conduct states:

It is also the appointing Minister’s responsibility to ensure that their special adviser(s) adhere to this Code of Conduct.

With the previous paragraph in the Code of Conduct reminding Special Advisers that:

Special advisers are bound by the standards of integrity and honesty required of all civil servants as set out in the Civil Service Code.

So there is no wriggle room here.  If special advisers in Number 10 have fallen below the required standards of integrity and honesty, the PM is responsible; and the PM is accountable to parliament and the public for their conduct. But the second point to make is that although the PM may be ultimately responsible, to expect him to look after the management of all of his special advisers is completely unrealistic. The PM is an exceptionally busy person.  So it is a responsibility which must be delegated: the rest of this blog considers, to whom.  Should the management and conduct of special advisers be the responsibility of the Cabinet Secretary, the Permanent Secretary, or the Chief of Staff?

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Constitution Unit publishes new study on non-executive directors in Whitehall

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In 2017, the Constitution Unit conducted the first-ever study of the work of non-executive directors (NEDs) within Whitehall. In this blog post, project leader Robert Hazell and Lucas Chebib, one of the project’s research volunteers, discuss the methodology and findings of the report. 

The Constitution Unit has just completed the first major study of non-executive board members in Whitehall (commonly known as non-executive directors, or NEDs). The report concluded that non-executives are high calibre, committed people, whose expertise is greatly valued by the civil service. However, NEDs themselves often said they find the role frustrating, and feel they could be much more effective if the system only allowed.

The study was carried out over 18 months by four former senior civil servants, with assistance from five research volunteers. The team compiled a detailed database of all NEDs; organised a survey; conducted almost 70 interviews; and tested their findings in private briefings and seminars. The full report is published here; what follows is a summary of the main points. Continue reading →