Tag Archives: House of Lords Appointments Commission

What should happen when MPs resign? Why the Commons should have control of the departure of its members and MPs should not be offered post-dated peerages

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The resignation of Nadine Dorries prompted questions about how, and in what circumstances, an MP should leave office. In this post (the first of two), former senior House of Commons official David Natzler argues that it is wrong for the executive to have the final say over MPs’ departures, and that MPs should not be offered peerages until after they have left the Commons.

On 25 August the backbencher and former Cabinet minister Nadine Dorries, MP for Mid Bedfordshire, announced that she had formally applied for the position of Crown Steward and Bailiff of the Chiltern Hundreds. The appointment was duly made on 29 August and she ceased thereby to be a member of the House of Commons. The writ for a by-election was ordered when the Commons returned from its summer recess on 4 September, with delayed effect until 12 September: unlike the writ for Rutherglen and Hamilton West caused by the successful recall petition against Margaret Ferrier, which was ordered at the same sitting but with immediate effect. As a result, the by-election to replace Dorries will not be held until 19 October. This was in the news primarily because more than 10 weeks earlier, on 9 June, Dorries stated that she had informed the Conservative Chief Whip that she was ‘standing down as the MP for Mid Bedfordshire with immediate effect’. That day saw the publication of the resignation honours list of former Prime Minister Boris Johnson, and both she and fellow Johnson loyalist Nigel Adams had been widely tipped to receive peerages. Neither did, apparently following doubts expressed by the House of Lords Appointments Commission (HOLAC). Johnson announced his resignation as an MP later on 9 June and was appointed to the Chiltern Hundreds on 12 June. Adams announced his resignation on 10 June – using identical words to Dorries about ‘standing down with immediate effect’ –  and was duly appointed as Steward of the Manor of Northstead on 13 June.

It soon became clear that Dorries had not actually resigned and that she had no immediate intention of doing so. On 14 June she said that it was still ‘absolutely my intention to resign’ but that she was awaiting information she had sought from the Cabinet Office and HOLAC on her non-appointment to the House of Lords. On 29 June she stated on her weekly TalkTV show that ‘I’ve resigned… I’ll be gone long before the next general election.’ Criticism mounted from Conservative MPs, and within her constituency, most conspicuously from first Flitwick and then Shefford town councils, both of whom published letters they had sent to her. These focused primarily on allegations that she was failing in her duties to her constituents, both in terms of her failure over a period of many months to speak or vote or attend the House of Commons, and of her refusal to hold constituency surgeries or play an active role in the constituency. Rishi Sunak suggested during an LBC radio interview on 2 August that her constituents were not being properly represented, and thereafter several ministers and backbench Conservatives were similarly critical. She continued however to receive the Conservative whip. And of course, she continued to receive her salary. 

Political drama aside, does this story hold any lessons for the way parliament and the constitution should function? I believe that it illustrates several issues, although they are not all capable of resolution: specifically, the grant of peerages to MPs; the practice and process used by MPs to resign their seats; the expectations of attendance of MPs at Westminster; and MPs’ work for and in their constituencies. The first two of these matters will be covered in this post. The latter two will be discussed in a post that will appear on this blog tomorrow.

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Why Rishi Sunak should take the initiative on standards reform

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Rishi Sunak has appointed a new Independent Adviser on Ministers’ Interests, but there is still a need for the role to be strengthened to ensure the new Adviser has genuine independence and freedom to act. Concerns have also been raised about the standard of recent appointments to the House of Lords. Peter Riddell argues that Sunak should follow the example of John Major and take the initiative on standards reform.

Rishi Sunak has so far been stronger on aspirations to improve standards in public life than on his actions, which have largely continued the approach of his predecessors. Ministers have reaffirmed limits to the role of independent regulators and scrutiny by reasserting executive prerogatives.

On the positive side, in his first comments on entering 10 Downing Street, Sunak promised that his government would have ‘integrity, professionalism and accountability at every level’. Trust, he said, is earned. And in his personal foreword to the Ministerial Code issued just before Christmas, he referred to upholding the Principles of Public Life (commonly known as the Nolan principles), which Boris Johnson had omitted from the May 2022 version. At the same time, Sunak appointed Laurie Magnus as the new Independent Adviser on Ministers’ Interests, six months after the resignation of predecessor Lord (Christopher) Geidt.

The role of the Independent Adviser

The remit of the Adviser has not, however, been strengthened since the compromise changes of last May, which attracted criticism at the time. The government adopted some of the package proposed by the Committee on Standards in Public Life (CSPL) in its Upholding Standards in Public Life report of November 2021, which recommended a graduated system of sanctions solely in the hands of the Prime Minister, combined with greater independence for the Adviser in launching inquiries and determining breaches of the Code. As Lord (Jonathan) Evans of Weardale, the committee’s chair, commented in June 2022, the government accepted the former but not the latter in the form proposed.

The Adviser will now be able initiate their own investigations but only after ‘having consulted the Prime Minister and obtained his consent’. The requirement for prime ministerial consent is justified on the grounds that the Prime Minister is constitutionally responsible for appointing and dismissing ministers. As Boris Johnson said in a letter to Lord Evans in April 2021, this meant that, ‘I cannot and would not wish to abrogate the ultimate responsibility for deciding on an investigation into allegations concerning ministerial misconduct’. Moreover, the Prime Minister will also continue to have the right to decide when any report by the Adviser is published – risking lengthy delays, as has happened in the past – and on the significance of any breach of the Code, as well as on the form of any sanctions. Parliament is still left with no role in approving the Code or its implementation.

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The problem(s) of House of Lords appointments

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Lords appointments are back in the news, with rumours of resignation honours from Boris Johnson, and even possibly Liz Truss. The current unregulated system of prime ministerial patronage causes multiple problems, and new Constitution Unit polling shows widespread public demand for change. Meg Russell reviews the problems and possible solutions, in the context of a bill on Lords appointments due for debate tomorrow. She argues that small-scale changes are now urgently required, and urges party leaders to embrace them – whatever their longer-term aspirations for Lords reform.

Recent weeks have seen revived controversies about appointments to the House of Lords. These include concerns about Boris Johnson’s long-rumoured resignation honours list, now joined by concerns that Liz Truss may want resignation honours of her own after just 49 days as Prime Minister. While the personalities may be different, controversies over Lords appointments are nothing new. The central overarching problem is the unregulated patronage power that rests with the Prime Minister. As this post highlights, a series of other problems follow: regarding the chamber’s size, its party balance, the quality of candidates appointed, the chamber’s reputation and widespread public dissatisfaction with the system.

An end to the Prime Minister’s unfettered appointment power is long overdue. Tomorrow a bill will be debated in the Lords aiming to tackle some of the problems, but as a backbench bill it is unlikely to succeed. Its contents nonetheless provide a useful (though incomplete) guide to the kind of important small-scale changes needed. Both main party leaders now need urgently to propose short-term packages of their own.

The problem of the size of the Lords

Much attention has focused in recent years on the spiralling size of the House of Lords. The current system places no limits whatsoever on the number of members who may be appointed to the chamber by the Prime Minister. Most – though not all – prime ministers have appointed unsustainably. Particularly given that peerages are for life, over-appointment drives the size of the chamber ever upwards. This is a historic problem, visible throughout the 20th century. The Blair government’s reform of 1999 brought the size of the chamber down (from around 1200 to just over 650). But since then it has risen again. Two reports from the Constitution Unit – in 2011 and 2015 – analysed this problem, calling for urgent action. In 2016 the Lord Speaker established a cross-party Committee on the Size of the House, which made recommendations the following year. Centrally these included restraint by the Prime Minister based on a ‘two-out-one-in’ principle – so that only one new peer would be appointed for every two who left, until the chamber stabilised at 600 members. These principles were endorsed by the Commons Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, and respected by Theresa May. But Boris Johnson ignored them. In 2021, the Lord Speaker’s Committee lamented how he had ‘undone progress’ achieved by his predecessor.

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The constitutional causes and consequences of the Truss-Kwarteng budget crisis

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Within weeks, Liz Truss’s premiership was plunged into economic and political turmoil due to Kwasi Kwarteng’s ‘mini budget’. But this crisis, suggests Meg Russell, has distinctly constitutional roots. Building on Boris Johnson’s legacy, Truss chose to sideline expert officials and regulators, and shut out her own MPs. The consequences that have since befallen her are a compelling advertisement for respecting – and rebuilding – appropriate constitutional checks and balances.

The Conservative Party conference, indeed the entirety of Liz Truss’s new premiership, has been severely destabilised by the market reaction to Chancellor Kwasi Kwarteng’s ‘mini budget’. Far from securing Truss her desired reputation for acting on the energy crisis and boosting the economy, and a positive bounce in the polls, Kwarteng’s 23 September ‘fiscal event’ saw the pound plunge, lenders withdraw mortgage products, and Labour achieve record poll leads. Faced with a mass rebellion by Conservative MPs, Kwarteng performed a U-turn on abolition of the top rate of income tax, while other parts of the package may face further such trouble ahead.

Fiscal policy is well beyond the usual scope of the Constitution Unit blog, or of this author. But the extent to which the unforced economic and political crisis built on foundations of poor constitutional and governance practice is striking. Boris Johnson played fast and loose with many constitutional norms, and Liz Truss seems quickly to have followed suit. But her now catastrophic position – with some Conservative MPs calling for the Prime Minister’s removal after less than a month in the job – demonstrates just how shortsighted and dangerous such behaviour can be.

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