Tag Archives: Conservatives

The new voting system for mayors and PCCs: how it changed the results

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This month’s elections for mayors and police and crime commissioners were contested under a revised voting system. In the first of a two-part blogpost, Alan Renwick examines how the shift affected the results. He finds that the impact was substantial, and that it specifically benefited the Conservatives. 

The elections held earlier this month for mayors and police and crime commissioners (PCCs) took place under a revised voting system. The Elections Act 2022 abolished the previous Supplementary Vote (SV) system, under which voters could express first and second preferences, in favour of straightforward First Past the Post (FPTP). The changed rules were applied in four local mayoral elections last year. But this year’s local elections offered the new system its first large-scale outing: every part of England and Wales had either mayoral or PCC elections; a few had both. 

So how did the new system fare? Did it affect the results? If so, whom did it benefit? This post endeavours to answer these questions, while a second part, which will be published tomorrow, will examine how the change affected the democratic quality of the elections in the round. 

How the change affected the results 

Ten combined authority mayoral elections and 37 PCC elections took place on 2 May. Under the new FPTP rules, Labour won nine of the mayoral contests, while the Conservatives won one. In the PCC contests, the Conservatives won 19, Labour 17, and Plaid Cymru one.  

We cannot be sure what the results would have been had the former SV system still been in place, but we can make estimates grounded in evidence. To do so, it is easiest to break the contests down into three groups. 

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Election spending limits: we’re going to spend, spend, spend (or are we)?

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Increasing the amount of money that political parties can spend during election campaigns might not sound sensible, but as Justin Fisher explains, the government’s proposal to do so seems reasonable in principle, but must be implemented with care to avoid disproportionately benefiting the two most popular parties.

On 20 July, Michael Gove, the Secretary of State responsible for overseeing party finance regulation, announced that party (and candidate) campaign spending limits for Westminster elections were to be increased in line with the value of money. This received little fanfare and was only touched upon briefly in the press the following month. This proposed change is both welcome and significant. So why is the change being proposed? To understand this, it is worth explaining how party spending limits are calculated.

Party Spending limits

Party (rather than candidate) spending limits were introduced by the Political Parties, Elections & Referendums Act 2000 (PPERA). Setting the period of regulation as 365 days before a general election, the act devised a formula for parties based on the number of constituencies in which a party fielded a candidate. The overall party spending limit was set at the number of seats contested multiplied by £30,000. Thus, at the 2019 general election, if a party fielded candidates in the 631 constituencies in Great Britain (assuming they did not contest the seat of the Speaker), the national party spending limit would be £18,930,000.

However, the sum per constituency (£30,000) set by PPERA in 2000 has never been adjusted for inflation. As a result, the national party limit is approximately 50% lower in real terms than when it was introduced. When accounting for whole-year inflation, the £18,930,00 spending limit equates to approximately £9,473,344 at 2022 prices. This erosion of the level in real terms has occurred over a period of relatively low inflation. So, given the relatively high rates of inflation experienced in 2023, this real-term figure will be even lower come the end of this year.

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Can muscular unionism save the Union?

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Several UK politicians have been described as embracing a ‘muscular’ form of unionism, which includes taking a hard line against the possibility of constituent parts of the UK leaving the Union. As Iain McLean warns, muscular unionism can look like ‘know your place unionism’ and history has shown that such a muscular approach can backfire and hasten the very secession it seeks to prevent.

The phrase ‘muscular unionism’ is new but the concept is not. As Prime Minister, Boris Johnson called Scottish devolution ‘a disaster north of the border’. Liz Truss said while campaigning for the Conservative leadership that she would ‘ignore’ the ‘attention seeker’, First Minister Nicola Sturgeon. She was true to her word, never contacting Sturgeon or Mark Drakeford, First Minister of Wales, during her premiership. Lord (David) Frost, who served as a member of Johnson’s Cabinet, recently wrote:

The Scottish “government” is not the government of a state in confederation with England. It is a subordinate entity within the UK, with powers granted to it by the UK government and Parliament, and ultimately subject to the supremacy of that Parliament.

It does indeed sound muscular, but it ended in tears and self-contradiction last time, and there is no reason to expect differently this time. The UK government would be well advised to become a little weedier than PMs Johnson or Truss. Rishi Sunak contacted Sturgeon and Drakeford on his first full day in office as Prime Minister. Is this a hopeful sign?

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The constitutional causes and consequences of the Truss-Kwarteng budget crisis

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Within weeks, Liz Truss’s premiership was plunged into economic and political turmoil due to Kwasi Kwarteng’s ‘mini budget’. But this crisis, suggests Meg Russell, has distinctly constitutional roots. Building on Boris Johnson’s legacy, Truss chose to sideline expert officials and regulators, and shut out her own MPs. The consequences that have since befallen her are a compelling advertisement for respecting – and rebuilding – appropriate constitutional checks and balances.

The Conservative Party conference, indeed the entirety of Liz Truss’s new premiership, has been severely destabilised by the market reaction to Chancellor Kwasi Kwarteng’s ‘mini budget’. Far from securing Truss her desired reputation for acting on the energy crisis and boosting the economy, and a positive bounce in the polls, Kwarteng’s 23 September ‘fiscal event’ saw the pound plunge, lenders withdraw mortgage products, and Labour achieve record poll leads. Faced with a mass rebellion by Conservative MPs, Kwarteng performed a U-turn on abolition of the top rate of income tax, while other parts of the package may face further such trouble ahead.

Fiscal policy is well beyond the usual scope of the Constitution Unit blog, or of this author. But the extent to which the unforced economic and political crisis built on foundations of poor constitutional and governance practice is striking. Boris Johnson played fast and loose with many constitutional norms, and Liz Truss seems quickly to have followed suit. But her now catastrophic position – with some Conservative MPs calling for the Prime Minister’s removal after less than a month in the job – demonstrates just how shortsighted and dangerous such behaviour can be.

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Prime Minister Liz Truss and the short, unhappy fate of the ‘takeover leader’

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Following her appointment as Prime Minister yesterday, Liz Truss has become the third Prime Minister in a row to take office directly as a result of a party leadership election. Ben Worthy explains that taking office in the middle of a parliament has historically not gone well for the incoming Prime Minister, with none of the last three ‘takeover Prime Ministers’ able to complete a full parliamentary term in office.

There are two routes to becoming Prime Minister in the UK. You can either win a general election or triumph in a party leadership election to become head of the largest parliamentary party when a predecessor leaves. As section 2.18 of the Cabinet Manual puts it:

Where a Prime Minister chooses to resign from his or her individual position at a time when his or her administration has an overall majority in the House of Commons, it is for the party or parties in government to identify who can be chosen as the successor.

Prime Minister Liz Truss is a ‘takeover’ leader, securing the post via the second route rather than the first. Remarkably, she will be the fifteenth takeover since 1916 and the second woman appointed mid-term since 2016.

There are some downsides to being a takeover. As the table below shows, takeovers’ time in office tends to be relatively brief. UK prime ministers in the last 100 years have lasted an average of just over five years, equivalent to the maximum length of one parliamentary term. Takeover tenure was considerably shorter at just over 3.6 years, compared with an average of 6.6 years for those who came to office following a general election. The longest takeover premiership was that of John Major, which lasted seven years, and the shortest was Andrew Bonar Law’s seven months (due to ill health).

The most recent takeovers are bywords for difficult, if not failed, premierships. Major (1990–1997), Gordon Brown (2007–2010) and the successive takeovers of Theresa May (2016–2019) and Boris Johnson (2019–2022) stand out as dysfunctional and struggling leaders. All led deeply divided parties and their names are linked to deep crises, whether economic (the Winter of Discontent or Black Wednesday), political (Maastricht or Brexit) or global (COVID-19).

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