Tag Archives: Jess Sargeant

The Mechanics of a Further Referendum on Brexit Revisited: Questions for the New Parliament

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A further referendum on Brexit is central to many parties’ general election pledges. Today, the Constitution Unit launches a new report examining how such a vote might come about and what form it might take. This updates previous work conducted last year. In this post, adapted from the report’s final chapter, Alan Renwick, Meg Russell, Lisa James and Jess Sargeant sum up the key conclusions. They find that, though it would not be without difficulties, a vote on Johnson’s deal may be the quickest option and the one most likely to command public legitimacy. 

The Constitution Unit’s latest report, The Mechanics of a Further Referendum on Brexit Revisited: Questions for the New Parliament, is published today. It significantly updates our previous analysis of the mechanics of a further Brexit referendum, exploring the circumstances that might lead to a further referendum on Brexit, and the form that such a referendum might take. The report does not advocate for or against a referendum, or assess the broader impact that such a vote might have. Rather, it explores the practical implications of the different options: in terms of the processes to bring a referendum about, the standards that it should meet, the options for reforming regulation, and, crucially, the timetable.

The minimum timetable from the point at which parliament decides in principle to hold a referendum to the date on which that referendum is held is roughly 22 weeks – or five months. Claims that organising a referendum would take a year or more are therefore overstated. However, very clearly, a decision to proceed with a referendum would require a further extension to the Article 50 period, which currently expires on 31 January 2020. And there are various factors that could put pressure on the minimum timetable, requiring a somewhat longer period of planning and preparation. This post (adapted from the report’s final chapter) considers how the pieces fit together, and what the overall timetable would likely be. The most obvious implication of this is for the length of Article 50 extension which a future government should request if seeking to hold a referendum.

The report considers the factors which could impinge on the timetable in detail, but in brief they include the following:

  • Is the referendum to be held on a pre-existing Brexit deal, or is time required (as Labour’s policy implies) for further renegotiation before proceeding to a referendum?
  • How contentious would the referendum bill be in parliament? This depends partly on the constellation of parties and groups in the House of Commons after the general election, and also on the content of the bill.
  • What form would the referendum question take? This may be one of the points of contention in parliament. We conclude that a three-option referendum is unlikely. Moving to such a format would slow down the process.
  • To what extent would campaign regulation be tightened up and updated via the referendum bill? Some updating is essential, and could be incorporated within the 22-week timetable. Other more major changes might be desirable, but in the interests of speed would likely be set aside.
  • Would the referendum result be made legally binding? This is not essential, but would be beneficial to provide clarity and certainty for voters. Preparing for a fully legally binding referendum would be likely to take slightly more time.

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The Constitution Unit blog in 2018: a year in review

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2018 has been an interesting year for the UK constitution, its institutions and those involved in studying or working within them. As the year draws to a close, blog editor Dave Busfield-Birch offers a roundup of the most popular blogs of the year, as well as a look at the reach of the blog through the lens of its readership statistics. 

Obviously, Brexit has made this a very interesting time to work in political science, and the blog has benefited both in terms of increased general interest as a result, but also because there are niche topics being discussed in public now that would have generated little interest in other years. Few, for example, would have predicted in May 2016 that whether or not a motion in the House of Commons was amendable would become a hot political topic.

Below are our most popular blogs from the past year, as well as two personal selections from me, at the end of my first twelve months as blog editor.

Editor’s pick

‘Gendered Vulnerability’ and representation in United States politics by Jeffrey Lazarus and Amy Steigerwalt.

This was obviously a tough decision, but if you were to ask me for my favourite post of the year, this would be my instinctive choice. Jeffrey Lazarus and Amy Steigerwalt discuss their new book, Gendered Vulnerability: How Women Work Harder to Stay in Office, which argues that women’s perception of a more difficult electoral landscape leads them to adopt distinct, and more constituent-oriented, legislative strategies than their male counterparts. It is a fascinating insight into the challenges faced by women in running for, securing and retaining office. A similar blog on the UK experience, entitled Strategies for Success, was written by Leah Culhane in November. Continue reading →

How and when might a second referendum on Brexit come about?

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download.001alan_renwick.000jess_sargent.000Today the Constitution Unit launches a report on the possible mechanics of a further referendum on Brexit. In the last of a series of posts on this topic, Meg Russell, Alan Renwick and Jess Sargeant sum up the report’s findings, focusing on how a referendum might come about, what question would be asked, and the implications for referendum timing.

Our new report, The Mechanics of a Further Referendum on Brexit, is published today. While the report takes no position on whether a further referendum should be held, it explores the constitutional and legal questions that politicians would need to consider if proceeding with such a poll. Earlier blog posts in this series have considered the timetable, the possible triggers, the referendum question, the legal and regulatory framework, and the implications of extending Article 50. This post, based on the final chapter of the report, draws all this material together to consider how and when a further referendum might occur.

Conclusions from earlier chapters (and posts) include the following:

  • It would take at least 22 weeks to hold a referendum, following parliament’s initial decision. This is required for passing legislation, question testing by the Electoral Commission, and preparing and holding the campaign. An extra six weeks might be needed if a three-option question were used.
  • This implies that Article 50 would need to be extended, but this should be easy to achieve. The biggest complication is the European Parliament elections, due in late May 2019.
  • Given the planned parliamentary processes around Brexit there are five basic scenarios in which a referendum might be triggered – these are examined further below.
  • There are three viable options to put to a referendum – accepting the government’s deal with the EU (assuming there is one), leaving without a deal, or remaining in the EU. A yes/no vote on the deal would be unwise (as the meaning of a ‘no’ vote would be unclear). A two-part referendum would also be problematic. Hence the public might be offered the choice between two options, or all three options, in a single-question referendum.
  • The franchise for the poll should remain the same as in 2016, to avoid exacerbating arguments about legitimacy. Some updates to regulation (particularly regarding online campaigning) would be advisable.

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What would be the rules for a second Brexit referendum?

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jess_sargent.000alan_renwick.000download.001This week’s Labour Party conference leaves a further Brexit referendum firmly on the political agenda. In the sixth of a series of posts on the mechanics of such a vote, Jess Sargeant, Alan Renwick, and Meg Russell examine what rules and regulations should govern the referendum process, arguing that important changes are needed to facilitate a fair and transparent campaign.

If  a further referendum on Brexit is held, the rules governing how it is conducted would be of utmost importance. The UK’s standing legislation on referendums – the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act (PPERA) 2000 – is both incomplete and in some respects out of date. As explained in a previous post, a new referendum would require fresh legislation. This therefore needs to fill in the gaps and update the rules to reflect the realities of modern campaigning. The natural starting point would be the legislation that paved the way for the 2016 referendum – the European Union Referendum Act 2015. But even that has deficiencies. This post examines key points that new referendum legislation would need to address. It also considers non-legislative changes that could improve the referendum campaign.

The franchise: who should be able to vote in a further referendum?

The franchise for referendums in the UK is not specified in PPERA, so would need to be defined in the legislation for a further Brexit referendum. The 2016 referendum franchise included all those eligible to vote in UK parliamentary elections, plus members of the House of Lords and EU citizens resident in Gibraltar. Some proponents of a second referendum argue this should be extended to 16- and 17-year-olds and EU citizens resident in the UK.

There are good arguments for extending the franchise, and precedent for doing so: 16- and 17-year-olds and EU citizens resident in Scotland could vote in the 2014 Scottish independence referendum. But – despite attempts to change this in parliament – the 2016 EU referendum legislation did not extend the right to vote to these groups, and consistency matters. If it appeared that the result of the 2016 referendum had been overturned because the franchise had been changed, many Leave supporters would view this outcome as illegitimate. As such, the franchise for any further referendum should be the same as for the 2016 vote.

How might referendum regulation be improved?

The referendum regulations in PPERA have not been substantively amended since they were introduced 2000. Since then, five referendums have been held, and the nature of communication and campaigning has changed significantly. Continue reading →

Could Article 50 be extended to allow for a second Brexit referendum?

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jess_sargent.000alan_renwick.000download.001With increasing speculation about a possible second referendum on Brexit, this is the fifth in a series of posts about the practicalities of such a poll. With ‘exit day’ set for 29 March 2019, Jess Sargeant, Alan Renwick and Meg Russell ask whether the Article 50 period could be extended to allow a referendum to take place, and what the knock-on consequences would be.

In a previous blogpost we concluded that, given the time it would take to hold a new referendum on Brexit, the UK’s exit day of 29 March 2019 would almost certainly need to be delayed. This is legally possible – Article 50, the clause of the EU treaty setting out the process by which member states can leave the EU, makes provision for an extension to the two-year period if agreed unanimously by the UK and the EU27. This post examines whether such an agreement is likely, what difficulties may be encountered should the UK’s leaving date be postponed, and what solutions could be found.

Would the EU be likely to agree an Article 50 extension?

All the indications are that the EU would be willing to agree an Article 50 extension to allow the UK to conduct a democratic process such as a general election or a referendum before Brexit is finalised. If remaining in the EU were an option in the referendum, the 27 might well want to afford the UK the opportunity to change its mind. Even if Remain were not an option, there is a strong argument that the EU would want to honour the democratic principles on which it was founded and not deny sufficient time for the UK electorate to have the chance to vote, provided it felt that the UK was being sincere and not just ‘playing for time’. Continue reading →