Tag Archives: Cabinet manual

Should military action require parliamentary approval? 

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The role of parliament in authorising the use of military force has been much debated in recent years, and most recently due to airstrikes against targets in Yemen. The Unit hosted an event with three distinguished experts to discuss what role – if any – parliament should have in approving military action. Rowan Hall offers a summary of the key contributions.

Recent airstrikes in Yemen have revived the debate around parliament’s role in military action. In March, the Constitution Unit held an event on this very topic, with a panel consisting of academic experts Dr Veronika Fikfak and Dr James Strong, and former Cabinet minister and current chair of the Royal United Services Institute, David Lidington. This blog post summarises some of the points made at the event, a recording of which is available on YouTube and in podcast form. 

Dr Veronika Fikfak 

Veronika Fikfak began by outlining the current constitutional convention governing parliament’s role in military action and made three key points. 

First, citing the Cabinet Manual, Fikfak said that the role of MPs currently only extends to debating military action, not necessarily to voting on it. Although MPs have voted on military action in the past, this is not always guaranteed under the convention as it currently stands.  

Second, Fikfak said that the convention as it currently stands is explicitly linked to the period before military action takes place, not during or after it happens. She welcomed this, arguing that if parliament is to have a real say, it needs to do so in advance of military action. However, she did also note that this aspect of the convention has not always been observed.  

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What is constitutional monarchy, and what is its role in the UK? 

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Constitutional monarchies are governed by elected parliaments and governments; but a monarch remains head of state and plays various important roles. Lisa James and Robert Hazell explain the UK monarchy’s constitutional role, its impact, and the questions that would need to be addressed should the UK ever decide to replace it. 

Background 

A constitutional monarchy is a system in which the head of state is a monarch, but that person does not rule the country. Governing is undertaken instead by an elected parliament and government. In the UK, the monarch’s involvement in politics has gradually diminished over the centuries, to the point where they effectively no longer exercise political power.  

The UK is not alone in having a constitutional monarchy. There are seven other monarchies in Europe, which are very similar to the UK system. The main difference is one of size: the UK has a much larger population than most European monarchies, and a larger royal family to service it.  

The UK’s monarchy is also uniquely international: the British monarch is head of state for 14 other ‘realms’ such as Canada, Australia, Jamaica and Papua New Guinea. 

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How might Keir Starmer codify his Prevention of Military Intervention Act?

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Recent events have led to renewed discussion about the convention that parliament should have a formal role in authorising military action, which Keir Starmer at one point proposed to codify in legislation. Robert Hazell argues that placing the existing convention on a statutory footing is unwise, and calls on parliament and the government to work together in creating a ‘shared vision’ of how the convention should operate.

Tony Blair’s decision to support the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 has cast a long shadow over every subsequent leader of the Labour party. Keir Starmer opposed the Iraq war, and one of ten pledges he promised as part of his 2020 leadership campaign was to introduce a Prevention of Military Intervention Act. He subsequently specified on The Andrew Marr Show: ‘I would pass legislation that said military action could be taken if first the lawful case for it was made, secondly there was a viable objective and thirdly you got the consent of the Commons’.

Starmer was reminded of this pledge when he was interviewed about the UK airstrikes against the Houthi rebels in Yemen. He told Laura Kuenssberg on 14 January that his proposal for military action to require the support of the Commons only meant sustained military action involving troops on the ground, rather than targeted airstrikes like those in the Red Sea:

If we are going to deploy our troops on the ground, then parliament should be informed: there should be a debate, the case should be made, and there should be a vote… What I wanted to do was to codify the convention: the Cabinet Manual has a convention… it could be in a law or it could be by some other means.

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Parliamentary scrutiny: what is it, and why does it matter?

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Parliamentary scrutiny is at the heart of UK politics. In this post, Meg Russell and Lisa James examine the four key methods of parliamentary scrutiny, and offer proposals on how to strengthen it, calling for better behaviour by government and strong engagement from backbenchers.

Background

Parliament lies at the heart of UK politics. The legislature is a core institution in any democracy, but is particularly important in the UK, due to our tradition of ‘parliamentary sovereignty’. The government is dependent on the confidence of the House of Commons, which can potentially remove it from office. Parliamentary consent is required for primary legislation, and parliament is a particularly central and important body in holding ministers to account day-to-day.

This makes scrutiny – the detailed examination of policy proposals, actions and plans – one of the essential roles of parliament. Other functions include representation, and serving as a space for national debate – which in turn feed into parliament’s scrutiny function.

This briefing summarises why parliamentary scrutiny matters, what different kinds of parliamentary scrutiny exist at Westminster, some recent concerns about the decline of scrutiny, and ways in which it can be protected and strengthened.

Why does parliamentary scrutiny matter?

The government is responsible for much day-to-day decision-making, in terms of national policy formulation and implementation. But the government itself is not directly elected, and depends for its survival on the continued confidence of the House of Commons. This makes parliament one of the central checks and balances in the constitution – arguably the most central one of all. To provide government accountability, one of the core functions of parliament is scrutiny.

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Rebuilding and renewing the constitution: the executive

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A new Constitution Unit report by Meg Russell, Hannah White and Lisa James, published jointly with the Institute for Government, provides a menu of constitutional reform options ahead of political parties’ manifesto preparation. Its chapters appear on this blog throughout August, with this first excerpt identifying potential changes to the executive branch.

In recent years there have been significant concerns about the functioning of central government, including but not confined to ethical standards. Perennial tensions in the relationship between ministers and the civil service have been exacerbated by the political stresses of the Brexit process and the Covid pandemic, culminating in some politicians’ attacks on the civil service, and some high-profile removals of permanent secretaries under the Johnson and Truss premierships. Since becoming Prime Minister, Rishi Sunak has repeatedly missed opportunities to match his actions to his widely welcomed assertion on the steps of Downing Street that he wanted to lead a government of ‘integrity, professionalism and accountability’. Various episodes have also raised questions about whether the UK’s standards regulators have the status and powers required adequately to perform their roles.

Yet public opinion research by the Constitution Unit shows that people give great emphasis to the importance of honesty and integrity in their politicians, and want independent regulatory mechanisms that punish bad behaviour. Reforms in these areas could help both to increase public trust in politics and promote good governance. The Committee on Standards in Public Life (CSPL), parliamentary committees and external experts have made various recommendations for specific changes. While these are partly targeted at stabilising the situation, experts also agree that there is scope to go further to strengthen constitutional regulators, and to clarify the role, duties and accountability of the civil service. Some changes in this area lie squarely in the government’s power and could be quickly and easily implemented. Some others would require legislation, or benefit from wider consultation. There are also some larger questions which remain more controversial.

Quick wins

  • The Prime Minister should commit to treating civil servants and constitutional regulators with respect and avoiding negative public briefing against them, requiring members of the Cabinet and governing party to abide by the same principle. Impartial civil servants and other independent officials serve the public interest, and can rarely answer back. They should not be beyond constructive criticism, but undermining confidence in them risks damaging trust in the political system as a whole.
  • The Independent Adviser on Ministers’ Interests should be given the power to open his or her own investigations into alleged breaches of the Ministerial Code, and publish their findings, without requiring the Prime Minister’s authorisation to do so. This has been recommended by CSPL and numerous other bodies.
  • The UK’s other constitutional regulators should be strengthened. Partly this is a matter of legislation (discussed below) but some improvements could be made purely by ministers. For example, the recruitment processes for the heads of key watchdogs should require a majority of fully independent members on the appointments panel to minimise partisan influence over the appointment of ethical regulators.
  • Another matter that lies in the Prime Minister’s power would be to reduce ministerial turnover (‘churn’) – which has long been identified as a challenge to effective policymaking. The results would not be seen immediately, but a commitment to this principle would be welcome.
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