The role of parliament in authorising the use of military force has been much debated in recent years, and most recently due to airstrikes against targets in Yemen. The Unit hosted an event with three distinguished experts to discuss what role – if any – parliament should have in approving military action. Rowan Hall offers a summary of the key contributions.

Recent airstrikes in Yemen have revived the debate around parliament’s role in military action. In March, the Constitution Unit held an event on this very topic, with a panel consisting of academic experts Dr Veronika Fikfak and Dr James Strong, and former Cabinet minister and current chair of the Royal United Services Institute, David Lidington. This blog post summarises some of the points made at the event, a recording of which is available on YouTube and in podcast form. 

Dr Veronika Fikfak 

Veronika Fikfak began by outlining the current constitutional convention governing parliament’s role in military action and made three key points. 

First, citing the Cabinet Manual, Fikfak said that the role of MPs currently only extends to debating military action, not necessarily to voting on it. Although MPs have voted on military action in the past, this is not always guaranteed under the convention as it currently stands.  

Second, Fikfak said that the convention as it currently stands is explicitly linked to the period before military action takes place, not during or after it happens. She welcomed this, arguing that if parliament is to have a real say, it needs to do so in advance of military action. However, she did also note that this aspect of the convention has not always been observed.  

Third, Fikfak said that several types of military operation have fallen outside the scope of the convention. As examples, she cited the use of special forces, the use of drones, UN Security Council-authorised activity and emergencies. 

Dr James Strong 

James Strong set out why ministers should consult parliament over military action. He started with the fact that the UK is a parliamentary democracy, where the government’s power ultimately comes from MPs. Holding a vote ensures that a majority of MPs are behind military action, an issue over which their views do not always predictably split along party lines, but where a government and prime minister need the support of the House of Commons.  

Strong additionally highlighted that a vote binds parliamentary supporters to a decision, making it harder for them to become future critics of the military action they previously publicly supported. He added that a successful vote in the Commons sends a message to both allies and adversaries that military action has firm domestic support.  

Turning to the possibility of drafting and enacting a ‘War Powers Act’, Strong suggested that there are dangers in codifying the constitution in a piecemeal way. He also pointed to general agreement that a decision to deploy the military should not be justiciable (subject to challenge in the courts). He suggested that legislation is not necessary to guarantee MPs a vote, as, if a majority of MPs want a vote, ‘there’s a good chance they will get one’. 

David Lidington 

David Lidington drew on his experience in both parliament and government to consider how parliament’s role in relation to military action might be strengthened. He argued that a War Powers Act, which the Conservative Party had considered in both opposition and government, would pose practical problems. In particular, it would rob the government of the ability to take its adversaries by surprise and make it more difficult to act jointly with allies who want to move quickly.  

One proposal which Lidington mentioned would be to amend the standing orders of the House of Commons to recognise that, a certain number of days after military action takes place, ministers should make a statement and hold a vote on an amendable motion concerning the action taken. 

Lidington also suggested that select committees might play a greater role in the scrutiny of military action. He proposed that the Defence Committee might be given an overarching power and duty to monitor both the conduct of conflicts in which the UK is involved and the special forces more generally, so that it can continually keep an eye on progress. He further suggested that relevant select committees might be given the power to hold secret evidence sessions, allowing them to consider pertinent evidence too sensitive to be disclosed to the House of Commons as a whole. 

Panel discussion 

After the panellists made their opening remarks, they were given the opportunity to respond to each other and engage with questions from the chair, Lisa James. Fikfak suggested that one valuable addition to the convention would be the clear expectation that the government should lay out its case for the legality of any proposed military action in international law. 

Responding to questions about the timing of debates, Strong noted that provisions in the current convention allowing the government to act without prior parliamentary approval in the case of ‘emergency’ have sometimes been open to abuse.  

Addressing a question about the information that might be provided to support parliamentary debate, Lidington highlighted the challenges of not being able to share foreign intelligence. He also noted a degree of suspicion of parliament on the part of the civil service, recalling that one senior Foreign Office official had described the Commons to him as ‘a medium-sized power with rather uncertain intentions towards us’. However, he did say that MPs take decisions over military action very seriously, as was evident in the debate preceding the Iraq War in 2003. 

Q&A 

The panel discussion was followed by an audience Q&A. When asked about the potential role of the House of Lords, Strong acknowledged that its members have significant relevant expertise and suggested that its role in military action should be that of a revising chamber, as it is with legislation.  

Strong also emphasised that the historical role that the Commons has played during extended conflicts is sometimes forgotten. He pointed to a number of prime ministers who have been toppled by MPs during major conflicts. He said that one of the biggest weaknesses of the current convention is that it does not apply when things change during the course of a conflict, as in Afghanistan’s Helmand Province in 2006. Fikfak echoed this view, although she highlighted that parliamentary votes have sometimes, but not always, taken place when military action has been extended.  

Lidington argued that the ability of the House of Commons to ensure such votes take place would be enhanced if the institution were to gain greater control over its own agenda, a topic which the Unit produced a report about in 2021.

If you would like to watch to the event in full, it is available to watch on the Unit’s YouTube page. An audio-only version is also available in podcast form. And if you are interested in the topics raised in this post, we have numerous blogs on war powers and use of the royal prerogative.

About the author  

Rowan Hall is the Impact Researcher at the Constitution Unit.  

Featured image: Defence Secretary Grant Shapps in the House of Commons (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0) by UK Parliament.