Can analogue politics work in an era of digital scrutiny? The negative effect of COVID-19 on the informal politics of Westminster

Posted on April 22, 2020 by The Constitution Unit

This week the House of Commons approved measures to conduct business in a semi-virtual form. These were necessary to ensure parliament can function during the coronavirus crisis, but as Greg Power explains, they will also involve the loss of some of the key elements of parliamentary life that enable effective scrutiny and party management.

Parliament finally returned in semi-virtual form this week. While initial coverage has inevitably focused on the novel use of digital technology in the most analogue of institutions, underlying this are more important questions about whether parliament will be able to exert the same political pressure on government when its members are not physically present.

Westminster is not alone in this task. Every other legislature around the world is looking for ways to meet and decide things when MPs cannot be in the same room, most of which seem destined to further increase the share price of Zoom. Yet, as most parliaments are finding, whilst adapting the formal procedures is a relatively easy task, the politics is more complex.

For example, Brazil moved swiftly to change its rules to allow fully virtual plenary sessions, South Africa has introduced new systems for electronic submission of questions to ministers and many parliamentary committees have quickly moved to remote meetings. Other countries, like France, Ireland, Norway and Germany have reduced both the amount of business, and the number of people allowed in the plenary at any one time, along with other provisions for remote deliberations and questions.

The UK has ended up with a similar combination of measures, but spats have already emerged in other countries about the politics of such changes. Reducing the number of MPs in the chamber at any one time for questions seems appropriate, provided those numbers reflect the party balance. But who decides which MPs get to turn up? And if parliamentary business is being reduced, what takes priority? This is the traditional territory of the party whips, who will relish the ability to further influence the tone and contents of such public debates. Continue reading →

Brexit and parliament: an end of term report

Posted on August 6, 2019 by The Constitution Unit

On 22 July, the Unit, in association with The UK in a Changing Europe, hosted four experts on the legislative process, including our Director, Professor Meg Russell, for a panel discussion of parliament’s handling of Brexit. Sam Anderson summarises the main contributions.

On 22 July, the Constitution Unit held a packed event entitled ‘Brexit and Parliament: an end of term report’. As well as launching Unit Director Professor Meg Russell’s new Senior Fellowship with The UK in a Changing Europe, it offered a key opportunity to reflect on parliament’s recent performance on Brexit and what may lie ahead. The other contributors were Hilary Benn MP, Labour Chair of the Commons Exiting the European Union Select Committee; Chris White, Managing Director of Public Affairs at Newington Communications and former adviser to two Conservative Leaders of the House; and Dr Brigid Fowler, Senior Researcher at the Hansard Society, who leads its work on parliament and Brexit. The event was chaired by Dr Daniel Gover, Research Fellow at the Constitution Unit and Lecturer in British Politics at Queen Mary University of London. The discussion included whether parliament had used some of its more innovative procedures appropriately, potential next steps in the backbench fight to stop ‘no deal’ and public perceptions of how parliament is performing in the Brexit process.

Meg Russell

Meg Russell gave an overview of the three key research areas that her new fellowship will focus on.

1. How direct and representative democracy relate to each other in the UK

This has been one of the main issues raised by the 2016 referendum. The centrality of parliamentary sovereignty in the UK constitution means that there is a natural tension between representative democracy – where decisions are made by parliament – and direct democracy, involving the use of referendums. Referendums can undoubtedly create tensions with parliament’s representative function; however the Unit’s Independent Commission of Referendums concluded that in certain circumstances referendums can usefully complement parliamentary sovereignty.

The concepts of direct democracy and the overriding mandate of the referendum have fed debates about the role of parliament that have taken a ‘darker turn’ in recent months. Challenging parliament’s decisions is legitimate in a democracy, but threatening the right of parliament to sit and perform its constitutional and legal functions is something we never expected to see. This rhetoric seeks ‘to pit the people against parliament’, with the ‘worrying implication that the executive should cut loose’ of the accountability that lies at the heart of our system, in the name of the people. For example, many responses to a recent tweet from former Conservative MP Nick Boles, in which he expressed concern about the government ‘muzzling’ parliament, invoked ‘the will of the 17.4 million’, with some suggesting that the will of MPs no longer matters. Prorogation has been advocated by a number of Brexiteer MPs, to prevent parliament blocking a ‘no deal’ Brexit. However it has been criticised by other prominent Leavers, such as Sir Bernard Jenkin, Chair of the Commons Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, and Andrea Leadsom, former Leader of the Commons.

2. The power of parliament over government policy

Professor Russell’s previous work has looked at the ways parliament exercises its power, including through select committees and the legislative process. Parliament is more powerful – and exercises that power in more subtle ways – than many often assume. The Brexit process has demonstrated this in a high profile way. A number of established patterns have continued: one is the anticipatory influence that the Commons has on government, such as when Theresa May offered MPs a vote on ‘no deal’ in March to avoid it being forced upon her. In addition, the Commons and the Lords have largely worked together as partners not rivals; the scrutiny role of select committees and the Commons chamber have been shown to play an important role in testing the claims and policies of ministers; and opposition days have been used in a number of ‘imaginative’ ways. Continue reading →

Monitor 72: Brexit and the changing logic of British politics

Posted on June 24, 2019 by The Constitution Unit

The latest issue of Monitor, the Constitution Unit’s regular newsletter, was published today. Since the previous issue was published in March, we have had two Brexit extensions, two — the first two — recalled MPs, multiple inquiries into the functioning of parliament and its members, and two party leadership resignations, one of which means that we will almost certainly have a new Prime Minister before the end of July. If the constitution was ‘in flux’ when Monitor 68 was published the previous March, then it must now be acknowledged that the ordinary logic of British politics has been changed — perhaps permanently — by the events that have flowed from the 2016 Brexit referendum. Here, Meg Russell and Alan Renwick review the last four months of constitutional events in what is also the lead article from Monitor 72. The full edition can be found here.

The Brexit tumult goes on, and is increasingly challenging some central tenets of British politics.

Having been due to leave the European Union on 29 March, the UK will now remain until at least 31 October. Right up to the original deadline, the government was making frenetic efforts to negotiate addenda to the Withdrawal Agreement (see page 2), but it could not gain concessions adequate to persuade MPs to accept the deal (see page 4). Extensions were agreed, first just for two weeks, then for seven months. A key obstacle is fragmentation on the government side, with Conservative MPs (mostly those who are pro-Brexit) refusing to compromise. With great reluctance, the Prime Minister ultimately turned to seeking a pact with the Labour Party – a distinctly un-British approach whose necessity her European partners had apparently seen long before she did. But, with the pressure of an immediate deadline gone, and with looming European Parliament elections that she had never wanted to hold, the perilous politics of a cross-party deal proved unnavigable. Following her promise that a proposed Withdrawal Agreement Bill would include a referendum clause, Theresa May’s cross-party flirtations sufficiently infuriated sections of her party that she was eventually forced to acknowledge defeat. On 24 May she announced her intention to step down, triggering a contest for the leadership of the Conservative Party and (very likely) for the country.

Throughout these months of tumult the role of parliament has been central, and hotly contested. The 2016 referendum initiated such tension, by pitting popular sovereignty against the conventional logic of parliamentary sovereignty. Most recently there has been a long battle of wills between government and parliament. A key argument (see page 4) has concerned parliament’s ability to control its own agenda, with initiatives from backbenchers firmly backed up by the Commons Speaker. While these had mixed success, many MPs are clearly now willing to use all the powers they possess to prevent an outcome they believe would be deeply damaging to the country. Continue reading →

How long an extension to Article 50 does the UK need?

Posted on March 12, 2019 by Constitution Unit

Despite last-minute additions, Theresa May’s Brexit deal has again been heavily defeated in the Commons. Hence, MPs will need to consider an extension of Article 50. Meg Russell and Alan Renwick argue that for any practical purposes – including renegotiating a deal, or holding a referendum or citizens’ assembly to break the Brexit impasse – the extension previously proposed by the Prime Minister is too short. MPs may now want to press a longer extension on the government.

This week is crunch Brexit decision time for parliament. With the official exit day of 29 March just over a fortnight away, the Prime Minister has been defeated for the second time on her deal, despite some last-minute concessions. She has previously promised MPs further votes on two things: the immediate prospect of a ‘no deal’ exit, or requesting an extension to the Article 50 period. Following tonight’s defeat, MPs will be asked tomorrow whether they wish to exit without a deal on 29 March. If that is defeated, as looks very likely, they will be asked on Thursday whether the Prime Minister should return to Brussels requesting a delay to exit day. Such a decision is at the discretion of the EU27, who must unanimously agree.

The Prime Minister originally proposed that if the Commons supported extending Article 50 she would ask for a ‘short, limited extension’, which should go ‘not beyond the end of June’. But while this might buy the UK time, and avoid the immediate risk of a ‘no deal’ exit, would it really be adequate to resolve the situation? When MPs face this question, there are many reasons to believe that they should demand a longer extension, given how little could be achieved within three months.

Continue reading →

Should we worry if MPs seize control of the parliamentary agenda?

Posted on January 27, 2019 by The Constitution Unit

Ahead of Tuesday’s votes on Brexit, attention has focused on the rights and wrongs of the House of Commons seeking to ‘seize control’. Meg Russell argues that there’s nothing unusual about a democratic parliament controlling its own procedure and business. Indeed, the core principle of parliamentary sovereignty already gives the Commons control by default.

With stalemate over the Prime Minister’s Brexit deal, rejected dramatically by the House of Commons on 15 January by 432 votes to 202, there is increasing talk of parliament ‘seizing control’. On Tuesday, following the Speaker’s controversial decision to allow a vote on Conservative backbencher Dominic Grieve’s amendment speeding up the timetable, MPs will vote on a series of propositions about what should happen next. These include a further proposal by Grieve that the government’s usual control of the agenda should be set aside on specified days to allow MPs to make decisions on Brexit, and a proposal from Labour’s Yvette Cooper that such control be set aside to allow time to debate a private member’s bill demanding that ministers avoid a no deal Brexit by requesting an extension to Article 50.

Consequently, some inside government have expressed concerns that the Commons, with the Speaker’s assistance, is overreaching itself. It has been reported that an internal government document warns of MPs’ moves ‘represent[ing] a clear and present danger to all government business’, and even meaning that ‘the government would lose its ability to govern’. One senior legal figure (whose career was spent inside the government) has argued that changes of this kind could set dangerous precedents for the future, even potentially dragging the monarch into a constitutional crisis (though other legal experts have firmly rebutted such claims).

So are we entering dangerous constitutional territory? What is, after all, so odd about the idea of a democratically-elected chamber gaining greater control over its own time, and its own rules? Continue reading →

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Can analogue politics work in an era of digital scrutiny? The negative effect of COVID-19 on the informal politics of Westminster

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Brexit and parliament: an end of term report

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Monitor 72: Brexit and the changing logic of British politics

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