Brexit and parliament: where did it all go wrong?

Posted on June 14, 2020 by The Constitution Unit

Parliamentary arguments over Brexit may now feel far behind us, but the bitterness of those arguments has left scars on our politics. Meg Russell examines four factors which contributed to the parliamentary ‘perfect storm’ over Brexit, concluding that ‘parliament’ largely got the blame for divisions inside the Conservative Party. This was fuelled by the referendum, minority government and the inability of parliamentary rules to accommodate a minority situation. The populist anti-parliamentary rhetoric which resulted was potentially damaging, with implications for the current Covid-19 crisis, when public trust in political decision-making is essential.

Amidst the current Covid-19 crisis, last year’s Brexit clashes already feel a long time ago. But at the time, they pushed Britain’s politics and constitution to their limits. Parliament was frequently at the heart of these conflicts – with angry headlines suggesting that parliamentarians were seeking to ‘block Brexit’, and branding them ‘wreckers’ or ‘saboteurs’. Twice questions of parliament’s proper role in relation to government ended up in the Supreme Court. Boris Johnson sought a lengthy prorogation of parliament, after which the Attorney General told MPs that they had ‘no moral right to sit’. How on earth did the UK, traditionally the most parliamentary of all democracies, get into such a mess? I dissect this question in a newly-published paper, ‘Brexit and Parliament: The Anatomy of a Perfect Storm’, in the journal Parliamentary Affairs. This post summarises the article’s key arguments. The full version is freely available to read online.

I suggest that four key political and constitutional features, all unusual in the UK context, contributed to this ‘perfect storm’. It was accompanied by a rise in populist and anti-parliamentary rhetoric – of a kind which would be destabilising and dangerous in any democracy, but particularly one based on a core principle of parliamentary sovereignty – as returned to at the end of this post. The four factors were as follows:

The referendum

As charted by the Independent Commission on Referendums, referendum use has grown in UK politics, but can sit awkwardly with traditional parliamentary sovereignty. Arguments for referendums on matters concerning EU powers were made over a long period (somewhat ironically) on the basis of protecting that very sovereignty. The 2016 EU referendum – eventually conceded by David Cameron, under pressure from Conservative Eurosceptics and UKIP – was very unusual, in two important ways. First, it was what the House of Commons Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee (chaired by senior Brexit supporter Bernard Jenkin) criticised as a ‘bluff-call’ referendum: where the government’s purpose was not to seek approval for a change that it supported, but to shut down its opponents’ demands. Second, the referendum was held on a broad proposition (to leave the EU), rather than a detailed prospectus. Hence when the result came in, and was not the one the Prime Minister or most MPs (even on the Conservative benches at that time) wanted, parliament was left to decide how to put it into effect. Such circumstances generated clear tensions between parliamentary and popular sovereignty. Continue reading →

Brexit and parliament: an end of term report

Posted on August 6, 2019 by The Constitution Unit

On 22 July, the Unit, in association with The UK in a Changing Europe, hosted four experts on the legislative process, including our Director, Professor Meg Russell, for a panel discussion of parliament’s handling of Brexit. Sam Anderson summarises the main contributions.

On 22 July, the Constitution Unit held a packed event entitled ‘Brexit and Parliament: an end of term report’. As well as launching Unit Director Professor Meg Russell’s new Senior Fellowship with The UK in a Changing Europe, it offered a key opportunity to reflect on parliament’s recent performance on Brexit and what may lie ahead. The other contributors were Hilary Benn MP, Labour Chair of the Commons Exiting the European Union Select Committee; Chris White, Managing Director of Public Affairs at Newington Communications and former adviser to two Conservative Leaders of the House; and Dr Brigid Fowler, Senior Researcher at the Hansard Society, who leads its work on parliament and Brexit. The event was chaired by Dr Daniel Gover, Research Fellow at the Constitution Unit and Lecturer in British Politics at Queen Mary University of London. The discussion included whether parliament had used some of its more innovative procedures appropriately, potential next steps in the backbench fight to stop ‘no deal’ and public perceptions of how parliament is performing in the Brexit process.

Meg Russell

Meg Russell gave an overview of the three key research areas that her new fellowship will focus on.

1. How direct and representative democracy relate to each other in the UK

This has been one of the main issues raised by the 2016 referendum. The centrality of parliamentary sovereignty in the UK constitution means that there is a natural tension between representative democracy – where decisions are made by parliament – and direct democracy, involving the use of referendums. Referendums can undoubtedly create tensions with parliament’s representative function; however the Unit’s Independent Commission of Referendums concluded that in certain circumstances referendums can usefully complement parliamentary sovereignty.

The concepts of direct democracy and the overriding mandate of the referendum have fed debates about the role of parliament that have taken a ‘darker turn’ in recent months. Challenging parliament’s decisions is legitimate in a democracy, but threatening the right of parliament to sit and perform its constitutional and legal functions is something we never expected to see. This rhetoric seeks ‘to pit the people against parliament’, with the ‘worrying implication that the executive should cut loose’ of the accountability that lies at the heart of our system, in the name of the people. For example, many responses to a recent tweet from former Conservative MP Nick Boles, in which he expressed concern about the government ‘muzzling’ parliament, invoked ‘the will of the 17.4 million’, with some suggesting that the will of MPs no longer matters. Prorogation has been advocated by a number of Brexiteer MPs, to prevent parliament blocking a ‘no deal’ Brexit. However it has been criticised by other prominent Leavers, such as Sir Bernard Jenkin, Chair of the Commons Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, and Andrea Leadsom, former Leader of the Commons.

2. The power of parliament over government policy

Professor Russell’s previous work has looked at the ways parliament exercises its power, including through select committees and the legislative process. Parliament is more powerful – and exercises that power in more subtle ways – than many often assume. The Brexit process has demonstrated this in a high profile way. A number of established patterns have continued: one is the anticipatory influence that the Commons has on government, such as when Theresa May offered MPs a vote on ‘no deal’ in March to avoid it being forced upon her. In addition, the Commons and the Lords have largely worked together as partners not rivals; the scrutiny role of select committees and the Commons chamber have been shown to play an important role in testing the claims and policies of ministers; and opposition days have been used in a number of ‘imaginative’ ways. Continue reading →

Monitor 72: Brexit and the changing logic of British politics

Posted on June 24, 2019 by The Constitution Unit

The latest issue of Monitor, the Constitution Unit’s regular newsletter, was published today. Since the previous issue was published in March, we have had two Brexit extensions, two — the first two — recalled MPs, multiple inquiries into the functioning of parliament and its members, and two party leadership resignations, one of which means that we will almost certainly have a new Prime Minister before the end of July. If the constitution was ‘in flux’ when Monitor 68 was published the previous March, then it must now be acknowledged that the ordinary logic of British politics has been changed — perhaps permanently — by the events that have flowed from the 2016 Brexit referendum. Here, Meg Russell and Alan Renwick review the last four months of constitutional events in what is also the lead article from Monitor 72. The full edition can be found here.

The Brexit tumult goes on, and is increasingly challenging some central tenets of British politics.

Having been due to leave the European Union on 29 March, the UK will now remain until at least 31 October. Right up to the original deadline, the government was making frenetic efforts to negotiate addenda to the Withdrawal Agreement (see page 2), but it could not gain concessions adequate to persuade MPs to accept the deal (see page 4). Extensions were agreed, first just for two weeks, then for seven months. A key obstacle is fragmentation on the government side, with Conservative MPs (mostly those who are pro-Brexit) refusing to compromise. With great reluctance, the Prime Minister ultimately turned to seeking a pact with the Labour Party – a distinctly un-British approach whose necessity her European partners had apparently seen long before she did. But, with the pressure of an immediate deadline gone, and with looming European Parliament elections that she had never wanted to hold, the perilous politics of a cross-party deal proved unnavigable. Following her promise that a proposed Withdrawal Agreement Bill would include a referendum clause, Theresa May’s cross-party flirtations sufficiently infuriated sections of her party that she was eventually forced to acknowledge defeat. On 24 May she announced her intention to step down, triggering a contest for the leadership of the Conservative Party and (very likely) for the country.

Throughout these months of tumult the role of parliament has been central, and hotly contested. The 2016 referendum initiated such tension, by pitting popular sovereignty against the conventional logic of parliamentary sovereignty. Most recently there has been a long battle of wills between government and parliament. A key argument (see page 4) has concerned parliament’s ability to control its own agenda, with initiatives from backbenchers firmly backed up by the Commons Speaker. While these had mixed success, many MPs are clearly now willing to use all the powers they possess to prevent an outcome they believe would be deeply damaging to the country. Continue reading →

Parliament must act quickly to exert influence if it wishes to prevent a ‘no deal’ Brexit

Posted on June 21, 2019 by The Constitution Unit

In four months’ time, the extension to the Article 50 period agreed in April will expire. The UK will have a new Prime Minister by then, although it remains unclear what position they will take if the Commons continues to refuse to approve the Withdrawal Agreement. Jack Simson Caird analyses the legal and political mechanisms available should parliament seek to prevent the next Prime Minister taking the UK out of the EU without a deal.

Boris Johnson has said that if he is the next Prime Minister the UK will leave the EU on 31 October with or without a deal. Theresa May, made the same pledge before the original Article 50 deadline on 29 March. However, after coming under significant pressure from MPs, she did not follow through and sought two extensions from the EU (resulting in the current exit day of 31 October).

Since Theresa May said that she would step down, there has been significant debate over whether the House of Commons could prompt Prime Minister Johnson to avoid ‘no deal’. In this post, I argue that MPs could stop a Prime Minister determined to deliver ‘no deal’ by putting the new leader under extreme pressure to reveal his position on Brexit from the very beginning of his premiership. There is no guarantee that steps taken by parliament to prevent ‘no deal’ would be legally effective, but the events in the first half of 2019 have shown that parliamentary pressure can result in a shift in the government’s position. It is constitutionally unsustainable for a government to pursue a policy which does not have the support of a majority of MPs. This fact will be front and centre from the very moment the new Prime Minister takes over.

Commanding the confidence of the Commons and ‘no deal’ Brexit

When the Conservative Party appoints a new leader, the next natural step is for Theresa May to go to the Queen and recommend that the MP chosen – likely to be Boris Johnson – is best placed to command the confidence of the Commons and should be appointed Prime Minister. This is usually a constitutional formality. However, unlike when Theresa May was appointed, the next Prime Minister will take over a minority administration. Furthermore, Theresa May resigned after it became clear that there was no prospect of her being able to get a majority for the Brexit deal in the Commons (and because she was not prepared to leave without a deal in the face of opposition from a majority of MPs). In fact, some Conservative MPs have already indicated their potential willingness to vote down a Johnson government if the new Prime Minister sought to pursue ‘no deal’. Should such claims become louder in the coming weeks, Theresa May might struggle to give the necessary assurances to the Queen that the person she recommends can command the confidence of a majority of MPs. Even if she does, the new Prime Minister will clearly be in a delicate constitutional situation. Continue reading →

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Brexit and parliament: where did it all go wrong?

Brexit and parliament: an end of term report

Monitor 72: Brexit and the changing logic of British politics

Parliament must act quickly to exert influence if it wishes to prevent a ‘no deal’ Brexit

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