Tag Archives: Sue Gray

Monitor 81. Johnson falls; what’s next for the constitution?

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Today, the Unit published the 81st edition of Monitor, which provides analysis of the key constitutional news of the past four months. In this post, which also serves as the issue’s lead article, Meg Russell and Alan Renwick reflect on the collapse of Boris Johnson’s government, increasing concerns about ministerial and parliamentary standards, and continuing doubts about the future of the Union.

The preoccupying question in UK politics over recent months increasingly became when – rather than whether – the Prime Minister would be forced from office. In April, Boris Johnson was fined for breaching restrictions on social gatherings during lockdown, and the Commons referred him to its Privileges Committee for allegedly misleading parliament. In May, the Conservatives suffered steep losses in the local elections, and Sue Gray’s official report into ‘partygate’ was finally published, concluding that the ‘senior leadership at the centre, both political and official, must bear responsibility’ for the culture of disregard for the rules that had emerged. In June, Johnson survived a vote of no confidence among his MPs and the loss of two parliamentary by-elections, followed by the resignation of the Conservative Party Co-Chair, Oliver Dowden. But the resignation of Deputy Chief Whip Chris Pincher in early July, and Number 10’s bungled reaction to it, finally brought the Prime Minister down.

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Lord Geidt’s resignation is a fresh reminder of the government’s restrictive approach to scrutiny of its actions

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After barely a year in post, Lord (Christopher) Geidt resigned yesterday as the Prime Minister’s Independent Adviser on Ministers’ Interests. As Peter Riddell demonstrates below, his resignation is a further example of the battles of constitutional watchdogs to remain independent of the executive, and reflects the increasing presidentialism of the current administration, dismissing scrutiny not only by regulators but also by parliament, the courts and the media.

The immediate and pressing question raised by Lord (Christopher) Geidt’s resignation is whether the role of Independent Adviser on Ministers’ Interests is doable at present. This is only partly a matter of rules but more one of political culture and attitudes. That has been implicitly acknowledged in the response of a Downing Street spokesman that there will not be an immediate replacement and that the Prime Minister is ‘carefully considering’ the future of the role.

As often with resignations, the background and the run-up to the decision to go matter as much as the specific reason for departure. Lord Geidt’s frustrations have been increasingly clear in his correspondence with Boris Johnson, in his annual report last month (as I discussed on this blog last week) and in his evidence to the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee (PACAC) on 7 June. Johnson and his team failed to supply relevant information over the decoration of the Downing Street flat when initially sought and the PM did not take account of his obligations under the Ministerial Code over the ‘partygate’ allegations, for which he received a fixed penalty notice. Lord Geidt felt that Johnson’s eventual comments still did not address criticisms by Sue Gray about his adherence to the Nolan principles of public life.

Nonetheless, despite ‘inconsistencies and deficiencies’, Lord Geidt said in his resignation letter that he ‘believed it was possible to continue credibly as Independent Adviser, albeit by a very small margin’. He apparently told Boris Johnson on Monday that he would be content to serve until the end of the year. This followed the government’s concession last month that the Adviser could initiate his own investigations but only after having consulted the Prime Minister and obtained his consent, and with greater transparency over a refusal. Lord Geidt has described this as a ‘low level of ambition’ and his discomfort over the ambiguities of his relationship with the Prime Minister was evident in some robust questioning by PACAC. He was clearly seen by the MPs as not truly independent, not least when he said he was one of the PM’s assets, and, in practice, inhibited from advising a Prime Minister on his own conduct and obligations under the Code.

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Partygate and the special advisers’ code of conduct: lessons for the new Downing Street Chief of Staff

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Following the publication of Sue Gray’s report update, the Prime Minister announced his intention to reform the Downing Street machine. Robert Hazell, author of an authoritative study of the way special advisers work, argues that this presents an opportunity to revise the code of conduct that regulates their behaviour, and that incoming Chief of Staff Steve Barclay would be wise to take it.

Towards the end of his statement in the House of Commons on 31 January Boris Johnson said that he would ‘sort out what Sue Gray rightly calls the “fragmented and complicated” leadership structures of Downing Street’. He undertook to do two things:

  • create an Office of the Prime Minister, with a Permanent Secretary to lead Number 10.
  • review the civil service and special adviser codes of conduct to make sure that those codes are properly enforced.

Three days later Munira Mirza, the PM’s Head of Policy, resigned, swiftly followed by the resignations of Dan Rosenfield, the PM’s Chief of Staff, Martin Reynolds, Johnson’s Principal Private Secretary, and Jack Doyle, director of communications. On 5 February it was announced that the Cabinet Office Minister Steve Barclay was to be the new Chief of Staff. This blog is addressed to him, and the new Permanent Secretary in Number 10, as they consider what changes might be required to the Special Advisers’ Code of Conduct.  It draws upon the research done for a book by Ben Yong and myself, Special Advisers: Who they are, what they do, and why they matter, a year-long project including over 100 interviews with ministers, special advisers and senior officials.

The first point to make is that under the Ministerial Code and the Special Advisers’ Code of Conduct it is the PM who is responsible for the special advisers in No 10.  That is clearly spelled out in paragraph 3.3 of the Ministerial Code, and paragraph 9 of the Code of Conduct, which contain identical wording:

The responsibility for the management and conduct of special advisers, including discipline, rests with the Minister who made the appointment.

The Ministerial Code goes on to say:

Individual Ministers will be accountable to the Prime Minister, Parliament and the public for their actions and decisions in respect of their special advisers.

And the Code of Conduct states:

It is also the appointing Minister’s responsibility to ensure that their special adviser(s) adhere to this Code of Conduct.

With the previous paragraph in the Code of Conduct reminding Special Advisers that:

Special advisers are bound by the standards of integrity and honesty required of all civil servants as set out in the Civil Service Code.

So there is no wriggle room here.  If special advisers in Number 10 have fallen below the required standards of integrity and honesty, the PM is responsible; and the PM is accountable to parliament and the public for their conduct. But the second point to make is that although the PM may be ultimately responsible, to expect him to look after the management of all of his special advisers is completely unrealistic. The PM is an exceptionally busy person.  So it is a responsibility which must be delegated: the rest of this blog considers, to whom.  Should the management and conduct of special advisers be the responsibility of the Cabinet Secretary, the Permanent Secretary, or the Chief of Staff?

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Northern Ireland on the brink, again: the responsibility of London

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As political tensions rise and riots erupt, or are provoked, on the streets of Belfast, the suggestion is now widely heard that the Northern Ireland institutions may again collapse before long. But London appears at present to have a limited grip of the Northern Ireland situation, suggests Alan Whysall, and if it does not change its approach markedly, it – and others – may face great grief soon.

Lessons of history

London governments were hands off in Northern Ireland until the late 1960s. Meanwhile conditions developed there that provoked protest, which was then hijacked by terrorism. Over several decades they painfully learned again about Ireland, the need to give its affairs at times a degree of priority, and the importance of working with Dublin. That approach led to the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement, and an intensive cooperative effort between the governments to implement it and keep it on the road.

Since 2016, matters have changed. In settling the UK’s approach to Brexit, it has generally been regarded as a side issue, to be resolved once the grand lines of the withdrawal plan were settled. The May government, under much pressure from Brussels, Belfast and Dublin, eventually recognised that the architecture of Brexit must accommodate Northern Ireland concerns. In 2019, however, policy shifted from the May backstop to the Johnson Protocol, and there is a strong perception that Northern Ireland has chiefly been valued as a battleground for the government’s trench warfare with the EU.

The build-up to the recent violence

Brexit is of course not the sole cause of what is now going wrong. In various ways, the underpinnings of the Agreement have been weakening for eight or nine years; and a number of factors led to the Executive collapsing in early 2017. But the tensions that Brexit has provoked, and the necessity to create a border somewhere – across the island, around the two islands, or between Great Britain and Ireland (the inevitable choice, because the other two are unfeasible) have seriously envenomed matters.

Nevertheless, Julian Smith, the last Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, developed a strong rapport with all the main Northern Ireland parties, and the Irish government, and was able to reach the New Decade, New Approach agreement to bring the institutions back early last year. But he was promptly sacked, apparently for having offended Number 10, a step widely seen in Northern Ireland as indicating the government’s general lack of concern for its affairs. He was replaced by Brandon Lewis.

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