Tag Archives: fixed-term parliaments act

Parliamentary reform in the 2024 party manifestos 

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The main party manifestos have now been published, allowing exploration and comparison of their constitutional proposals. In this second post in a series on the manifestos, Meg Russell looks at the parties’ commitments on parliamentary reform. What are they promising, and what are the prospects for these proposed changes? 

Yesterday on this blog, Lisa James reviewed the constitutional proposals presented by the political parties in their 2024 general election manifestos. Unsurprisingly, parliamentary reform is a key area that appears in several of them. Most parties include aspirations to reform the House of Lords, and some make other commitments on the House of Commons, or the overall power of parliament. This second post in the Constitution Unit’s manifesto series reviews these proposals, reflecting on their origins, merits, and prospects for implementation. It starts with the power of parliament as a whole, before moving to the Commons, and then the Lords. 

The power of parliament 

It is primarily the Liberal Democrats that give space to parliament’s overall place in the constitution – an area subject to significant recent controversy. The Brexit referendum of 2016 led to fierce clashes in parliament, and unusually high-profile arguments about both parliamentary procedure and the limits of the government’s prerogative power. Brexit also raised new questions about parliament’s powers over policy matters that returned to the UK following its exit from the European Union. 

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In praise of fixed-term parliaments

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The surprise general election may leave many suddenly nostalgic for the principle of fixed-term parliaments. The original central arguments for fixed terms have been reawakened. In this post, Meg Russell and Robert Hazell revisit these long-standing arguments, summarise the birth and death of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011, and argue that – on the basis of UK and international experience – we should consider returning Westminster to fixed terms. 

The lengthy and debilitating speculation about when Rishi Sunak might call the general election may have reminded many of the arguments in favour of fixed-term parliaments. His shock announcement on 22 May that such an election would take place in July only reinforces those views. This blog post revisits the arguments for fixed terms, reminds readers of how the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 (FTPA) was created and abolished, and argues for reintroduction of the principle of fixed terms – albeit with flexibility to allow early elections on occasion, as applies in many other democracies (and existed under the FTPA). 

The arguments for fixed-term parliaments 

The following is a summary of points in favour of the principle of fixed-term parliaments: 

  • Allowing the government to decide the timing of elections provides an unjustified incumbency advantage. 
  • It also confers disproportionate power on the executive over parliament. 
  • A fixed election cycle is better for both civil service and electoral administration planning, and encourages more long-term thinking in government. 
  • Fixed terms are also better for political parties, prospective parliamentary candidates, and the regulation of election spending. 
  • Speculation about an early election may unnecessarily unsettle commercial and economic decisions. 
  • Parliamentary business, including the work of select committees, can be planned and carried through with less risk of interruption.  

These are not our words; they are drawn (mostly verbatim) from the report of the cross-party parliamentary Joint Committee on the Fixed-term Parliaments Act (paragraph 17), published in March 2021. Based on recent experience, some of them may now feel very familiar. 

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Unchecked power? How recent constitutional reforms are threatening UK democracy

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The constitution has consistently felt under strain in recent years, following a succession of crises. Alison Young argues that a written constitution is not necessarily the solution to this problem, concluding that it is important to ensure that key constitutional guardrails are not just defended against abolition, but protected from gradual degradation as well.

Ever since the outcome of the Brexit referendum in June 2016, it seems like the UK constitution has lurched from crisis to crisis. Even after negotiating Brexit, the UK had to deal with a global pandemic – something, it would appear from hearings of the Covid-19 inquiry, for which the UK was not fully prepared.

With commentators naturally immersed in these key issues, there has been less attention paid to other, quieter, aspects of constitutional reform. The Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Act 2020, for example, appears to have barely registered with the general public. There is probably even less awareness of the changes to the oversight of the Electoral Commission provided for in the Elections Act 2022. Yet both reshaped the UK constitution.

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What role should the monarch have in a constitutional crisis?

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Robert Saunders argues that the UK cannot rely on a ceremonial monarchy that seeks to remain apart from politics to protect the constitution from attack in times of crisis. For that, he concludes that other instruments will be needed, without which both monarchy and the constitution will suffer. This post is based on material from the Unit’s new report, The British Monarchy, co-published yesterday by the Unit and the UK in a Changing Europe.

For much of British history, it was hard to imagine a constitutional crisis without the monarch at its core. From the barons at Runnymede imposing Magna Carta on King John to the expulsion of James II in 1688, the English (and, later, British) constitution was forged in the collision between Crown and parliament. As late as the nineteenth century, suspicion of royal power pulsed through progressive politics. Victorians may have revered ‘Her Little Majesty’, but they also celebrated a ‘Glorious Revolution’ against royal tyranny and erected a statue of Oliver Cromwell outside Westminster.

With the decline of constitutional politics in the twentieth century, the political functions of the Crown slipped from public debate. Yet recent controversies have redirected attention to the role of the monarch at times of constitutional crisis. More specifically, they have reopened a question that deserves greater public discussion: who wields the historic powers of the Crown once the monarch is no longer politically active? Should there be any limit on their use by a Prime Minister?

An emergency brake

Some of the highest powers of the British state still technically reside with the Crown, including the right to declare war, conclude treaties and suspend parliament. By convention, those powers are exercised ‘on the advice of the Prime Minister’. But they do not belong to the Prime Minister, and might, in theory, be withheld.

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Reforming the royal prerogative  

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The Brexit process raised questions about how – and in what areas – the royal prerogative should operate. Following a lengthy project, which has resulted in a new book on the subject and a Unit report – published today – on options for reform, Robert Hazell explains why the prerogative matters, and how it might be reformed to strike a better balance between parliament and the executive.

The royal prerogative has long been a mystery to most observers. I have now produced a book Executive Power: The Prerogative, Past, Present and Future to help demystify it. It was written with my former researcher (now a barrister) Tim Foot, and covers the whole range of prerogative powers, from going to war and ratifying treaties, appointing and dismissing ministers, regulating the civil service and public appointments, to the grant of honours and pardons and the issue of passports. The book’s 19 chapters provide a comprehensive guide to the operation of the prerogative – past, present, and future – together with suggestions for reform.

Working with us was another researcher, Charlotte Sayers-Carter, and Charlotte and I have distilled the key findings of our book into a much shorter report, Reforming the Prerogative. It selects just five powers, to illustrate the scope for reform through codification in statute, soft law, or by clearer and stronger conventions. This blog offers edited highlights from the book and the report, to explain why the prerogative matters; to illustrate this with a few prerogative powers; and to suggest ways in which it might be reformed.

What is the prerogative?

The prerogative derives from the original executive powers of the Crown. Over the years these have been overlain and superseded by statute, and most powers have transferred to ministers. The monarch retains the power to summon, dissolve and prorogue parliament; to grant royal assent to bills passed by parliament; to appoint and dismiss ministers. The main prerogative powers in the hands of ministers are the power to make war and deploy the armed forces; to make and ratify treaties; to conduct diplomacy and foreign relations; to grant peerages and honours; to grant pardons; to issue and revoke passports.

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