Miller 2/Cherry and the media – finding a consensus? 

thumbnail_20190802_092917.jpgprofessor_hazell_2000x2500_1.jpg Despite the UK Supreme Court managing to find unanimity regarding the legality of the attempted prorogation of parliament in  September, the rest of the country, including its national newspapers, appeared to divide along Leave/Remain lines regarding the correctness of the judgment. Sam Anderson and Robert Hazell analyse how the national press discussed the political and constitutional questions raised by the judgment.

The government’s resounding defeat in the Supreme Court is one example of the rolling constitutional drama that breaks in the news almost daily. However, when it comes to media coverage of these stories, the key consideration is almost always ‘What impact will this have on Brexit?’ Issues are reported through the Leave/Remain divide, with popular news outlets framing events for their audiences. This post seeks first to examine the extent to which this has occurred with the prorogation case by looking at eight national newspaper editorials, and the way they have framed the political implications of the judgment. Then, using the same editorials, we will examine whether there is consensus around important constitutional issues that have arisen in this case, such as the proper role of the Court and the importance of the independence of the judiciary. We coded the editorials on both these questions, and found that the case was framed by almost all the papers to some degree through a Brexit lens, and that there is a lack of consensus on the constitutional issues.  

The political questions

The first issue was coded on a scale of -5 to five. Zero reflects the position of the Court: that the judgment concerned the specific prorogation issue, but was neutral with regards to the political implications of the decision. Editorials which argued the judgment would have negative political implications for the government and the Brexit process were assigned a negative number up to -5, depending on the extent they engaged in direct criticism of the judgment, and promoted the government’s policy of getting Brexit done. Editorials that argued that the judgment would have positive political implications for the government and Brexit process were assigned a positive number up to five, depending on the extent to which they were directly critical of the government and its Brexit policies. All eight articles were independently coded by two researchers. Where discrepancies occurred, a mid-point was taken. 

Paper Implications for Brexit 
Sun -5
Mail -4
Express -2
Telegraph  -1.5
Times  0.5
FT  2
Independent 3
Guardian  4.5

 

Looking qualitatively, there were three overarching positions taken. Of the eight publications, four were critical of the judgment and its  potential political implications. The Sun described the Prime Minister as the victim of a ‘staggering legal coup and accused the Court of having done the bidding of Remainers. The Daily Mail was less virulent, but still argued the case was a victory for Remainers, and emphasised how the judgment allowed MPs (including ‘masochistically intransigent Eurosceptic zealots) to continue to try and block the will of the electorate. The Daily Express was less direct but warned politicians that the case should not be used as a way to try to avoid Brexit. The Daily Telegraph made the only substantive comments on the case, noting pointedly that the Supreme Court overruled the High Court’s finding of non-justiciability, and gave some explanation for the prorogation: the government had only been ‘trying to carry out the democratic will’ of the people as expressed in the referendum.  Continue reading

Which MPs are responsible for failing to ‘get Brexit done’?

meg_russell_2000x2500.jpgToday Boris Johnson will give his leader’s speech at Conservative Party conference, doubtless with a central argument about the need to ‘get Brexit done’. MPs have been blamed for the failure to achieve this. But which MPs precisely are responsible? Meg Russell argues that opposition parties cannot normally be expected to deliver government policy. Instead, government backbenchers usually have that role. It is resistance from Conservative backbenchers – including Johnson himself and others promoted to his Cabinet – to supporting Theresa May’s deal that provides the most obvious reason for Brexit not having been agreed.

The slogan for this year’s Conservative Party conference, under the leadership of the new Prime Minister Boris Johnson, is to ‘get Brexit done’. Immediately following the Supreme Court ruling against the government last week, ill-tempered exchanges in the House of Commons saw the Prime Minister repeatedly blaming parliamentarians for failing to deliver Brexit. For example, Boris Johnson commented thatPoliticians of all parties promised the public that they would honour the result. Sadly, many have since done all they can to abandon those promises and to overturn that democratic vote’. In contrast he pledged thatWe will not betray the people who sent us here; we will not’, adding that ‘That is what the Opposition want to do’. Far stronger words, characteristically, have been ascribed to his chief adviser Dominic Cummings in blaming parliament for the Brexit impasse. Several papers have reported Cummings as suggesting that it was ‘not surprising’ that people are angry with MPs, as they have failed in their duty to get Brexit done. Given the risks that such comments further stoke such public anger against our democratic institutions, it seems important to consider exactly which MPs primarily bear responsibility for the failure to agree a Brexit plan.

First, a quick recap on what happened in the months before Johnson took office. His predecessor, Theresa May, pursued a lengthy negotiation with the EU27 – resulting in a withdrawal agreement that was signed off on 25 November 2018. Under the terms of Section 13 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act, this deal was then put to an initial ‘meaningful vote’ in the House of Commons on 15 January 2019. However, it was defeated by MPs by a whopping 432 to 202 votes. The Prime Minister subsequently brought the deal back for a second such attempt on 12 March. By this point various MPs had been brought round to supporting the deal; but it was nonetheless still heavily defeated, by 391 votes to 242. A third and final attempt at getting the House of Commons to agree the deal then occurred on the originally-planned Brexit day, of 29 March 2019. This was not a ‘meaningful vote’ under the terms of the Act, as Speaker John Bercow had hinted that such a move could be ruled out of order – on the basis that MPs cannot just repeatedly be asked to vote upon the same proposition – but it was again an in-principle vote on the deal. Again the gap between supporters and opponents narrowed, but the government was defeated by 344 votes to 286 – a margin of 58. Hence a further 30 MPs would have needed to switch from opposing to supporting the deal in order for it to be clearly approved. Continue reading

The Supreme Court ruling in Cherry/Miller (No.2), and the power of parliament

meg_russell_2000x2500.jpgThis week’s Supreme Court judgment against Boris Johnson on parliament’s prorogation has shaken British politics and will be looked back on as a landmark case. Yet at the same time, Meg Russell argues, it simply reinforces the core principle of parliament’s centrality in our constitution. There has long been a myth of executive-dominance in the British system. Perhaps after this case, the fact that the government gains its power and authority from parliament will be better recognised – by those both inside and outside the system.

The Supreme Court’s judgment in the prorogation case was damning. Short of deciding that Boris Johnson had misled the Queen (which would be difficult to know, given private conversations) the court issued the strongest possible condemnation on all counts. The government had argued that prorogation was non-justiciable: i.e. not a matter in which the courts could get involved. The justices instead ruled it justiciable. Having established that, they then ruled it to be unlawful. Then, rather than leaving any loose ends regarding remedies, they explicitly quashed the prorogation, declaring that ‘Parliament has not been prorogued’. To cap it all, the decision was a unanimous one by all 11 justices who sat in the case. The prorogation was hence not just ‘improper’, as argued previously on this blog, and in a letter to the Times signed by 22 constitutional experts, but also found to be unlawful in the most powerful possible terms.

In some respects this feels like a constitutional earthquake. Few at the outset expected such a resounding result. On the basis of the High Court’s judgment, the first hurdle of justiciability was in doubt. Many who watched the proceedings, and the careful forensic analysis by Lord Pannick, representing Gina Miller, will soon have started thinking otherwise. This can only have been reinforced by watching the presentations by the government’s lawyers, who claimed that the issue of prorogation should be resolved politically rather than through the courts. Their suggestion that parliament could somehow defend itself, when the very point of the case was that parliament had been shut down, rang hollow.

The court’s judgment confirmed that advising the monarch to prorogue ‘will be unlawful if the prorogation has the effect of frustrating or preventing, without reasonable justification, the ability of Parliament to carry out its constitutional functions as a legislature and as the body responsible for the supervision of the executive’ (para 50). That flows, the judgment suggested, from two principles at the very core of the UK constitution: the sovereignty of parliament, and the accountability of the government to parliament – exercised, for example, through questions and committees. Continue reading