Starmer’s challenges and early steps towards constitutional renewal

Today, the Unit published Monitor 87, providing analysis of constitutional events over the last four months. This post by Meg Russell and Alan Renwick also serves as the issue’s lead article. It discusses the Labour landslide at the general election and the new-look House of Commons; the constitutional changes we can expect from the new government (such as House of Lords reform, measures on standards, and increased devolution in England); and unexpected changes in political leadership in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. It also warns that aspects of the election campaign show that the divisive politics plaguing the UK has not gone away. And it commits the Unit to work hard to inform the new government, new opposition parties and wider public about the constitutional challenges ahead.

Since the last edition of Monitor was published four months ago, the face of UK politics has radically changed. Most obviously, a general election was unexpectedly called, and the dramatic results delivered a Labour landslide and therefore a change of government. Former Leader of the Opposition Keir Starmer is now the UK’s Prime Minister, while former Prime Minister Rishi Sunak is (at least for now) Leader of the Opposition. The Shadow Cabinet has very largely become the Cabinet, while many members of Sunak’s government lost their seats, as did former Prime Minister Liz Truss.

The Labour manifesto (analysed alongside others on the Unit blog) promised various constitutional changes, some of which were reflected in the King’s speech given on 17 July. The government promises reform of the House of Lords, with a first session bill to remove the hereditary peers; it is committed to reforming appointments and shrinking the size of the chamber, before turning to larger-scale reform. It also promises quick action on changes to the territorial constitution, with a new Council of the Nations and Regions, and further devolution within England. The speech reiterated plans to act on the integrity of elections and encourage participation – the manifesto pledged to extend the franchise to 16 and 17-year-olds, and improve electoral registration. As for the manifesto commitment to create a new Ethics and Integrity Commission, legislation on the detail of this is expected later – the Unit published a report on the options in March. Beyond legislation, the government has committed to creating a new House of Commons Modernisation Committee – a topic on which the Unit likewise issued a report, in June.  

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Northern Ireland: challenges for the next Westminster government 

A new report from the Constitution Unit, Northern Ireland: Challenges for the Next Westminster Government, is published today. It sets out the challenges in Northern Ireland that will face a new government at Westminster, of whatever complexion, and urges a distinctly new approach. Here the author, Alan Whysall, Honorary Senior Research Associate at the Unit, introduces the report. 

The Northern Ireland political institutions resumed in February, and Northern Ireland has attracted predictably little attention in the rest of the UK since. The manifestos of the Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat parties contained little about Northern Ireland to surprise. 

Today’s new report suggests that Northern Ireland needs much sensitivity and some priority in London, however, among all the other problems the new government will need to deal with, including at times attention from Number 10. 

We cannot assume that the Agreement settlement is now back on the right path 

It should not be assumed that the institutions established under the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement are guaranteed to function stably after the election. There is still discontent within the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) over the deal that took the party back into government, and its support is down following that deal, and the abrupt departure from politics of its champion, former party leader Jeffrey Donaldson. Several DUP seats are too close to call in this election, including that of the new leader Gavin Robinson. 

Even if the institutions do survive, however, they are liable to be hindered, perhaps gravely, by continuing controversy over EU issues. 

Nor should it be assumed – as has often been the case in recent years – that if the institutions are in being, all is well with the wider Belfast/Good Friday Agreement settlement. 

The institutions have often delivered poor government, with difficult decisions repeatedly dodged. That is one of the reasons behind the financial crisis that has bitten Northern Ireland already, and is liable to return; and behind acute problems in the public services. 

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The 2019 Conservative Party manifesto: were its pledges on the constitution delivered? 

The 2019 Conservative Party manifesto contained a number of constitutional policy commitments – on Brexit, UK institutions, elections, civil liberties, and devolution. As the manifestos for this year’s general election emerge, Lisa James assesses the delivery record of the 2019–24 Conservative governments against the pledges made in 2019. 

The 2019 Conservative Party manifesto contained a wide-ranging set of constitutional commitments. Since its publication much has changed – the UK has left the EU, experienced a global pandemic, and had three Prime Ministers and five Chancellors of the Exchequer. But delivery against manifesto commitments still matters, so with the 2019–24 parliament dissolved, now is the time to reassess the pledges that were made. 

Getting Brexit done 

The single highest profile – and titular – pledge of the manifesto was of course the promise to ‘get Brexit done’. The election followed a period of parliamentary deadlock, and the negotiation of Boris Johnson’s Brexit deal. The manifesto pledged to pass this deal, limit the length of the ‘transition period’ for negotiating new trade arrangements, end the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) over the UK, and end the supremacy of EU law. 

The Brexit deal was rapidly passed following the Conservative general election victory, and the UK left the EU on 31 January 2020. The pledge not to extend the transition period beyond the end of 2020 was also kept. The deal largely removed ECJ jurisdiction from the UK, but the court retained a continuing role in relation to Northern Ireland as a result of its treatment under Johnson’s Brexit deal (discussed further below). The supremacy of retained EU law (a special category of legislation derived from the UK’s EU membership) was ended by the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act 2023

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The new voting system for mayors and PCCs: how it affects democracy

This month’s elections for mayors and police and crime commissioners were contested under a revised voting system. In a post published yesterday, Alan Renwick found that this change had a substantial impact on the results, to the benefit of the Conservatives. Here, he concludes that it also harmed democracy. 

Elections of mayors and police and crime commissioners (PCCs) were previously held under the Supplementary Vote (SV) system, where each voter could express first and second preferences. Now they take place using First Past the Post (FPTP), where there is a vote for a single candidate. The previous post in this series showed that this change produced a marked shift in the outcome of the elections held earlier this month, and that it did so entirely to the benefit of the Conservatives.  

That a change in the rules should favour those in power who instigated it is already cause for concern: democracy requires a level playing field. But ministers might defend the reform on the basis that the new system is superior on democratic grounds to its predecessor and that it was introduced fairly. Both of these claims therefore require interrogation. How do the two systems compare in terms of democratic quality? And was the process through which the change in voting system came about appropriate?  

Which voting system is more democratic? 

As I outlined in a blogpost published when the bill changing the voting system was before parliament in 2021, ministers argued that FPTP is the more democratic system: SV, they said, allows losing candidates – those coming second in terms of first preferences – to win. But this argument is circular: it works only if we have already accepted the FPTP definitions of ‘winner’ and ‘loser’.  

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Devolution returns to Northern Ireland

Two years after the Democratic Unionist Party put the institutions of the 1998 Belfast/Good Friday Agreement into suspension by withdrawing from them, those institutions returned, and devolved government exists in Northern Ireland again, headed by a Sinn Féin First Minister. Negotiations between the UK government and DUP led to a deal, embodied in a white paper. Alan Whysall looks at the paper, and the prospects for the Agreement settlement.

How we got here

The history of the dispute has been set out on this blog and a recent Constitution Unit podcast. Briefly, a Protocol to the EU Withdrawal Agreement left Northern Ireland effectively within the EU single market for goods and customs arrangements. This avoided the necessity for a border within the island of Ireland, which would be acutely difficult in both political and practical terms; it gave Northern Ireland rights to trade freely in the EU as well as Great Britain. But potentially it inhibited trade with GB, the symbolism of which antagonised some unionists. Hardline pressure grew. The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) responded by withdrawing from the institutions in February 2022, thereby shutting them down.

The Windsor Framework, agreed between the UK and EU in 2023, was intended to respond to the DUP’s demands – but it stayed out. Negotiations went on, in private, between the DUP and London, reportedly involving Julian Smith, who more or less uniquely among recent secretaries of state is widely respected in Northern Ireland. There was also a brief interparty discussion in December in which the government made an offer of relief for Northern Ireland’s desperate public finances. But deadlines came and went.

Finally, a week or so ago, DUP leader Jeffrey Donaldson presented the proposals emanating from the negotiations to various party groupings; and securing majorities, albeit not it appears large ones, announced acceptance.

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