Conor J. Kelly and Etain Tannam discuss the new Irish coalition’s programme for government and what it means for UK-Irish relations. They conclude that while the disagreements between London and Dublin that characterised the Brexit period are dissipating and political relationships have noticeably improved in recent years, several challenges remain which will require strict adherence to the structures of the 1998 Belfast/Good Friday Agreement.
Continue readingTag Archives: Windsor Framework
Northern Ireland: challenges for the next Westminster government
A new report from the Constitution Unit, Northern Ireland: Challenges for the Next Westminster Government, is published today. It sets out the challenges in Northern Ireland that will face a new government at Westminster, of whatever complexion, and urges a distinctly new approach. Here the author, Alan Whysall, Honorary Senior Research Associate at the Unit, introduces the report.
The Northern Ireland political institutions resumed in February, and Northern Ireland has attracted predictably little attention in the rest of the UK since. The manifestos of the Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat parties contained little about Northern Ireland to surprise.
Today’s new report suggests that Northern Ireland needs much sensitivity and some priority in London, however, among all the other problems the new government will need to deal with, including at times attention from Number 10.
We cannot assume that the Agreement settlement is now back on the right path
It should not be assumed that the institutions established under the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement are guaranteed to function stably after the election. There is still discontent within the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) over the deal that took the party back into government, and its support is down following that deal, and the abrupt departure from politics of its champion, former party leader Jeffrey Donaldson. Several DUP seats are too close to call in this election, including that of the new leader Gavin Robinson.
Even if the institutions do survive, however, they are liable to be hindered, perhaps gravely, by continuing controversy over EU issues.
Nor should it be assumed – as has often been the case in recent years – that if the institutions are in being, all is well with the wider Belfast/Good Friday Agreement settlement.
The institutions have often delivered poor government, with difficult decisions repeatedly dodged. That is one of the reasons behind the financial crisis that has bitten Northern Ireland already, and is liable to return; and behind acute problems in the public services.
Continue readingThe constitution in the 2024 general election manifestos
With just over two weeks to go until polling day, most parties have now released their manifestos. In this post, Lisa James summarises their key pledges on the constitution, covering parliamentary reform, standards, the rule of law and rights protection, elections and public participation, media and democratic discourse, devolution and Europe.
With the 4 July general election fast approaching, political parties are releasing their manifestos. Though much of the election campaign has focused on the economy and public services, several of the manifestos also contain significant constitutional policy pledges. This post summarises the key commitments on the constitution, covering the manifestos of the main parties in Great Britain: the Labour Party, Conservatives, Liberal Democrats, Green Party, Reform UK, Plaid Cymru and Scottish National Party.
Parliament
The most striking commitment in relation to the House of Commons comes from Labour, which proposes a Modernisation Committee charged with assessing procedure, and improving standards and working practices. The party also proposes to grasp the nettle of House of Lords reform, pledging to scrap the remaining hereditary peers, introduce an age limit of 80 and ‘a new participation requirement’, and introduce reforms to ‘ensure the quality of new appointments’ and improve territorial diversity. Longer-term, the party commits to replacing the House of Lords with an ‘alternative second chamber that is more representative of the regions and nations’, and pledges to consult on proposals for doing so.
Lords reform is also pledged by the Green Party, which proposes replacement with an elected second chamber, and the Liberal Democrats (who propose to reform the chamber to have a ‘proper democratic mandate’ but offer no more detail). Reform UK proposes to replace the House of Lords with a ‘much smaller, more democratic second chamber’ – though it leaves further detail ‘to be debated’. The SNP supports abolition. The Liberal Democrats also propose strengthening parliament’s powers in relation to the calling of elections, trade deals, and military intervention. The Conservative manifesto contains nothing on the role of parliament.
Continue readingThe 2019 Conservative Party manifesto: were its pledges on the constitution delivered?
The 2019 Conservative Party manifesto contained a number of constitutional policy commitments – on Brexit, UK institutions, elections, civil liberties, and devolution. As the manifestos for this year’s general election emerge, Lisa James assesses the delivery record of the 2019–24 Conservative governments against the pledges made in 2019.
The 2019 Conservative Party manifesto contained a wide-ranging set of constitutional commitments. Since its publication much has changed – the UK has left the EU, experienced a global pandemic, and had three Prime Ministers and five Chancellors of the Exchequer. But delivery against manifesto commitments still matters, so with the 2019–24 parliament dissolved, now is the time to reassess the pledges that were made.
Getting Brexit done
The single highest profile – and titular – pledge of the manifesto was of course the promise to ‘get Brexit done’. The election followed a period of parliamentary deadlock, and the negotiation of Boris Johnson’s Brexit deal. The manifesto pledged to pass this deal, limit the length of the ‘transition period’ for negotiating new trade arrangements, end the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) over the UK, and end the supremacy of EU law.
The Brexit deal was rapidly passed following the Conservative general election victory, and the UK left the EU on 31 January 2020. The pledge not to extend the transition period beyond the end of 2020 was also kept. The deal largely removed ECJ jurisdiction from the UK, but the court retained a continuing role in relation to Northern Ireland as a result of its treatment under Johnson’s Brexit deal (discussed further below). The supremacy of retained EU law (a special category of legislation derived from the UK’s EU membership) was ended by the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act 2023.
Continue readingWhy the UK government must take a different approach to restoring devolution in Northern Ireland
Alan Whysall discusses the prospects for the return of the Northern Ireland political institutions this autumn. He finds limited grounds for optimism and concludes that the responsibility for salvaging the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement settlement may now fall to the next British government. This post picks up themes from the author’s two most recent papers for the Constitution Unit, called Northern Ireland’s Political Future (NIPF) and The Agreement at 25.
As the July issue of Monitor recorded, visits from US President Joe Biden and other notables to celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement had little apparent effect on Northern Ireland politics; nor did local government elections, at which Sinn Féin emerged triumphant. The principal Agreement institutions remained in abeyance, vetoed by the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), which remains concerned about the Northern Ireland Protocol and Windsor Framework. At the time of writing, tensions are growing over policing, potentially deepening the political standoff. Northern Ireland meanwhile is being governed without government by civil servants who have very limited authority, together with occasional interventions from London.
Will devolution come back?
Before the summer, many commentators believed that the DUP would reach a deal in the autumn, claiming credit for aspects of the Windsor Framework, to bring back the institutions. This remains possible – many DUP careers depend on their existence. There have been suggestions of progress behind the scenes in the last few days. But it is now harder to be confident. Stasis until the UK general election seems possible, while the political, social and economic fabric of Northern Ireland deteriorates. Why?
First, the DUP may find compromise over the Protocol difficult. Negotiations are apparently going on between the party and the government, informed by a private 18-page DUP wish list. Its public demands for action on the Protocol, and on the threats it sees in it to Northern Ireland’s constitutional position, have been vaguely expressed, but the implication is that they are substantial. It seems unlikely that London can do very much to satisfy them without reopening the Protocol or the Agreement itself: and it has warned that it cannot do significantly more. So DUP supporters may be disappointed in any feasible compromise, and according to polling, they largely endorse the hard line taken so far. Senior party figures may be obdurate too, whatever the leader, Jeffrey Donaldson, wants: the former deputy leader, Lord (Nigel) Dodds of Duncairn, spoke vehemently of the ‘many unresolved and outstanding problems’ created by the Framework, suggesting London was merely peddling spin.
Continue reading