What should happen when MPs resign? Why the Commons should have control of the departure of its members and MPs should not be offered post-dated peerages

The resignation of Nadine Dorries prompted questions about how, and in what circumstances, an MP should leave office. In this post (the first of two), former senior House of Commons official David Natzler argues that it is wrong for the executive to have the final say over MPs’ departures, and that MPs should not be offered peerages until after they have left the Commons.

On 25 August the backbencher and former Cabinet minister Nadine Dorries, MP for Mid Bedfordshire, announced that she had formally applied for the position of Crown Steward and Bailiff of the Chiltern Hundreds. The appointment was duly made on 29 August and she ceased thereby to be a member of the House of Commons. The writ for a by-election was ordered when the Commons returned from its summer recess on 4 September, with delayed effect until 12 September: unlike the writ for Rutherglen and Hamilton West caused by the successful recall petition against Margaret Ferrier, which was ordered at the same sitting but with immediate effect. As a result, the by-election to replace Dorries will not be held until 19 October. This was in the news primarily because more than 10 weeks earlier, on 9 June, Dorries stated that she had informed the Conservative Chief Whip that she was ‘standing down as the MP for Mid Bedfordshire with immediate effect’. That day saw the publication of the resignation honours list of former Prime Minister Boris Johnson, and both she and fellow Johnson loyalist Nigel Adams had been widely tipped to receive peerages. Neither did, apparently following doubts expressed by the House of Lords Appointments Commission (HOLAC). Johnson announced his resignation as an MP later on 9 June and was appointed to the Chiltern Hundreds on 12 June. Adams announced his resignation on 10 June – using identical words to Dorries about ‘standing down with immediate effect’ –  and was duly appointed as Steward of the Manor of Northstead on 13 June.

It soon became clear that Dorries had not actually resigned and that she had no immediate intention of doing so. On 14 June she said that it was still ‘absolutely my intention to resign’ but that she was awaiting information she had sought from the Cabinet Office and HOLAC on her non-appointment to the House of Lords. On 29 June she stated on her weekly TalkTV show that ‘I’ve resigned… I’ll be gone long before the next general election.’ Criticism mounted from Conservative MPs, and within her constituency, most conspicuously from first Flitwick and then Shefford town councils, both of whom published letters they had sent to her. These focused primarily on allegations that she was failing in her duties to her constituents, both in terms of her failure over a period of many months to speak or vote or attend the House of Commons, and of her refusal to hold constituency surgeries or play an active role in the constituency. Rishi Sunak suggested during an LBC radio interview on 2 August that her constituents were not being properly represented, and thereafter several ministers and backbench Conservatives were similarly critical. She continued however to receive the Conservative whip. And of course, she continued to receive her salary. 

Political drama aside, does this story hold any lessons for the way parliament and the constitution should function? I believe that it illustrates several issues, although they are not all capable of resolution: specifically, the grant of peerages to MPs; the practice and process used by MPs to resign their seats; the expectations of attendance of MPs at Westminster; and MPs’ work for and in their constituencies. The first two of these matters will be covered in this post. The latter two will be discussed in a post that will appear on this blog tomorrow.

Continue reading

Why the UK government must take a different approach to restoring devolution in Northern Ireland

Alan Whysall discusses the prospects for the return of the Northern Ireland political institutions this autumn. He finds limited grounds for optimism and concludes that the responsibility for salvaging the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement settlement may now fall to the next British government. This post picks up themes from the author’s two most recent papers for the Constitution Unit, called Northern Ireland’s Political Future (NIPF) and The Agreement at 25.

As the July issue of Monitor recorded, visits from US President Joe Biden and other notables to celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement had little apparent effect on Northern Ireland politics; nor did local government elections, at which Sinn Féin emerged triumphant. The principal Agreement institutions remained in abeyance, vetoed by the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), which remains concerned about the Northern Ireland Protocol and Windsor Framework. At the time of writing, tensions are growing over policing, potentially deepening the political standoff. Northern Ireland meanwhile is being governed without government by civil servants who have very limited authority, together with occasional interventions from London.

Will devolution come back?

Before the summer, many commentators believed that the DUP would reach a deal in the autumn, claiming credit for aspects of the Windsor Framework, to bring back the institutions. This remains possible – many DUP careers depend on their existence. There have been suggestions of progress behind the scenes in the last few days. But it is now harder to be confident. Stasis until the UK general election seems possible, while the political, social and economic fabric of Northern Ireland deteriorates. Why?

First, the DUP may find compromise over the Protocol difficult. Negotiations are apparently going on between the party and the government, informed by a private 18-page DUP wish list. Its public demands for action on the Protocol, and on the threats it sees in it to Northern Ireland’s constitutional position, have been vaguely expressed, but the implication is that they are substantial. It seems unlikely that London can do very much to satisfy them without reopening the Protocol or the Agreement itself: and it has warned that it cannot do significantly more. So DUP supporters may be disappointed in any feasible compromise, and according to polling, they largely endorse the hard line taken so far. Senior party figures may be obdurate too, whatever the leader, Jeffrey Donaldson, wants: the former deputy leader, Lord (Nigel) Dodds of Duncairn, spoke vehemently of the ‘many unresolved and outstanding problems’ created by the Framework, suggesting London was merely peddling spin.

Continue reading

Perspectives on the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement: new evidence and insights

The Constitution Unit today publishes a new report examining diverse perspectives on the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement. Through interviews, focus groups, and documentary analysis, it reveals different understandings, preferences, hopes, and fears, in Northern Ireland and beyond. As efforts continue to restore Northern Ireland’s power-sharing institutions, authors Alan Renwick and Conor J. Kelly argue that only by listening to these many viewpoints can progress be made.

Recent months have seen numerous celebrations marking the 25th anniversary of the Belfast or Good Friday Agreement. After decades of violence, the Agreement brought peace and relative political stability to Northern Ireland. Emerging after years of effort by both the British and Irish governments, and actors in Northern Ireland, it was approved by large majorities in referendums in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. It is a unique and carefully constructed document, and it remains the cornerstone of consensual politics in Northern Ireland today.

Yet the Agreement also faces serious challenges. Some aspects have not functioned as imagined in 1998, or indeed been implemented at all. The main ‘Strand 1’ institutions established through the Agreement – the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive – have repeatedly collapsed or been suspended. They last functioned in early 2022, and negotiations to restore them are ongoing as we write. Tensions generated by Brexit and the Protocol have created a period of fractious politics that has been deeply destructive of trust. As Alan Whysall has repeatedly warned on this blog, the situation is grave.

Continue reading

The Belfast/Good Friday Agreement at 25: the need for coherent engagement in London

Alan Whysall, author of the Constitution Unit’s recent paper on The [Belfast/Good Friday] Agreement at 25, looks at immediate political prospects in Northern Ireland. The next few months may decide whether the Agreement has a future and London, he suggests, must show sustained commitment and leadership. Getting the institutions back is the starting point for reviving the Agreement, but there is much more to do.

For over a year, the DUP, the largest unionist party in Northern Ireland, has prevented the Assembly and Executive from functioning, in its dispute over the Northern Ireland Protocol and Windsor Framework. Hardliners urge it on, though other unionists oppose the veto on government.

The crux of the unionist objections varies within and between parties. Some emphasise the Irish sea border, the inconveniences of which may be significantly alleviated by the Framework. Others focus on constitutional fundamentals, as they see them: the continuing role of EU law and the European Court of Justice (because Northern Ireland remains within the European Single Market for goods) and the alleged impact of the Protocol on its place in the Union. Some speak of Northern Ireland as an EU ‘colony’; some now openly reject the Agreement. They see refusing to enter government as ‘leverage’ with London (implying the slightly odd characterisation of their participation in self-government as a favour to others).

Meanwhile civil servants run the administration, but without legal authority to take new policy initiatives – and doubtful legitimacy for making contentious decisions. That has just come to the fore with a difficult budget, set from London in the absence of an Executive, embodying real term cuts of 6.4%. Civil servants may be expected to decide where the impact should fall, and are objecting publicly.

Where will the negotiation lead?

Political movement is unlikely before the 18 May local government elections. The DUP may want to negotiate on the Windsor Framework; measures safeguarding the Union; and other sweeteners (including, as always, money). But there are serious limits to what is possible. The present government in London is unlikely to reopen the Framework – there may be flexibilities around implementation, but anything more risks reviving conflict with Brussels. The government has promised ‘legal reassurances’ about Northern Ireland’s place within the Union, but how much more it can offer is doubtful (it is already expressly protected: broadening the guarantee to prevent changes unionists object to would be strongly resisted).

Continue reading

Northern Ireland: dangers and opportunities for London

Northern Ireland is again governed by civil servants. Alan Whysall argues that London’s self-interest requires it to give Northern Ireland serious attention in coming months. But success may require more effort and time than is currently envisaged, and a return to the approach that led to the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement. Not making this commitment could have grave consequences for the entire Union, not just Northern Ireland.

This blog draws on the Unit’s report on Northern Ireland’s Political Future, published in May (hereafter referred to as the Report).

No government again

Northern Ireland has had no functioning Executive since the DUP’s withdrawal of its First Minister, in protest at the Northern Ireland Protocol, in February. The party declined to appoint a deputy First Minister following Assembly elections in May – when, for the first time, Sinn Féin emerged the largest party, entitled to the First Minister post (the DUP deny their refusal to appoint has anything to do with this, but Sinn Féin and others are sceptical). Government was carried on by ministers on a caretaker basis, unable to make controversial or crosscutting decisions, amid social and economic challenges often (as in the NHS) worse than in England. There is no budget and a £660 million overspend (exacerbated by the absence of an Executive). The DUP also blocked meetings of the Assembly.

On 28 October, with no Executive formed, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Chris Heaton-Harris, came under a duty to hold further Assembly elections, before mid-January. By law, the caretaker ministers have now lost office, and civil servants are in charge.

Few wanted the elections, however, and either by his own decision or the Prime Minister’s, the Secretary of State announced emergency legislation on 9 November to put them off for 6, potentially 12 weeks. They could be avoided by the DUP agreeing to appoint an Executive by 8 December (19 January if extended). The legislation would also underpin civil servants’ powers, set a budget and enable the Secretary of State to reduce the pay of members of the Northern Ireland Assembly (MLAs).

Political prospects

The issue of the Northern Ireland Protocol remains intractable. The DUP refuses to return to devolution until it changes fundamentally; it appeared unimpressed by the threat to reduce MLA pay. The EU is willing to discuss implementing the Protocol more flexibly, but not to rewriting it.

Continue reading