Tag Archives: PACAC

In praise of post-election transition periods 

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The UK is about to embark on its first July general election since 1945. After an initial burst of activity, this timing will give both government and parliament some breathing space before ‘politics as usual’ resumes in the autumn. Various experts have previously indicated the benefits of a more formal post-election transition period. Meg Russell summarises these, suggesting that the unusual circumstances in 2024 might encourage reflection on longer-term changes to the system. 

Rishi Sunak’s election timing surprised many. Tomorrow’s vote represents the first UK general election held in July since 1945. Prior to the last election, held in December 2019, all of the previous 10 contests had taken place in April, May or June.  

An earlier post on this blog in praise of fixed-term parliaments discussed the downsides of the uncertainty over this year’s timing. This follow-up post instead considers some of the potential upsides of the timetable, in terms of likely events in the weeks and months ahead. After polling day, parliament is due to reconvene on 9 July, with a King’s speech setting out the government’s intended legislative programme following on 17 July. The start date for parliament’s summer recess seems likely to be delayed slightly from the previously planned 23 July. But there will be little appetite – among MPs, their staff, civil servants or journalists – for parliamentary activity in August. This makes an enforced break of several weeks very likely, allowing election participants to recover, but also to plan ahead. 

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Constitutional watchdogs: restoring the role

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Unit research shows that the public cares deeply about ethics and integrity in public life. Many constitutional and ethical watchdogs exist: there is a consensus that they need strengthening, but not on how, or to what extent. Robert Hazell and Peter Riddell have produced a new report on how to reinvigorate these watchdogs: they summarise their conclusions here.

This week we have published a new report, Trust in Public Life: Restoring the Role of Constitutional Watchdogs. It comes at an important juncture, when public trust in politicians has fallen to an all-time low. There is a wealth of evidence from survey data about the decline in trust; not least from the Constitution Unit’s own surveys, as part of our Democracy in the UK after Brexit project. Those surveys show that the public value honesty in politicians above qualities like being clever, working hard or getting things done; but only 6% of the public believe that politicians who fail to act with integrity are dealt with effectively. There is an urgent need to repair and rebuild the system for upholding standards in public life if trust in politicians is to be restored.

Constitutional watchdogs are the guardians of the system for upholding standards. The Unit has long had an interest in them, from one of our earliest reports in 1997 to one of our most recent, on parliament’s watchdogs published in 2022. This new report is complementary to the one on parliament, in studying the watchdogs which regulate the conduct of the executive. They are the Advisory Committee on Business Appointments (ACOBA); the Civil Service Commission; the Commissioner for Public Appointments (OCPA); the Committee on Standards in Public Life (CSPL); the House of Lords Appointments Commission (HOLAC); the Independent Adviser on Ministers’ Interests; and the Registrar for Consultant Lobbyists.

A series of official and non-governmental reports have all agreed that these watchdogs need strengthening; but there is less agreement on how, or by how much. That is the gap that our report is intended to fill. It sets out a range of strengthening measures, in detail, for implementation early in the next parliament. Early action is possible because most of our recommendations do not require legislation.

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International agreements: what is parliament’s role, and why does this matter?

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This is the first edition of this briefing. It has since been updated. Read the most up-to-date version and other briefings on the Constitution Unit’s website.

Treaties and other international agreements have a major effect on citizens’ day-to-day lives. But the mechanisms for parliamentary involvement in scrutinising and agreeing them are widely considered inadequate. Lisa James and Arabella Lang explain how these mechanisms work, and how they might be reformed.

Background

International treaties and other agreements are vital policy tools in a world where many problems and solutions cross borders. But the UK parliament has limited involvement in them, which is increasingly considered inadequate. Parliamentary committees such as the Commons Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, the Lords International Agreements Committee, and the former Commons International Trade Committee – as well as external experts – have consistently called for a greater role for parliament in both making and approving international agreements.

What are international agreements?

International agreements vary hugely in their scale and scope. They include large trade agreements between several states, such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which the UK is in the process of joining; security, data or visa agreements between two governments; international human rights and refugee conventions; and agreements governing international organisations such as the EU or UN. At one extreme, it can take years to set a negotiating mandate, conduct negotiations, agree and sign a text, implement and ratify the agreement, and bring it into force. Or, at its simplest, an agreement might consist of an exchange of letters between two states.

International agreements also vary in their effects. Some are legally binding treaties, with consequences under international law for any breaches. Others are not legally binding but still have political force, and may entail spending commitments or have other significant impacts. The UK–Rwanda agreement on offshoring asylum seekers, for example, was initially a non-binding Memorandum of Understanding, before the two governments negotiated a binding treaty.

During the UK’s EU membership, many of the international agreements affecting the country were negotiated and scrutinised at EU level. Following Brexit, the UK is now conducting more of its own international negotiations. This has brought increasing attention to how those negotiations and the resulting agreements are – or should be – scrutinised and approved domestically.

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How might Keir Starmer codify his Prevention of Military Intervention Act?

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Recent events have led to renewed discussion about the convention that parliament should have a formal role in authorising military action, which Keir Starmer at one point proposed to codify in legislation. Robert Hazell argues that placing the existing convention on a statutory footing is unwise, and calls on parliament and the government to work together in creating a ‘shared vision’ of how the convention should operate.

Tony Blair’s decision to support the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 has cast a long shadow over every subsequent leader of the Labour party. Keir Starmer opposed the Iraq war, and one of ten pledges he promised as part of his 2020 leadership campaign was to introduce a Prevention of Military Intervention Act. He subsequently specified on The Andrew Marr Show: ‘I would pass legislation that said military action could be taken if first the lawful case for it was made, secondly there was a viable objective and thirdly you got the consent of the Commons’.

Starmer was reminded of this pledge when he was interviewed about the UK airstrikes against the Houthi rebels in Yemen. He told Laura Kuenssberg on 14 January that his proposal for military action to require the support of the Commons only meant sustained military action involving troops on the ground, rather than targeted airstrikes like those in the Red Sea:

If we are going to deploy our troops on the ground, then parliament should be informed: there should be a debate, the case should be made, and there should be a vote… What I wanted to do was to codify the convention: the Cabinet Manual has a convention… it could be in a law or it could be by some other means.

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Why the UK should have a Parliamentary Committee on the Constitution

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Last year, the Institute for Government and the Bennett Institute for Public Policy published a Review of the UK Constitution. One recommendation in that review was that parliament create a joint committee on the constitution. Steph Coulter sets out the case for such a body.

As part of our recently completed Review of the UK Constitution, the Institute for Government and Bennett Institute for Public Policy outlined the key issues with the UK’s current constitutional arrangements and made recommendations for reform. We highlighted the lack of clarity within a system underpinned by an uncodified constitution and the failure of existing political checks to deter constitutional impropriety.

Given the UK system’s reliance on parliamentary sovereignty as its central constitutional principle, we believe that parliament should be central to addressing these issues. Therefore, one of our key recommendations was the establishment of a new Parliamentary Committee on the Constitution, comprised of members from both the House of Commons and House of Lords. By acting as a central and authoritative constitutional guardian, such a body would go some way to improving constitutional clarity and would provide a more effective check on unconstitutional behaviour than existing arrangements.

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