How might Keir Starmer codify his Prevention of Military Intervention Act?

Recent events have led to renewed discussion about the convention that parliament should have a formal role in authorising military action, which Keir Starmer at one point proposed to codify in legislation. Robert Hazell argues that placing the existing convention on a statutory footing is unwise, and calls on parliament and the government to work together in creating a ‘shared vision’ of how the convention should operate.

Tony Blair’s decision to support the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 has cast a long shadow over every subsequent leader of the Labour party. Keir Starmer opposed the Iraq war, and one of ten pledges he promised as part of his 2020 leadership campaign was to introduce a Prevention of Military Intervention Act. He subsequently specified on The Andrew Marr Show: ‘I would pass legislation that said military action could be taken if first the lawful case for it was made, secondly there was a viable objective and thirdly you got the consent of the Commons’.

Starmer was reminded of this pledge when he was interviewed about the UK airstrikes against the Houthi rebels in Yemen. He told Laura Kuenssberg on 14 January that his proposal for military action to require the support of the Commons only meant sustained military action involving troops on the ground, rather than targeted airstrikes like those in the Red Sea:

If we are going to deploy our troops on the ground, then parliament should be informed: there should be a debate, the case should be made, and there should be a vote… What I wanted to do was to codify the convention: the Cabinet Manual has a convention… it could be in a law or it could be by some other means.

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Why the UK should have a Parliamentary Committee on the Constitution

Last year, the Institute for Government and the Bennett Institute for Public Policy published a Review of the UK Constitution. One recommendation in that review was that parliament create a joint committee on the constitution. Steph Coulter sets out the case for such a body.

As part of our recently completed Review of the UK Constitution, the Institute for Government and Bennett Institute for Public Policy outlined the key issues with the UK’s current constitutional arrangements and made recommendations for reform. We highlighted the lack of clarity within a system underpinned by an uncodified constitution and the failure of existing political checks to deter constitutional impropriety.

Given the UK system’s reliance on parliamentary sovereignty as its central constitutional principle, we believe that parliament should be central to addressing these issues. Therefore, one of our key recommendations was the establishment of a new Parliamentary Committee on the Constitution, comprised of members from both the House of Commons and House of Lords. By acting as a central and authoritative constitutional guardian, such a body would go some way to improving constitutional clarity and would provide a more effective check on unconstitutional behaviour than existing arrangements.

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Rebuilding and renewing the constitution: the territorial constitution

A Constitution Unit report by Meg Russell, Hannah White and Lisa James, published jointly with the Institute for Government, provides a menu of constitutional reform options ahead of political parties’ manifesto preparation. Its chapters will be published in summary form on this blog throughout August, with this third excerpt identifying potential changes relating to the territorial constitution.  

Recent years have been unsettled ones in UK territorial politics, with structural pressures following the Brexit vote, and other tensions between the centre and the devolved institutions. Meanwhile, the devolution arrangements for England remain an incomplete patchwork.  

While wholesale reform may be complex and contentious, much can be done to mitigate the tensions that exist within the existing framework. There is widespread recognition that cooperation between the UK government and devolved institutions could be improved, and some positive steps in this direction have already been taken. With the fiercest battles about the implementation of Brexit now over, opportunities exist for strengthening interparliamentary arrangements. The governance arrangements for England could also be made more transparent and coherent.  

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Must a caretaker government be a zombie government?

During the recently concluded Conservative leadership contest, the government appeared to be in a holding pattern, taking little or no action of substance until the election of Boris Johnson’s successor. But did the government, which had a substantial parliamentary majority and an electoral mandate, need to act as if it was merely a ‘caretaker’? Robert Hazell explains that the rules around a ‘lame duck’ PM remain fuzzy, and argues that steps must be taken to clarify the position as soon as possible.

Something very strange happened at Westminster over the summer: a government which enjoyed a comfortable working majority of 71 seats was declared to be a caretaker which could not take any major decisions. It was variously accused of being a ‘zombie government’ ‘asleep at the wheel’, and incapable of taking urgent decisions required by the energy crisis. In its defence the government might have responded that as a caretaker it was precluded from taking such decisions. But the Whitehall rules on this are far from clear. So, what are the Whitehall rules about caretaker governments, and the principles underlying them? And given the confusion this summer, do the rules need clarifying or updating?

‘Caretaker government’ is not a term to be found in any UK government guidance. The Cabinet Manual talks instead about ‘restrictions on government activity’. A leadership election in the governing party is not one of the circumstances when the Cabinet Manual says government activity must be restricted. It envisages just three such circumstances when governments are restricted:

…governments are expected by convention to observe discretion in initiating any new action of a continuing or long-term character in the period immediately preceding an election, immediately afterwards if the result is unclear, and following the loss of a vote of confidence.

Paragraph 2.27.
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The Constitutional Reform Act 2005 led to greater judicial independence: politicians and parliament must continue to support it

As part of an ongoing inquiry, the Lords Constitution Committee has sought evidence as to whether ‘the amendment of the role of the Lord Chancellor by the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (CRA), and the resulting separation of powers between the judiciary and the Government, [have] been successful’. Robert Hazell argues that the 2005 reforms led to greater judicial independence, a political achievement that requires continuing support from politicians and parliament.

The House of Lords Constitution Committee is currently undertaking an inquiry into the role of the Lord Chancellor and the Law Officers, in which it seeks to answer a number of questions, including whether ‘the amendment of the role of the Lord Chancellor by the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (CRA), and the resulting separation of powers between the judiciary and the Government, [have] been successful’. Through written evidence, submitted with Professor Kate Malleson, I have attempted to answer that question. Our answers were based upon the main findings and conclusions of a three-year research project on the Politics of Judicial Independence, funded by the AHRC. The research explored the impact of the greater separation of powers introduced by the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (CRA). Our principal conclusion – as explained in our 2015 book on the subject – was that judicial independence and judicial accountability have emerged stronger, not weaker; but that greater separation of powers requires increased engagement by the judiciary with other branches of government.

The changes made by the Constitutional Reform Act 2005

Until 2005 the head of the judiciary was a Cabinet minister, the Lord Chancellor. In an extraordinary breach of separation of powers, he could also sit as a judge in the UK’s highest court. The CRA removed the Lord Chancellor as head of the judiciary, handing that responsibility to the Lord Chief Justice in line with an agreement struck in the Concordat of 2004. The division of powers between the executive and judiciary was further refined in 2008 in a Framework Document for the management of the Courts Service (revised and updated in 2011 to incorporate the Tribunals Service). The CRA also created a new Supreme Court, and established the Judicial Appointments Commission.

The new politics of judicial independence are more formal, fragmented, and politicised

The old politics were informal, depending on regular meetings between the Lord Chancellor and senior judges; closed, in that these were virtually the only contacts between the judiciary and the government; and secretive, with both sides preserving each other’s confidences. They were also consensual and conservative, in that neither side wanted to change the system. The ‘new’ politics, by contrast, are much more formal. The CRA required more formal structures and processes to handle the relationships between more separate branches of government. We now have the Judicial Appointments Commission, Judicial Appointments and Conduct Ombudsman, and Judicial Conduct Investigations Office: all products of the CRA. The new formal processes include regular meetings between the judiciary and other branches of government, with the innovation of six-monthly meetings between the LCJ and Prime Minister, the introduction of regular meetings with senior officials in parliament, and annual appearances by the LCJ and President of the Supreme Court before the Constitution Committee.

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