Tag Archives: independent adviser on ministers interests

Seven steps to restore trust in government ethics  

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The Constitution Unit today publishes a joint statement with the Institute for Government and UK Governance Project proposing seven steps for the new government to restore trust in the regulation of ethics in public life. This is summarised in a letter to The Times, signed by the leaders of these three groups and numerous others.

Trust in politics in the UK, and in the people and institutions of public life, is at an all-time low. Recent reports from the Institute for Government, Constitution Unit and UK Governance Project have identified important, practical reforms to the current system for setting out, monitoring and enforcing standards in public life.

A new parliament offers the opportunity for a renewal of the standards which protect our democracy. This document sets out key priorities, all of which can be easily implemented straightaway.

As soon as possible after the general election, to demonstrate clearly that a page has been turned, the Prime Minister should make a statement to parliament setting out his priorities for ethics and integrity in public life, including committing to:

  1. Publish, promote and provide independent enforcement of a new Ministerial Code designed to guide the ethical conduct of ministers.
  1. Enable ministers, senior public officials and special advisers to identify, manage and report conflicts of interest, by establishing a fair and robust new system.
  1. Ensure lobbying of ministers, senior public officials and special advisers is transparent, by building a new clear, coherent and consistent system.
  1. Regulate the post-government employment and appointments of ministers, civil servants and special advisers with a more rigorously enforced, fair and transparent system.
  1. Reform the appointments process to ensure that appointments to the House of Lords are made on merit, with the purpose of enhancing the work of parliament.
  1. Ensure public appointments are rigorous, delivered through an independent, transparent and timely process.
  1. Enhance the standing of the honours system by strengthening its independence and ending the practice of prime ministerial personal patronage.
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Constitutional watchdogs: restoring the role

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Unit research shows that the public cares deeply about ethics and integrity in public life. Many constitutional and ethical watchdogs exist: there is a consensus that they need strengthening, but not on how, or to what extent. Robert Hazell and Peter Riddell have produced a new report on how to reinvigorate these watchdogs: they summarise their conclusions here.

This week we have published a new report, Trust in Public Life: Restoring the Role of Constitutional Watchdogs. It comes at an important juncture, when public trust in politicians has fallen to an all-time low. There is a wealth of evidence from survey data about the decline in trust; not least from the Constitution Unit’s own surveys, as part of our Democracy in the UK after Brexit project. Those surveys show that the public value honesty in politicians above qualities like being clever, working hard or getting things done; but only 6% of the public believe that politicians who fail to act with integrity are dealt with effectively. There is an urgent need to repair and rebuild the system for upholding standards in public life if trust in politicians is to be restored.

Constitutional watchdogs are the guardians of the system for upholding standards. The Unit has long had an interest in them, from one of our earliest reports in 1997 to one of our most recent, on parliament’s watchdogs published in 2022. This new report is complementary to the one on parliament, in studying the watchdogs which regulate the conduct of the executive. They are the Advisory Committee on Business Appointments (ACOBA); the Civil Service Commission; the Commissioner for Public Appointments (OCPA); the Committee on Standards in Public Life (CSPL); the House of Lords Appointments Commission (HOLAC); the Independent Adviser on Ministers’ Interests; and the Registrar for Consultant Lobbyists.

A series of official and non-governmental reports have all agreed that these watchdogs need strengthening; but there is less agreement on how, or by how much. That is the gap that our report is intended to fill. It sets out a range of strengthening measures, in detail, for implementation early in the next parliament. Early action is possible because most of our recommendations do not require legislation.

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Rebuilding and renewing the constitution: the executive

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A new Constitution Unit report by Meg Russell, Hannah White and Lisa James, published jointly with the Institute for Government, provides a menu of constitutional reform options ahead of political parties’ manifesto preparation. Its chapters appear on this blog throughout August, with this first excerpt identifying potential changes to the executive branch.

In recent years there have been significant concerns about the functioning of central government, including but not confined to ethical standards. Perennial tensions in the relationship between ministers and the civil service have been exacerbated by the political stresses of the Brexit process and the Covid pandemic, culminating in some politicians’ attacks on the civil service, and some high-profile removals of permanent secretaries under the Johnson and Truss premierships. Since becoming Prime Minister, Rishi Sunak has repeatedly missed opportunities to match his actions to his widely welcomed assertion on the steps of Downing Street that he wanted to lead a government of ‘integrity, professionalism and accountability’. Various episodes have also raised questions about whether the UK’s standards regulators have the status and powers required adequately to perform their roles.

Yet public opinion research by the Constitution Unit shows that people give great emphasis to the importance of honesty and integrity in their politicians, and want independent regulatory mechanisms that punish bad behaviour. Reforms in these areas could help both to increase public trust in politics and promote good governance. The Committee on Standards in Public Life (CSPL), parliamentary committees and external experts have made various recommendations for specific changes. While these are partly targeted at stabilising the situation, experts also agree that there is scope to go further to strengthen constitutional regulators, and to clarify the role, duties and accountability of the civil service. Some changes in this area lie squarely in the government’s power and could be quickly and easily implemented. Some others would require legislation, or benefit from wider consultation. There are also some larger questions which remain more controversial.

Quick wins

  • The Prime Minister should commit to treating civil servants and constitutional regulators with respect and avoiding negative public briefing against them, requiring members of the Cabinet and governing party to abide by the same principle. Impartial civil servants and other independent officials serve the public interest, and can rarely answer back. They should not be beyond constructive criticism, but undermining confidence in them risks damaging trust in the political system as a whole.
  • The Independent Adviser on Ministers’ Interests should be given the power to open his or her own investigations into alleged breaches of the Ministerial Code, and publish their findings, without requiring the Prime Minister’s authorisation to do so. This has been recommended by CSPL and numerous other bodies.
  • The UK’s other constitutional regulators should be strengthened. Partly this is a matter of legislation (discussed below) but some improvements could be made purely by ministers. For example, the recruitment processes for the heads of key watchdogs should require a majority of fully independent members on the appointments panel to minimise partisan influence over the appointment of ethical regulators.
  • Another matter that lies in the Prime Minister’s power would be to reduce ministerial turnover (‘churn’) – which has long been identified as a challenge to effective policymaking. The results would not be seen immediately, but a commitment to this principle would be welcome.
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