A new Constitution Unit report by Meg Russell, Hannah White and Lisa James, published jointly with the Institute for Government, provides a menu of constitutional reform options ahead of political parties’ manifesto preparation. Its chapters appear on this blog throughout August, with this first excerpt identifying potential changes to the executive branch.

In recent years there have been significant concerns about the functioning of central government, including but not confined to ethical standards. Perennial tensions in the relationship between ministers and the civil service have been exacerbated by the political stresses of the Brexit process and the Covid pandemic, culminating in some politicians’ attacks on the civil service, and some high-profile removals of permanent secretaries under the Johnson and Truss premierships. Since becoming Prime Minister, Rishi Sunak has repeatedly missed opportunities to match his actions to his widely welcomed assertion on the steps of Downing Street that he wanted to lead a government of ‘integrity, professionalism and accountability’. Various episodes have also raised questions about whether the UK’s standards regulators have the status and powers required adequately to perform their roles.

Yet public opinion research by the Constitution Unit shows that people give great emphasis to the importance of honesty and integrity in their politicians, and want independent regulatory mechanisms that punish bad behaviour. Reforms in these areas could help both to increase public trust in politics and promote good governance. The Committee on Standards in Public Life (CSPL), parliamentary committees and external experts have made various recommendations for specific changes. While these are partly targeted at stabilising the situation, experts also agree that there is scope to go further to strengthen constitutional regulators, and to clarify the role, duties and accountability of the civil service. Some changes in this area lie squarely in the government’s power and could be quickly and easily implemented. Some others would require legislation, or benefit from wider consultation. There are also some larger questions which remain more controversial.

Quick wins

• The Prime Minister should commit to treating civil servants and constitutional regulators with respect and avoiding negative public briefing against them, requiring members of the Cabinet and governing party to abide by the same principle. Impartial civil servants and other independent officials serve the public interest, and can rarely answer back. They should not be beyond constructive criticism, but undermining confidence in them risks damaging trust in the political system as a whole.
• The Independent Adviser on Ministers’ Interests should be given the power to open his or her own investigations into alleged breaches of the Ministerial Code, and publish their findings, without requiring the Prime Minister’s authorisation to do so. This has been recommended by CSPL and numerous other bodies.
• The UK’s other constitutional regulators should be strengthened. Partly this is a matter of legislation (discussed below) but some improvements could be made purely by ministers. For example, the recruitment processes for the heads of key watchdogs should require a majority of fully independent members on the appointments panel to minimise partisan influence over the appointment of ethical regulators.
• Another matter that lies in the Prime Minister’s power would be to reduce ministerial turnover (‘churn’) – which has long been identified as a challenge to effective policymaking. The results would not be seen immediately, but a commitment to this principle would be welcome.