The unanswered questions posed by Labour’s plan for a new Ethics and Integrity Commission 

Labour’s manifesto proposes a new independent Ethics and Integrity Commission to oversee and enforce ethical standards in government, but offers no real detail on the remit and powers of this new body, or how it will fit into the wider standards landscape. Peter Riddell outlines some of the difficulties in designing the new Commission and argues that it is crucial that the country’s constitutional watchdogs are both independent of government and accountable to parliament.  

The familiar landscape of standards in public life could be about to change. The Labour manifesto proposes to ‘establish a new independent Ethics and Integrity Commission (EIC), with its own independent chair, to ensure probity in government’. This is a major part of its aim ‘to restore confidence in government and ensure ministers are held to the highest standards’. The pressures for changes in the standards regime have only been increased by the latest scandal over allegations of insider betting by mainly Conservative candidates and party officials on the election date. 

Yet while the direction of change is clear, there is still considerable uncertainty about how the new EIC will work, what its powers and remit will be, what its relations will be both with the main constitutional watchdogs and, in particular, with the Committee on Standards in Public Life (CSPL). There is a need for much greater clarity if the new arrangements are to work. Labour has also made separate proposals on the powers of some of the regulators. 

There are all kinds of models for an EIC. Public comments by Shadow Cabinet member Nick Thomas-Symonds before the election indicate that Labour has rejected a super-regulator combining some or all of the current constitutional watchdogs, which anyway perform very different functions. This points to an umbrella organisation, which would be headed by a new independent chair. It is important for public credibility and accountability that this new chair is chosen as a result of an open public competition which could be held in the late summer or early autumn after the role and remit of the EIC have become clearer.  

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Seven steps to restore trust in government ethics  

The Constitution Unit today publishes a joint statement with the Institute for Government and UK Governance Project proposing seven steps for the new government to restore trust in the regulation of ethics in public life. This is summarised in a letter to The Times, signed by the leaders of these three groups and numerous others.

Trust in politics in the UK, and in the people and institutions of public life, is at an all-time low. Recent reports from the Institute for Government, Constitution Unit and UK Governance Project have identified important, practical reforms to the current system for setting out, monitoring and enforcing standards in public life.

A new parliament offers the opportunity for a renewal of the standards which protect our democracy. This document sets out key priorities, all of which can be easily implemented straightaway.

As soon as possible after the general election, to demonstrate clearly that a page has been turned, the Prime Minister should make a statement to parliament setting out his priorities for ethics and integrity in public life, including committing to:

  1. Publish, promote and provide independent enforcement of a new Ministerial Code designed to guide the ethical conduct of ministers.
  1. Enable ministers, senior public officials and special advisers to identify, manage and report conflicts of interest, by establishing a fair and robust new system.
  1. Ensure lobbying of ministers, senior public officials and special advisers is transparent, by building a new clear, coherent and consistent system.
  1. Regulate the post-government employment and appointments of ministers, civil servants and special advisers with a more rigorously enforced, fair and transparent system.
  1. Reform the appointments process to ensure that appointments to the House of Lords are made on merit, with the purpose of enhancing the work of parliament.
  1. Ensure public appointments are rigorous, delivered through an independent, transparent and timely process.
  1. Enhance the standing of the honours system by strengthening its independence and ending the practice of prime ministerial personal patronage.
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Constitutional watchdogs: restoring the role

Unit research shows that the public cares deeply about ethics and integrity in public life. Many constitutional and ethical watchdogs exist: there is a consensus that they need strengthening, but not on how, or to what extent. Robert Hazell and Peter Riddell have produced a new report on how to reinvigorate these watchdogs: they summarise their conclusions here.

This week we have published a new report, Trust in Public Life: Restoring the Role of Constitutional Watchdogs. It comes at an important juncture, when public trust in politicians has fallen to an all-time low. There is a wealth of evidence from survey data about the decline in trust; not least from the Constitution Unit’s own surveys, as part of our Democracy in the UK after Brexit project. Those surveys show that the public value honesty in politicians above qualities like being clever, working hard or getting things done; but only 6% of the public believe that politicians who fail to act with integrity are dealt with effectively. There is an urgent need to repair and rebuild the system for upholding standards in public life if trust in politicians is to be restored.

Constitutional watchdogs are the guardians of the system for upholding standards. The Unit has long had an interest in them, from one of our earliest reports in 1997 to one of our most recent, on parliament’s watchdogs published in 2022. This new report is complementary to the one on parliament, in studying the watchdogs which regulate the conduct of the executive. They are the Advisory Committee on Business Appointments (ACOBA); the Civil Service Commission; the Commissioner for Public Appointments (OCPA); the Committee on Standards in Public Life (CSPL); the House of Lords Appointments Commission (HOLAC); the Independent Adviser on Ministers’ Interests; and the Registrar for Consultant Lobbyists.

A series of official and non-governmental reports have all agreed that these watchdogs need strengthening; but there is less agreement on how, or by how much. That is the gap that our report is intended to fill. It sets out a range of strengthening measures, in detail, for implementation early in the next parliament. Early action is possible because most of our recommendations do not require legislation.

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Public appointments: what are they, and why do they matter?

This is the first edition of this briefing. It has since been updated. Read the most up-to-date version and other briefings on the Constitution Unit’s website.

Public appointments – senior appointments made by ministers to various public service roles – are vital to the working of government, but some have attracted controversy in recent years. Lisa James explains how public appointments work, and how they might be reformed.

Background

Public appointments – various senior appointments made by ministers to public bodies – can have a major impact on how well the public sector operates. Though the system often works smoothly, recent years have seen some high-profile controversies linked to public appointments, notably those surrounding Paul Dacre’s application to be chair of Ofcom, and the appointment of Richard Sharp as chair of the BBC. These and other cases have raised questions about whether the system now needs additional safeguards.

Why do public appointments matter?

These appointments include senior roles across a wide range of public bodies – including delivery or policy advisory bodies, regulators and funders, as well as departmental non-executive directors. They also include individual roles (for example, commissioners for victims, further education, or children).

The holders of public appointments can therefore have a major impact on the successful delivery of policy and services. A well-functioning public appointments process, which can engage and deliver the best candidates, matters for the quality of governance. This is demonstrated in countries where control over appointments has allowed backsliding leaders (i.e. those who seek to erode democracy) to install allies in key positions.

Given that the holders of public appointments are so important to the working of government, ministers understandably want to be confident that these posts are held by people who are in sympathy with their aims and approach. But it is important for public trust – and successful delivery – that appointments are also made on merit, and cronyism or patronage is guarded against.

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The report on Richard Sharp raises big constitutional questions

The Heppinstall report into Richard Sharp’s appointment as BBC chair raised questions about possible reforms and has sparked calls for more far-reaching changes. Peter Riddell surveys such proposals, arguing that the merits of different options need to be carefully weighed.

The long-awaited report by Adam Heppinstall KC into the appointment of Richard Sharp as BBC chair has not only led to Sharp’s resignation, but also triggered a debate about changing how public appointments are made to reduce or eliminate the role of the Prime Minister. This links with many of the themes I discussed in my inaugural lecture at UCL on 26 April.

Having been Commissioner for Public Appointments at the time of Sharp’s appointment, I welcomed the setting up of the Heppinstall inquiry following the disclosure in January that Sharp had been involved – on his own account in a very limited way – in previously secret discussions about arranging financial support for Boris Johnson, the then Prime Minister, in autumn 2020 at the same time as he was applying to become BBC chair.

Heppinstall concluded that the original appointment process had been ‘good and thorough’ but that Sharp had breached the government’s Governance Code for Public Appointments by not disclosing to the advisory interview panel that he had met Johnson to inform him of his application and that he was going to meet Simon Case, the Cabinet Secretary, to attempt to introduce him to someone (Sam Blyth, a distant cousin of Johnson) who might assist the Prime Minister with his personal finances.  This created a potential conflict of interest and the risk of a perception that Sharp would not be independent from Johnson. The Sharp/Case meeting – and differences about what was said and recorded – has attracted considerable attention but is largely irrelevant, since Case never met nor contacted Blyth.

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