Labour’s manifesto proposes a new independent Ethics and Integrity Commission to oversee and enforce ethical standards in government, but offers no real detail on the remit and powers of this new body, or how it will fit into the wider standards landscape. Peter Riddell outlines some of the difficulties in designing the new Commission and argues that it is crucial that the country’s constitutional watchdogs are both independent of government and accountable to parliament.  

The familiar landscape of standards in public life could be about to change. The Labour manifesto proposes to ‘establish a new independent Ethics and Integrity Commission (EIC), with its own independent chair, to ensure probity in government’. This is a major part of its aim ‘to restore confidence in government and ensure ministers are held to the highest standards’. The pressures for changes in the standards regime have only been increased by the latest scandal over allegations of insider betting by mainly Conservative candidates and party officials on the election date. 

Yet while the direction of change is clear, there is still considerable uncertainty about how the new EIC will work, what its powers and remit will be, what its relations will be both with the main constitutional watchdogs and, in particular, with the Committee on Standards in Public Life (CSPL). There is a need for much greater clarity if the new arrangements are to work. Labour has also made separate proposals on the powers of some of the regulators. 

There are all kinds of models for an EIC. Public comments by Shadow Cabinet member Nick Thomas-Symonds before the election indicate that Labour has rejected a super-regulator combining some or all of the current constitutional watchdogs, which anyway perform very different functions. This points to an umbrella organisation, which would be headed by a new independent chair. It is important for public credibility and accountability that this new chair is chosen as a result of an open public competition which could be held in the late summer or early autumn after the role and remit of the EIC have become clearer.  

An umbrella body rather than a super-regulator could be like a college of cardinals; its other members being the chairs of the watchdogs – namely the Advisory Committee on Business Appointments, the Civil Service Commission, the Commissioner for Public Appointments, the House of Lords Appointments Commission and the Registrar of Consultant Lobbyists, with the involvement of the Independent Adviser on Ministers’ Interests and the Committee on Standards in Public Life to be decided. These are the executive regulators appointed by the government and overseeing the actions of ministers and officials rather than those bodies covering the actions of MPs and peers. This is an important constitutional distinction given the distinct prerogatives of the executive and the legislature, though all such bodies should have enhanced accountability to parliament. 

Crucially, if – in what appears to be Labour’s view – the EIC does not take over the powers of the existing regulators, it could have a more prominent role as a champion for standards generally across the public sector as well as power to convene and initiate debate. The EIC could also review the effectiveness and powers of the regulators. But a role as both a standards champion and as a reviewer raises tricky questions of relations between the EIC and its member bodies which value their independent standing. 

The EIC could act as a common employer of the current very small staffs of the individual regulators, handling budgetary and personnel issues. That could make it more independent of the Cabinet Office which is, at present, the sponsoring department for the constitutional watchdogs and has a big say on staffing and budgetary matters. There is a big question of how the Civil Service Commission, the largest of the existing bodies in terms of staff numbers, would operate, especially if it is given an enhanced role in relation to the civil service. 

The trickiest question is relations with CSPL which for nearly 30 years has produced important and highly influential reports on the standards landscape. It is currently looking at accountability within public bodies after a recent series of scandals. Thomas-Symonds has said that Labour values the CSPL. But as Professor Robert Hazell and I argued in our March 2024 report, Trust in Public Life- Restoring the Role of Constitutional Watchdogs, there are strong doubts about whether there is room for two umbrella bodies. If you try to list the possible functions of the EIC and the current ones of CSPL in championing high standards in public life and in examining systemic problems, there is a big overlap and risk of duplication. One option, as we advocated in our report, is for CSPL to be subsumed into the EIC but, as now, having no regulatory functions. The board of the new body could have a mixed composition including both existing members with no interests like the CSPL and the regulators. 

One problem which needs to be addressed is the convening function. At present, the chair of CSPL informally brings together a much wider range of regulators, not only the core executive ones but also the various parliamentary standards ones and bodies like the Electoral Commission and the Statistics Authority, as a means of comparing experiences and allowing the CSPL to canvas views. Any new arrangements need to allow for such discussions without interfering with separate constitutional accountabilities. 

The Labour manifesto has also made proposals for the powers of individual regulators. These are separate from the proposed EIC but could be announced before, and while, it is set up. For instance, the manifesto proposal to give ‘the Independent Adviser on Ministerial Interests [sic] the powers to start investigations into misconduct and ensure they have access to the evidence they need’, can be introduced quickly. A difficult question is who appoints the Adviser and to whom are they accountable? Should Parliament have a role? The Adviser has been seen as having a very personal relationship with the Prime Minister in both appointment and accountability. Key tests here will be whether the Independent Adviser is chosen after an open competition –  rather than subject to extensive interviews as the current incumbent was – and to pre, as opposed to post, appointment hearing by a Commons committee. Also, given the Independent Adviser’s special position, should he be part of the EIC, or at one remove? 

There is no commitment in the manifesto to introduce primary legislation in this area in the first session of the parliament— as distinct from a bill on membership of the House of Lords. The necessary changes can be achieved by use of the executive’s prerogative powers—in effect by setting new terms of reference in a letter to the regulators or an announcement in the Commons early in the parliament’s life. There are advantages here in terms of speed and flexibility, but ruling out legislation could be a mistake in the longer term. It is no good saying that as a government ministers will respect the independence of the standards regulators so legislation is unnecessary. There is ample recent evidence of attempts to undermine them. There is therefore a strong case for early legislation to underpin the independence of the regulators in statute, even if, at present, it is a largely symbolic backstop. 

At minimum, the proposals for the EIC and for strengthening the role and powers of the constitutional watchdogs should be brought together in an early statement in the Commons by the Prime Minister— linked perhaps to the publication of a new Ministerial Code, which happens at the start of every parliament. This would signal a fresh start. 

These changes would be incremental rather than radical, but would nonetheless represent an important step towards increasing the independence of the constitutional watchdogs. That would need to be accompanied by ensuring they are fully and regularly accountable to parliament.  

This is the latest in a series of posts that discuss the 2024 general election and the past 14 years of Conservative government Sign up via the box in the left-hand sidebar to receive email notifications when a new post goes live. 

About the author 

Sir Peter Riddell is an Honorary Professor at the Constitution Unit and a former Commissioner for Public Appointments and former Director of the Institute for Government.