Tag Archives: clerk of the commons

The House of Commons row over opposition day amendments: procedural background and implications

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Last week’s opposition day debate in the House of Commons about Gaza and Israel was overshadowed by a bitter procedural row over the Speaker’s selection of amendments. But the rules governing opposition days – and their role in allowing these arguments – are not straightforward. Tom Fleming discusses the procedural background and implications.

The background

Last week saw a House of Commons debate about a ceasefire in Gaza and Israel overshadowed by a bad-tempered row about the Speaker, Lindsay Hoyle, selecting an amendment from the Labour Party.

This debate came on an ‘opposition day’. There are 20 such days in each parliamentary session, when MPs can debate motions put forward by opposition parties rather than by the government. Of these, 17 are allocated to the largest opposition party in the Commons (currently Labour), and three to the next-largest, which is currently the Scottish National Party (SNP). Last Wednesday’s debate was on an SNP motion calling for ‘an immediate ceasefire in Gaza and Israel’.

Usually when the House debates motions, MPs can propose amendments to them in advance, and the Speaker selects which of those amendments will be debated. MPs then vote on the selected amendments before voting on the final motion (incorporating any successful amendments).

If this usual practice were followed on opposition days, it could mean opposition parties’ proposals regularly not getting voted on. This is because any government amendment is highly likely to pass, after which MPs would only be able to vote on the amended motion, not the original proposal. In acknowledgement of this, government amendments on opposition days are voted on after the main motion. In contrast, any non-government amendment selected would be voted on before the main motion. But it is a long-established convention that when a government amendment has been selected, no further amendments are chosen.

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The personal side of parliamentary reform

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The view that Westminster is not functioning as it should, and that reform would be beneficial, has become increasingly widespread in recent years. Greg Power argues that it is not sufficient to focus on technical details and process: reform efforts must instead understand what politicians believe to be important and offer them ways of dealing with those issues better.

There have been a number of good books in the last couple of years about what is wrong with Westminster and what needs to change. They all set out a compelling case and numerous ideas for reform. But most tend to focus more on the ‘why’ and the ‘what’, than on the ‘how’. There remains very little on which reformers can draw as to how we might engineer these sorts of sensible changes and how parliaments actually get overhauled.

This question of how to reform complex parliamentary institutions is at the heart of my new book, Inside the Political Mind, which draws partly on my own personal experience of working on such change: initially at Westminster as a Special Adviser to successive Leaders of the Commons, Robin Cook and Peter Hain, and since 2005 with parliaments and MPs in more than 60 countries around the world.

Every one of those institutions is different, and they each have their own peculiar problems. But there are common themes to the challenge of reform everywhere. And one of them is that parliamentary reform is hard. Really hard.

There are three standout reasons for this – all to do with the very way in which parliaments are composed and constructed.

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How much control should there be over how MPs do their job?

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In the second of a two-part series, former senior House of Commons official David Natzler discusses whether MPs should be subject to a minimum attendance requirement, and their role as constituency caseworkers. He concludes that an objective measure of individual MPs’ constituency activity and work, and some agreed minimum standards, would be useful, but that the right of MPs to determine for themselves how to do their job should be preserved.

In the first blog in this series, I set out the background to the recent resignation of Nadine Dorries and suggested that it raised some general issues of importance. In that post, I discussed the process of appointing MPs to the House of Lords, and on the process of resignation, suggesting that sitting members of the Commons should not be eligible for peerages, and that the process of resignation should be brought in line with prevailing norms, involving a simple letter of resignation to the Speaker or Clerk of the Commons. In this post I look at the issue of MPs’ attendance and at the performance of their constituency role.

Attendance

There was criticism of Nadine Dorries for not having spoken in the Commons chamber for around a year, since 7 July 2022 when she answered questions in the Commons as Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport. She was also criticised for not tabling a written question since 20 December 2017 (although between July 2019 and September 2022, she was a minister, and therefore not able to table questions) and for not having voted since 26 April 2023.

MPs are not formally obliged to attend the House of Commons. Those such as Sinn Féin MPs who decline to take the oath or affirmation of allegiance after their election may indeed never do so during their time as MPs. As Erskine May puts it: ‘On ordinary occasions, the attendance of Members in Parliament is not enforced by either House’.

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